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T his article proposes a rule to distinguish between those defense
decisions properly belonging to criminal defendants and those
properly belonging to their lawyers. In considering how to allocate defense
decisions, one finds fundamental values in conflict. Does the respect that a
free society must show for the dignity and autonomy of individuals
command allocation of defense decisions to defendants? Or does society's
commitment to justice through the adversary process command allocation
of defense decisions to lawyers? The conflicting demands of dignity and
justice in the often high-stakes setting of criminal prosecutions challenge
the theoretical coherence of the law. The following case illustrates this
painful dilemma.
James Rivers was charged with murder in the beating death of his male
roommate. The victim was killed in the apartment the two shared. By the
time the body was discovered, Rivers had disappeared. The police focused
their investigation on Rivers and found witnesses who gave incriminating
descriptions of Rivers's behavior around the presumed time of the killing.
A search of the apartment disclosed further evidence implicating Rivers.
After his arrest in a distant city, Rivers made incriminating statements to the
police.
The prosecution charged Rivers with first-degree murder. In the course
of preparing the case, defense counsel found persuasive evidence that
Rivers and the victim had a homosexual relationship. After a thorough
*B.A., Carleton College, M.A.L.D., Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Tufts
University, J.D., Harvard Law School. I thank Kimberly Kirkland, Landya McCafferty,
David Rothstein, Jeffrey Roy, Mitchell Simon, Sophie Sparrow, and Carol Steiker for their
careful reading and insightful comments on earlier drafts of this article. Sarah Cure and
Rebecca McKinnon provided invaluable research assistance. My greatest debt of gratitude
is owed to my colleagues and clients at the Southern Center for Human Rights and at the
New Hampshire Public Defender Program, from whom I have learned so much about these
difficult issues.
'I invented many of the details and all of the names in the scenario, building on an
actual case known to me through a colleague.
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investigation, counsel believed Rivers had killed the victim during an
argument about their relationship, under circumstances possibly supporting
a claim of self-defense or, more plausibly, a claim that the killing
constituted second-degree murder or manslaughter. Under the law of the
jurisdiction, first-degree murder carried a mandatory sentence of life
imprisonment without possibility of parole. Second-degree murder was
punishable by a term of years, up to a maximum sentence of life
imprisonment with the possibility of parole. Manslaughter carried a
maximum term of thirty years and a minimum term of probation.
Rivers adamantly resisted the presentation of any defense requiring the
revelation of his homosexual conduct. Instead, he demanded that the
defense argue that someone else killed the victim. Rivers and his counsel
discussed the matter at great length over the course of many months. In
those discussions, Rivers consistently denied a homosexual orientation, and
denied that his relationship with the victim ever had a sexual component.
Sometimes he refused to talk to counsel about the dilemma, apparently
finding the topic so embarrassing that discussing it was intolerable, even in
the privacy of the jail's attorney visiting room. When he could be induced
to consider the question from a strictly tactical point ofview, Rivers insisted
that the "gay defense" would hurt his cause with the jurors even -indeed,
especially-if they believed it. Life had taught him, said Rivers, that the
potential jurors in his community harbored such prejudice against
homosexuals that they would convict him for that reason alone if they
believed him gay.
In short, Rivers opposed counsel's proposed defense, claiming that it
would sacrifice truth, dignity, and tactical advantage. Counsel, mindful of
the severe punishment for first-degree murder and of the overwhelming
evidence of Rivers's involvement, believed the proposed defense both true
and tactically advantageous. As for Rivers's dignity, counsel came to
appreciate the depth of his client's opposition to the gay defense, but
wondered what part of Rivers's dignity would survive an absurd defense,
to say nothing of the lifetime of imprisonment in a maximum security
penitentiary that would surely follow.
Rivers refused to relent. Understanding the law to give the final
decision to the defendant, counsel reluctantly followed Rivers's wishes and
asserted the hopeless defense that another person had killed the victim. To
avoid disclosing Rivers's homosexual conduct, counsel neither raised
self-defense nor introduced evidence that would have supported jury
instructions on second-degree murder and manslaughter. The jury
convicted Rivers as charged and the court sentenced him to life
imprisonment without parole.
Weighty interests were at stake in this defense decision. Rivers's
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personal interest in the manner of his defense and in the outcome of his trial
favored allocating the decision to him. The community's interest in the
sound functioning of the adversary system on which we rely to guarantee,
as far as humanly possible, the accuracy of criminal verdicts favored
allocating the decision to the lawyer. The dilemma poses two distinct
choices. First, the law must choose whether to allocate ultimate control over
such defense decisions to the defendant or to the lawyer. Second, if the law
entrusts such decisions to lawyers, should the lawyer present the best
defense from the perspective of minimizing sentencing consequences, or
should the lawyer weaken the defense out of respect for the defendant's
attitudes and beliefs?
While recognizing the close relationship between the law's choice and
the lawyer's choice, this article offers an argument principally relating to
the former. As for the lawyer's choice, in making decisions committed to
their discretion, lawyers should carefully consider the defendant's broader
interests, and allow those interests to control in the appropriate case, even
at the cost of weakening the defense. I leave for another day the difficult
and enormously fact-sensitive question of what constitutes "the appropriate
case."
As for the law's choice, courts should give represented criminal
defendants the right to make decisions opposed by counsel in only two
circumstances. First, a defendant may, by deciding how to plead and
whether to appeal, insist upon or waive the adjudication of charges in the
adversary process. Second, a defendant may, by deciding whether to appear
at trial and whether to testify, control his personal participation in a trial.
But in all other circumstances, a represented defendant should not be able
to undermine the operation of the adversary process by insisting upon a
course of action opposed by defense counsel. In sum, nearly all decisions
should be committed to the discretion of lawyers.
In proposing that rule, I do not forget the imperfections of lawyers, but
take comfort in the possibility of correction through claims of ineffective
assistance of counsel. The defendant has a fundamental dignity interest in
controlling self-presentation at trial, but that interest is sufficiently
vindicated by the defendant's control over decisions about whether to attend
trial and whether to testify. I find less force in the defendant's interest in
autonomy-in influencing the outcome of trial. For, regardless of the
allocation of defense decisions, the ultimate arbiters of the defendant's fate
are the judge and the jury, not the defendant or the defense lawyer. Finally,
the law should allocate most decisions to lawyers because the community,
which after a criminal conviction claims the right to take the defendant's
life or liberty, has a great interest in the justice of its claim. Many besides
the defendant suffer when courts wrongfully convict or condemn, and our
2004-20051
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adversary system relies on the presentation of the best defense to avoid
those enormous, irrevocable errors.
Part I examines the theories courts and commentators have advanced to
justify or explain a preferred allocation of the power to decide. No theory
adequately explains the present allocation because the current law
inconsistently allocates decisions. Courts in the same jurisdiction often
reach different conclusions about the allocation ofa particular decision, and
appellate courts have often failed to give consistent guidance to lower
courts. Only with respect to the allocation of a few decisions does one find
a stable consensus. The prevailing allocation also tends to create, rather than
solve, problems by giving some decisions to one actor while giving
intrinsically related decisions to the other.
Part II turns from theory to practice by describing how courts currently
allocate decision-making authority between defendant and defense counsel.
While courts draw different lines between the prerogatives of counsel and
those of the defendant, most courts give represented defendants the power
to make more decisions than the proposed rule would allow.
Part III evaluates the three most important arguments for ceding control
over decisions to defendants. The first, here called the "autonomy
intuition," proposes that control over contested decisions follows jeopardy.
Control properly belongs to the defendant because it is the defendant's life
or freedom, and not the lawyer's, that is at stake. The second, referred to
here as the "dignity intuition," proposes that control belongs to the
defendant because the law should neither silence people nor prevent them
from choosing the manner of their own defense. The third, here called the
"reliability intuition," mounts a more direct attack upon the argument
favoring lawyer decisions by suggesting that the intervention of
lawyers-at least when the intervention works against the will of the
defendant-undermines, rather than advances, the truth-seeking function
of trial. For the reasons stated in Part III, these three intuitions justify
allocating to defendants decisions about whether to invoke the adversary
process and about the degree of the defendant's personal participation in the
trial. However, the goal of minimizing the risk of wrong results demands
allocation of other decisions to lawyers.
Part IV explores two fundamental premises justifying committing
decisions to the discretion of defense counsel. The first proposes that the
central purpose of criminal trials is to investigate the truth of the charge.
The second premise proposes that, in general, lawyers know the best course
of defense better than do defendants. This goal of consistency between trial
result and truth supports the rule committing most defense decisions to
lawyers.
Before beginning, I note that many important questions about the
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lawyer-client relationship lie outside the scope of this article. How may the
lawyer best win the client's trust and confidence? How should the lawyer
communicate bad news about the case? How much should the lawyer
involve the client in the decision making process? How can the lawyer
contribute to good decision making by the client? This article does not
address those matters. Instead, it seeks to answer the following question: in
the event of irreconcilable disagreement between lawyer and client about
a defense decision, who gets the final word?
One category of related topics involves a lawyer's professional ethical
responsibilities. Unquestionably, a lawyer has an obligation to consult with
a client,2 to meet with the client as necessary to the investigation of the
defense,3 and to keep the client informed about developments in the case.4
Some rules ofprofessional responsibility mandate that the lawyer follow the
client's wishes in certain instances, even when those wishes define a course
of action the lawyer believes detrimental to the case.5 To the extent that the
canons of professional responsibility conflict with the rule proposed in this
article, those canons, and not the rule, should yield for all the reasons set out
below.'
Another set of related topics involves the lawyer's tactical obligation
to build a good working relationship with the defendant.7 A lawyer who
loses the defendant's trust risks not obtaining important information from
the defendant, and risks losing the confidence of witnesses who
communicate with the defendant and adopt the defendant's attitudes. In
order to gain the client's confidence, the lawyer must invite discussion
about important decisions in the case, explaining his views about those
decisions and giving honest consideration to the defendant's views. Often,
the wise lawyer will follow the course preferred by the defendant, even
though the lawyer would not do so absent the defendant's preference. So
great is the value of a good lawyer-client relationship to the ultimate goals
2 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.4(b) (2003).
3 See id. at R. 1. 1 cmt. s.
4 Id. at R. 1.4(a).
'E.g., id. at R. 1.2(a).
6 Cf Martin Sabelli & Stacey Leyton, Train Wrecks and Freeway Crashes: An
Argumentfor Fairness and Against Self Representation in the Criminal Justice System, 91
J. CRtM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 161, 217 (2000) (recommending modification of the ethical
rules to clearly allocate authority to present evidence of mental illness to defense counsel,
regardless of the defendant's wishes).
'See Rodney J. Uphoff & Peter B. Wood, The Allocation ofDecisionmaking Between
Defense Counsel and Criminal Defendant: An Empirical Study of Attorney-Client
Decisionmaking, 47 U. KAN. L. REv. 1, 32-51 (1998) (reporting empirical research about
the extent to which public defenders actually involve clients in decision making).
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of representation, and so great are the uncertainties about which course best
serves those goals, that a defense lawyer should often take actions urged by
the client, but regarded in themselves by the lawyer as errors.8 However,
criminal defendants sometimes demand, after every effort at persuasion and
discussion has failed, that their lawyers take actions that those lawyers
believe will devastate the defense case. It is that circumstance-the
occurrence of irreconcilable differences about critical decisions-that this
article contemplates.
A third topic related to the focus of this article, but sufficiently distinct
to require separate treatment, involves the status of the rule of Faretta v.
California.9 In Faretta, the Supreme Court held that criminal defendants,
upon satisfying the trial court that they possess a minimum degree of
competence, have a constitutional right to refuse legal representation and
to represent themselves.1" This article focuses on the situation of defendants
who wish to avail themselves of legal representation but desire to control
the actions of their lawyers. When a defendant elects self representation, the
problem of conflict between lawyer and client disappears. I do not doubt
that a rule ceding control over most decisions to lawyers may motivate more
defendants to proceed without counsel, so long as that option remains
available to them. The argument that the law should assign more decisions
to lawyers, despite the existence of the Faretta option, thus depends on
certain empirical assumptions.
First, irreconcilable lawyer-client disagreements happen relatively
frequently, as evidenced by the sheer number of cases in which appellate
courts have confronted the problem, many of which are cited in this article.
The problem arises more often in serious cases because the defense must
make a greater number of decisions. The problem also tends to arise when
defendants distrust their lawyers, a misfortune that occurs either because the
' See Rodney J Uphoff, Who Should Control the Decision to Call a Witness:
Respecting a Criminal Defendant's Tactical Choices, 68 U. CIN. L. REV. 763, 799 (2000)
(setting out four factors for lawyers to consider in deciding whether to override a client's
preference: "the client's capacity for making an informed choice, the reasons for the client's
proposed choice, the degree of harm facing the client, and the likelihood of that harm").
9 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
1 Id. at 835-36.
" To some extent, defendants already fire, or at least attempt to fire, their lawyers after
disagreements about representation. E.g., United States v. Young, 482 F.2d 993,994-95 (5th
Cir. 1973); United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 984 (2d Cir. 1972); United States ex rel.
Higgins v. Fay, 364 F.2d 219 (2d Cir. 1966); United States v. Williams, 618 F. Supp. 1419
(D. Va. 1985), arid, 785 F.2d 306 (4th Cir. 1986); People v. Lara, 103 Cal. Rptr. 2d 201
(Cal. Ct. App. 2001); Pacheco v. State, 697 So. 2d 1288 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1997); State v.
Ayer, 834 A.2d 277 (N.H. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1668 (2004).
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lawyer performs or communicates poorly, or because the defendant is
disinclined to trust the lawyer.
Second, I assume that assigning more decisions to lawyers will not
induce substantially more defendants to elect self representation, although
only careful empirical research could definitively confirm or refute that
assumption. I suspect that most defendants who choose self representation
do not carefully measure the risks of that choice; they regard any substantial
sharing of authority with lawyers as intolerable. Defendants sensitive to the
risks of self representation will not choose that option.
Furthermore, Faretta has, in recent years, been refined 12 and even
criticized,13 and its rule recently faced a celebrated challenger. Kenneth
Starr, former solicitor general, federal judge, and independent prosecutor,
recently filed a petition for certiorari asking the Supreme Court to overrule
Faretta."4 The Court denied the writ, 5 but there is no reason to think that
the controversy about Faretta will end.
A fourth related topic involves the special problem presented by
defendants with impairments substantial enough to render them
incompetent. Others have written about that special case,16 so it is not given
much consideration here. Instead, this article contemplates a defendant who
is competent under prevailing legal standards, or even under alternative
formulations of competency advanced by commentators. 7 Moreover,
2 E.g., United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097, 1102 (9th Cir. 1999) (Reinhardt, J.,
concurrng) (finding that the right to self representation must yield when it infringes upon
the right to fair trial expressly provided in the Constitution); People v. Dent, 65 P.3d 1286,
1293 (Cal. 2003) (Chin, J., concurring) ("There is much to be said for modifying Faretta,
at least in capital cases."); People v. Clark, 833 P.2d 561, 631 (Cal. 1992) (Mosk, J.,
dissenting) (criticizing the right of self representation in capital cases); John F. Decker, The
Sixth Amendment Right to Shoot Oneself in the Foot: An Assessment of the Guarantee of Self
Representation Twenty YearsAfter Faretta, 6 SETON HALL CONST. L.J. 483,488-90,596-98
(1996); Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 226-29.
3 E.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152 (2000) (finding no constitutional
right of self representation on appeal); McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 183-85 (1984)
(rejecting pro se defendant's claim that overzealous counsel violated his right to self
representation).
" Egwaoje v. United States, 335 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003),petitionfor cert.filed, No.
03-69, 2003 WL 22697568 (U.S. Nov. 6, 2003).
15 Egwaoje v. United States, 335 F.3d 579 (7th Cir. 2003), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1712
(2004).
16 E.g., Rodney J. Uphoff, The Role of the Criminal Defense Lawyer in Representing
the Mentally Impaired Defendant: Zealous Advocate or Officer of the Court?, 1988 WiS. L.
REv. 65 (1988).
"E.g., Richard J. Bonnie, The Dignity of the Condemned, 74 VA. L. REv. 1363, 1389
(1988) (stating that a trial court's determination that defendant's preference for the death
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because incompetence further supports the allocation of decision-making
authority that this article already recommends, so as not to unfairly
strengthen the argument by positing the special case of an incompetent
defendant, I generally assume that the irreconcilable dispute arises between
a lawyer and a competent client-defendant.
The final related topic not covered herein involves the problem of
ineffective assistance of counsel. We read with distressing frequency of
lawyers who disgrace themselves and the defense bar by sleeping during
their clients' capital murder trials, 8 by appearing drunk in court, 9 or
simply by preparing and performing poorly by reason of incompetence,
underfunding, or overwork.2 ° Though such stories must give pause to those
who propose that lawyers should control most defense decisions, several
considerations justify proceeding with the argument.
First, no one could seriously propose allocation of decisions to
defendants as a remedy for the problem of ineffective assistance of counsel.
No one with any exposure to the criminal defense system could seriously
entertain the argument that criminal defendants, as a class, exercise better
judgment than criminal defense lawyers.2' Indeed, if that supposition were
correct, criminal defense lawyers, as a class, would have little reason to
exist. The solution to the problem of ineffective assistance of counsel
involves a reconsideration of the rules of Strickland v. Washington22 and
penalty is rational should be binding in future litigation).
, E.g., Burdine v. Johnson, 262 F.3d 336, 338, 344, 349 (5th Cir. 2001) (finding that
a defendant's Sixth Amendment right to counsel was violated when his attorney slept
through a significant portion of his capital murder trial).
'9 E.g., In re Seely, 427 N.E.2d 879, 879-80 (Ind. 1981) (suspending attorney who
appeared approximately one hour late for trial in an intoxicated state).
20 E.g., Williamson v. Ward, 110 F.3d 1508, 1521-23 (10th Cir. 1997) (overturning
capital conviction on habeas grounds because appointed counsel, who received no funding
for expert or investigative services and was paid the statutory maximum of $3200, failed to
investigate a videotaped statement of another person confessing to the crime); Groseclose
v. Bell, 130 F.3d 1161, 1169-70 (6th Cir. 1997) (overturning capital conviction on habeas
grounds because counsel failed to call any witnesses, did not cross-examine more than half
of the prosecution's witnesses, and made only one objection); Douglas W. Vick, Poorhouse
Justice: Underfunded Indigent Defense Services and Arbitrarv Death Sentences, 43 BUFF.
L. REv. 329, 334, 381-93 (1995).
21 See H. Richard Uviller, Calling the Shots: The Allocation of Choice Between the
Accused and Counsel in the Defense of a Criminal Case, 52 RUTGERS L. REV. 719, 725
(2000) ("[Bly and large, the judgment of the lawyer is greatly superior to the unrealistic
projections of the person in peril.").
22 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668 (1984).
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United States v. Cronic.23 However, that must remain the subject of another
article.24 Certainly, one advantage of ceding control of almost all decisions
to lawyers, as this article recommends, is to afford courts an opportunity to
review the effect of bad decisions on the fundamental justice of the criminal
process. There currently exists no mechanism for reviewing the negative
effects caused by bad choices made by pro se defendants or by those
defendants who, although represented by counsel, insist on following an
unwise course of action against counsel's advice."
I. PREVALENT THEORIES OF THE ALLOCATION OF DEFENSE DECISIONS
Various theories have been suggested to justify, or at least describe, the
current allocation of criminal defense decisions. Those theories take three
forms. The first kind of theory makes the relative importance ofthe decision
in question the defining criterion. For example, some courts have ruled that
defendants must have the final say in matters of fundamental26 or
constitutional27 scope. The second type of theory allocates decisions
according to the distinct functions of lawyer and client in the adversary
process. Defendants retain the power to make decisions about the "ends" of
the representation, while lawyers may make decisions regarding the
"means" for achieving those ends.2" The third kind of theory begins by
justifying a presumption in favor of either the defendant2 9 or the defense
lawyer,3" and permits only limited exceptions to that rule, for which specific
23 United States v. Cronic, 466 U.S. 648 (1984).
24 See William S. Geimer, A Decade of Strickland's Tin Horn: Doctrinal and Practical
Undermining of the Right to Counsel, 4 WM. & MARY BILL Rrs. J. 91 (1995), for a
discussion of the manner in which the United States Supreme Court has undermined the
right of an accused to counsel.
"' See Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) ("[A] defendant who elects to
represent himself cannot thereafter complain that the quality of his own defense amounted
to a denial of 'effective assistance of counsel"'); People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396,405 (Cal.
1985) ("When a defendant insists on a course of action despite his counsel's contrary
warning and advice, he may not later complain that his counsel provided ineffective
assistance by complying with his wishes."); Uphoff, supra note 8, at 792 n.156 (discussing
cases in which courts have rejected claims of ineffective assistance where evidence showed
that the lawyer allowed the client to make a decision that the lawyer could have made
against the client's preference).
26 See infra Part I.A.2.
27 See infra Part I.A. 1.
21 See infra Part I.B.
29 See infra Part I.C. I.




No theory describes the existing allocation of the power to decide
particularly well. Indeed, no theory could do so; as the case law review in
Part II shows, courts have not consistently allocated the power to decide.
The most persuasive description of the present disordered allocation appears
in LaFave, Israel, and King's influential treatise on criminal procedure."
After surveying the law and discovering no coherent principle to account
for the present allocation,32 the treatise's authors conclude that a balance of
miscellaneous factors best predicts courts' allocation rulings.3 Those
factors include, among others: "(1) the objective of avoiding disruption of
the litigation process; (2) the distinction between objectives
and means; (3) the 'inherently personal character' of the particular decision;
and (4) the need to foster a strong defense bar. 34
Theories based on criteria of importance or function suffer an additional
flaw beyond their inability to justify or explain the present state of the law.
For reasons set forth below, those theories inevitably fail to provide useful
guidance to judges in deciding hard questions of allocation. Therefore, the
only useful allocation theories are those that first identify either the lawyer
or the defendant as the presumptive decision maker, and then provide
principled and specific justifications for any departures from that
presumption. The succeeding sections of this article discuss the reasons
supporting the two presumption-based theories. In the end, I recommend
assigning most decisions to lawyers, but find justifications for two sound
departures from that assignment.
A. Criteria of Importance
Theories using a criterion of importance to determine decision
allocation focus on the nature of the decision. Does that decision implicate
constitutional rights? 5 Does it implicate fundamental rights?36 These
theories seek to find some inherent characteristic in a particular decision
31 WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL PROCEDURE § 11.6 (3d ed. 2000).
32 See id. at 595.
33 Id.
" Id. at 596. See also Welsh S. White, Federal Habeas Corpus: The Impact of the
Failure toAssert a Constitutional Claim at Trial, 58 VA. L. REV. 67, 71-72 (1972) (noting
the test which requires evaluation of the aforementioned factors and diagnosing its flaws).
3 See infra Part I.A. 1.
3 See infra Part I.A.2.
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and then allocate the decision accordingly.
1. Constitutional Rights Theory
Constitutional rights theory holds that only the defendant may waive
constitutional rights,37 but the power to decide all other matters belongs to
defense counsel. Some Supreme Court Justices have expressed support for
this theory.3"
At root, the theory reflects the belief that, because the defendant is the
party personally at risk, respect for the defendant's dignity and autonomy
requires that the defendant control matters of constitutional significance
within the potentially life-altering crisis of a criminal trial. 39 Justice
Brennan, in Faretta, forcefully stated the relevant intuition:
[t]o force a lawyer on a defendant can only lead him to believe that the
law contrives against him. Moreover, it is not inconceivable that in some
rare instances, the defendant might in fact present his case more
effectively by conducting his own defense. Personal liberties are not
rooted in the law of averages. The right to defend is personal. The
defendant, and not his lawyer or the State, will bear the personal
consequences of a conviction. It is the defendant, therefore, who must be
free personally to decide whether in his particular case counsel is to his
advantage. And although he may conduct his own defense ultimately to
his own detriment, his choice must be honored out of "that respect for the
individual which is the lifeblood of the law.'
40
When discussing arguments for making the defendant the presumptive
31 See Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-9 (1966) (stating that only the defendant may
waive his constitutional rights); Townsend v. Superior Court, 543 P.2d 619,624 (Cal. 1975)
(noting that counsel may not waive a defendant's constitutional right to a speedy trial over
the defendant's objection).
3 See, e.g., Estelle v. Williams, 425 U.S. 501, 527 (1976) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(stating that Fay v. Noia, 372 U.S. 391,439 (1963), "required that the decision not to assert
most constitutional rights be the informed choice of the accused himself rather than of his
counsel").
39 See Michael Mello, The Non-Trial of the Century: Representations of the
Unabomber, 24 VT. L. REV. 417, 507-08, 511-14 (2000) (arguing that the use of the mental
defect defense by Theodore Kaczynski's lawyers, over his objection, violated Kaczynski's
constitutional rights and denied him basic human dignity and autonomy).
40 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975) (quoting Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S.
337, 350-351 (1970) (Brennan, J., concurring)).
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decision maker, this article examines the considerations of dignity and
autonomy that support the assignment of decisions to defendants.4" Here,
the concepts of "fundamental" and/or "constitutional" rights give those
considerations practical application in deciding which specific decisions
should belong to defendants.
Several features of the constitutional rights theory deserve notice. First,
if rigorously applied, the theory would radically alter present judicial
practice with respect to decision allocation. A great many decisions now
generally assigned to lawyers would have to be reassigned to defendants.
For example, the Sixth Amendment guarantees criminal defendants the right
to confront prosecution witnesses.42 Courts have long understood this right
to include the right to cross-examine witnesses.43 Thus, a defendant who
does not cross-examine a prosecution witness thereby waives the
constitutional right of cross-examination. Nevertheless, decisions about
whether and how to examine adverse witnesses generally fall within the
province of the lawyer."
In fact, the pervasive constitutionalization of criminal procedure over
the last fifty years has given a great many trial decisions constitutional
roots. Many elements of a trial, including decisions about peremptory
challenges in jury selection," whether to call certain witnesses to testify,"
whether to appeal the erroneous admission of expert testimony, 47challenges
41 See infra Part 111.
42 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right... to be confronted with the witnesses against him....").
43See, e.g., Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 3-4 (1996) (noting that the "confrontation
guarantee of the Sixth Amendment [includes] the right of cross-examination");
Pennsylvania v. Ritchie, 480 U.S. 39, 51 (1987) ("The Confrontation Clause provides two
types of protections for a criminal defendant: the right physically to face those who testify
against him, and the right to conduct cross-examination.").
4See infra Part II.B.3.
4 See J.E.B. v. Alabama ex rel. T.B., 511 U.S. 127, 146 (1994); Powers v. Ohio, 499
U.S. 400,404, 415-16 (1991); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 84 (1986).
"See Morgan v. United States, 304 U.S. 1, 18-20 (1938) (implying that the right to
present evidence is essential to due process).
"' See Smith v. Murray, 477 U.S. 527, 531-32 (1986) (holding that petitioner's
underlying constitutional claim regarding admission ofpsychiatrist's testimony was waived
when counsel failed to assign such error on appeal).
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to hearsay testimony,48 and even basic rules of discovery, 49 have acquired
a significant degree of constitutional regulation. Most authorities concur in
assigning all of these decisions to defense lawyers.
One problem with the constitutional rights theory is that it would
require reassignment of certain decisions to defendants which, for reasons
of efficient trial management, courts are highly unlikely to take from
lawyers. Criminal trials would become administratively unwieldy if, every
time a lawyer made a decision in a courtroom about whether or not to
question a witness, the court had to consult with the defendant to confirm
his or her acquiescence to the lawyer's decision. But because decisions of
whether and how to question witnesses implicate a defendant's
constitutional right of confrontation, under the strict constitutional rights
theory, such decisions would have to belong to the defendant.
Some authorities advocate large-scale reassignment of decisions to
defendants, even to the point of making defendants the presumptive
decision makers.5" Those authorities tend to disdain considerations of
efficient trial administration.5 The theory that presumptively allocates
decisions to defendants has substantial strengths, and a section of this article
evaluates it.52 The constitutional rights theory tends to merge with that
theory in effect, but without that theory's chief virtue. Theorists giving
defendants presumptive control justify their allocation as protecting
defendants' dignity and autonomy. Constitutional rights theory, however,
assigns decisions about constitutional rights to defendants even when the
right in question has no significant implications for their dignity and
autonomy. It also assigns decisions to lawyers, even when the defendant's
dignity is implicated, as long as the right in question has no constitutional
root.
Perhaps the best example of the constitutional rights theory's
48 See Crawford v. Washington, 541 U.S. 36 (2004) (holding that the Confrontation
Clause bars the use of testimonial hearsay by a non-testifying declarant); Williamson v.
United States, 512 U.S. 594, 605 (1994); White v. Illinois, 502 U.S. 346, 352-54 (1992);
Richardson v. Marsh, 481 U.S. 200, 206 (1987).
4 9 See Wardius v. Oregon, 412 U.S. 470,471-72 (1973) (noting that state law discovery
rules have a federal constitutional dimension).
" Monroe H. Freedman, Personal Responsibility in a Professional System, 27 CATH.
U. L. REv. 191, 201-04 (1978); see also Richard H. Chused, Faretta and the Personal
Defense: The Role of a Represented Defendant in Trial Tactics, 65 CAL. L. REv. 636, 636,
651, 653-54, 664 (1977); Alex J. Hurder, Negotiating the Lawyer-Client Relationship: A
Search for Equality and Collabotation, 44 BUFF. L. REv. 71, 79-80 (1996); Mello, supra
note 39, at 507, 509-12.
"' See Hurder, supra note 50, at 83, 95.
52See infra Part III.
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shortcomings involves the question of waiver of the Sixth Amendment right
to a speedy trial.53 Some jurisdictions, by rule or statute, have enacted
specific'guidelines to give definite meaning to the right to a speedy trial.54
Under the constitutional rights theory, the lawyer may waive a defendant's
statutory right to a speedy trial, but the defendant retains the right to make
decisions affecting his constitutional right to a speedy trial.55 To make the
matter more complicated, the Sixth Amendment analysis makes relevant the
cause of the delay, and particularly whether the defense caused any part of
it.56 Therefore, under the constitutional rights theory, every decision about
whether to seek a continuance of trial belongs to the defendant because
those decisions affect the analysis of the constitutional speedy trial claim.
Moreover, because statutory speedy trial rights set definite periods within
which a trial must begin, the lawyer retains the power to waive the
defendant's better claim to absolute dismissal of the charges, but not the
less advantageous-and often less applicable-constitutional claim. At least
one court has expressly so held.57
In itself, radical alteration of the current practice of decision allocation
is not necessarily bad; present practice, as described in Part II, needs
revision, at least if consistency, predictability, and justice are desired.
Indeed, this article proposes an alteration of present practice that is, in some
respects, radical. Therefore, it speaks poorly of the constitutional rights
theory that courts have not, by using it, achieved consistency or
predictability.
2. Fundamental Rights Theory
The fundamental rights theory reformulates the criteria of importance
to limit a defendant's decisions to those regarding "fundamental" or
"fundamental constitutional" rights rather than all constitutional rights.5"
13 U.S. CONST. amend. VI ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
right to a speedy and public trial .... ").
54 E.g. N.D. CENT. CODE § 29-19-02 (Supp. 2003); N.C. GEN. STAT. § 15-10 (2003);
VA. CODE ANN. §§ 19.2-243 (2004).
" Barker v. Wingo, 407 U.S. 514, 529-31 (1972); see also Doggett v. United States,
505 U.S. 647, 656-58 (1992); Klopfer v. North Carolina, 386 U.S. 213, 219, 222 (1967).
16 Barker, 407 U.S. at 529-3 1; Doggett, 505 U.S. at 656-58.
7 Townsend v. Superior Court, 543 P.2d 619, 781-82 (Cal. 1975). But see In re
Horton, 813 P.2d 1335, 1342 (Cal. 1991) (rejecting constitutional rights theory).
58 See In re Horton, 813 P.2d at 1348 (Mosk, J., dissenting) (arguing that only defendant
can waivefundamental constitutional rights); Anne C. Singer, The Imposition of the Insanity
Defense of an Unwilling Defendant, 41 OHIo ST. L.J. 637, 667 (1980) (suggesting that
the defendant should have power to decide about his fundamental constitutional rights, such
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This reformulation avoids some of the previously discussed problems.
Decisions concerning nonfundamental constitutional rights remain with the
lawyer.59 But a new problem arises: what makes a particular right
"fundamental"?
One possible interpretation defines a fundamental right as one that is
"crucial to the accused's fate," which presumably indicates that the right
determines or substantially influences the outcome of the case.6" Two diff-
iculties immediately appear. First, a decision that determines or influences
the outcome of one case may play no important role in another case. For
example, the decision to call a particular witness may substantially
influence the outcome of a case when the witness's testimony is important,
but not when the witness's testimony is cumulative or unconnected to the
central issues of the trial. Some decisions, such as which witnesses to call,
are only occasionally outcome determinative. As a result, judges face the
problem of allocating such decisions on a case-by-case basis.61
An even greater objection to the "outcome-determinative"
interpretation is that it will often not be apparent, at the time a decision must
be made, whether that decision will determine or substantially influence the
outcome of the case. Thus, even in principle,judges attempting to apply the
outcome-determinative interpretation of "fundamental" frequently cannot
know, at the moment they must allocate a decision, how to do so. Taken
together, these two problems render the outcome-determinative
interpretation of "fundamental" unable to deliver either timely or definitive
guidance.
A second interpretation defines "fundamental" by reference to some
independently defined value. For example, a court could define as
fundamental those rights having a direct and important connection to the
dignity and autonomy of defendants. If taking a particular decision from a
defendant constitutes an intolerable affront in a civilized society that
respects the dignity of individuals, then the court must leave that decision
with the defendant.
One potential problem with this interpretation lies in the ambiguity of
as whether to employ an insanity defense).
59 See Singer, supra note 58, at 667.
60 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 797 (quoting ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE §§
4-5.2 (3d ed. 1993)).
61 See id. at 796-97 (noting that many decisions could be critical to the outcome of the




its standard.62 Which decisions, in the criminal trial context, must a court
leave with the defendant out of respect for the defendant's dignity? Because
this interpretation makes this criterion substantially identical to the theory
that makes defendants the presumptive decision makers, I address it again
in Part III.
Finally, two judicial formulations of the fundamental rights theory
deserve mention. First, in State v. Hereford63 the Wisconsin Court of
Appeals confronted the question of whether a defendant must personally
decide whether to seek a change of venue, thereby waiving the
constitutional right to trial in the jurisdiction in which the offense
occurred. 4 The Wisconsin court combined the two approaches described
above in its attempt to define "fundamental" rights. It considered whether
the right in question was potentially outcome-determinative by asking
whether waiver of the right lowers the accused's protection from
conviction. 65 The court also spoke about preventing oppression of the
accused by the State, 66 thus justifying its approach as a safeguard for the
defendant's dignity.
The California Supreme Court formulated the fundamental rights theory
somewhat differently in Townsend v. Superior Court.67 It proposed to
identify a right as "fundamental" according to whether the decision
involved substantial or procedural matters.6" Of course, this formulation
simply directs the inquiry toward the different, but still difficult, task of
distinguishing matters of substance from matters ofprocedure, to which this
article now turns.
B. Criteria of the Function of Defendant and Counsel
An alternative approach begins not with the inherent nature of
decisions, but with a description of the essential roles of counsel and
defendant in the attorney-client relationship. The most common
62See White, supra note 34, at 71 (noting disagreement among courts about what rights
are fundamental for this purpose).
63 State v. Hereford, 592 N.W.2d 247 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
64 Id. at 251-52.
61 Id. at 252.
" Id. at 251-52.
67 Townsend v. Superior Court, 543 P.2d 619 (Cal. 1975).
68 Id. at 627 (Mosk, J., dissenting) ("[T]he question before us is whether counsel
forfeited 'a substantial right of his client contrary to express instructions."'); see also
Uviller, supra note 21, at 769-70 (suggesting that the definition of "fundamental" is keyed
to the "factual predicate of the defense").
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formulation of the roles assigns to the defendant the power to decide the
ends of the representation, and reserves to the lawyer the power to decide
the means by which to pursue those ends.69
Specific defense decisions, then, are allocated according to whether
they involve the objectives of the representation or merely the means of
achieving those objectives. In 1972, Welsh White explained the ends/means
test as requiring allocation of decision-making responsibility to attorneys
"unless the defendant can sustain the burden of proving that the choice not
to assert the claim was made for reasons that relate to the ends to be
obtained in the lawsuit, rather than to the means used to obtain those
ends. 70
The ends/means theory, however, has come under significant
criticism.7 Its chief flaw lies in the difficulty of distinguishing the means
from the ends.72 The test has been described as "vague and unhelpful in
determining whether the lawyer or the client ultimately has the right to
make a particular strategic decision., 73 Another authority observes that the
ends/means distinction "is not as coherent as it might initially appear"
because "many decisions can easily be characterized both as strategic ones
regarding means and as fundamental ones regarding objectives., 74 For
example, the decision about whether to call a particular witness would
ordinarily seem to be a tactical decision involving the means to obtaining
acquittal. But in some cases, defendants may care very deeply about such
decisions for reasons having nothing to do with the tactical value of the
witness's testimony.75
69 See Don v. Nix, 886 F.2d 203, 207 (8th Cir. 1989) (finding that, under the
ends/means theory, counsel can only make strategic decisions that are "faithful to
defendant's basic elections");see also People v. Hattery, 488 N.E.2d 513 (111. 1985) (holding
that a defendant's decision to plead not guilty bars lawyers from conceding guilt in
argument, even if the lawyer is motivated to try to gain credibility for capital sentencing).
70 White, supra note 34, at 74-75.
7' Richard J. Bonnie, The Competence of Criminal Defendants: Beyond Dusky and
Drope, 47 U. MIAMI L. REv. 539,569-70 (1993); LAFAVEETAL., supra note 31, at 596; Joel
S. Newman, Doctors, Lawyers, and the Unabomber, 60 MONT. L. REv. 67, 87-90 (1999);
Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 182-83 & n.56; Uphoff, supra note 8, at 777 & n.57.
72 Bonnie, supra note 71, at 569; LAFAVE ETAL., supra 31, at 596; Newman, supra note
71, at 87-90; Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 182-183 & n.56; Uphoff, supra note 8, at
777 & n.57.
13 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 777.
4 Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 182.
75 E.g., Uphoff, supra note 8, at 763 (giving an illustration of a defendant who did not
want his father to testify out of concern for his father's health, despite the fact that his
father's testimony would help his defense).
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, The Rivers case, discussed earlier, illustrates the difficulty of applying
the-ends/means distinction. In one sense, Rivers and his lawyer agreed on
the ultimate end of the representation-the minimization of sentencing
consequences to Rivers, by acquittal if possible. Their disagreement
centered on whether the "gay defense" best served that goal. Viewing the
matter in that light, one would assign the decision to the lawyer.
In another sense, however, the dispute seems to implicate Rivers's
ultimate goals. Rivers also opposed the defense, regardless of its tactical
strength, out of a desire to protect himself from what he conceived to be its
humiliating content. Insofar as avoiding any humiliation of the defendant
constitutes an independent goal of the representation, that motivation makes
the question one of ends, rather than means, and so supports giving the
decision to the defendant.
The lawyer, however, may admit that avoiding humiliation of the
defendant constitutes a valid and distinct goal of the representation without
conceding that the decision at issue-what defense to present-implicates
that goal. The lawyer may say, "I accept avoidance of humiliation of Rivers
as an end, but the humiliation inherent in presenting the alternative and
possibly absurd defense, and its inevitable consequence of imprisonment for
life without any hope of release, will bring Rivers greater and longer
humiliation than will the gay defense." In short, the lawyer proposes, as the
best means of minimizing Rivers's humiliation, the presentation of the
defense Rivers abhors. Rivers may answer that the lawyer misdefines the
end. "My true end," he might say, "is not the avoidance of any humiliation,
but avoidance of humiliation by the gay defense itself." Still, his lawyer has
a reply. "By that alternative formulation Rivers has just begged the
question; the decision implicates the ends of the representation simply
because Rivers now says that it does."
A principal flaw in the ends/means analysis is that such arguments may
revolve endlessly. Another flaw appears upon consideration of the difficult
task the ends/means analysis imposes upon the judge. How likely is it that
even the best trial judge will be able to discover, during a formal, in-court
colloquy with a stressed and inarticulate defendant, the fundamental source
of the defendant's opposition to counsel's representation preferences? The
whole case will come down to whether Rivers happens to mention his
strategic or dignity concerns when the court demands of him a reason for
his rejection of his lawyer's advice.
C. Criteria of Departures from a Presumed Decider
The final species of allocation theory begins by arguing for the
selection of either the lawyer or the defendant as the primary decision
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maker. Such theories then identify specific decisions that should be
assigned away from that decision maker. For those exceptional assignments,
the theory provides specific justifications.
1. The Defendant as Presumptive Decision Maker
The preference for the defendant as the presumptive decision maker has
won a number of adherents. The North Carolina Supreme Court, for
example, drawing upon the notion that a lawyer is merely the client's agent,
has adopted a very strong version of the defendant preference. It held that
"when counsel and a fully informed criminal defendant client reach an
absolute impasse as to tactical decisions, the client's wishes must control.76
Some commentators have voiced support for the allocation of all decisions,
ultimately, to defendants.77 Those commentators often rely on the logic of
Faretta to justify that result. 8 If a defendant may proceed pro se, forsaking
the assistance of a lawyer altogether and taking authority over all decisions,
the defendant also possesses, as part of his Sixth Amendment rights, the
power to accept legal assistance with respect to some decisions, but to reject
it as to others. 9
Justice Brennan's dissent in Jones v. Barness° advanced a slightly more
modest version of the defendant preference. There, Justice Brennan
acknowledged that "[f]rom the standpoint of effective administration of
justice, the need to confer decisive authority on the attorney is paramount
with regard to the hundreds of decisions that must be made quickly in the
course of a trial."81
However, where compelling reasons of efficient trial management do
not apply, Justice Brennan endorsed the assignment of decisions to
76 State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991); see also State v. Brown, 451 S.E.2d
181, 187 (N.C. 1994) (quoting Ali, 407 S.E.2d at 189).
"See Chused, supra note 50, at 651, 653 (idea that if a defendant can represent himself,
that right includes within it the right to command the lawyer on any matter in which the
defendant is interested); Singer, supra note 58, at 657 (finding that the Sixth Amendment
gives a defendant the fight to command his lawyer as to the insanity defense); Christopher
Slobogin & Amy Mashburn, The Criminal Defense Lawyer's Fiduciary Duty to Client With
Mental Disability, 68 FORDHAM L. REV. 1581, 1601 (2000) ("[A]s long as the client is able
to give plausible, non-delusional reasons for his or her decision after demonstrating an
understanding and consideration of the relevant information, that decision should be honored
even when opposed to the attorney's."); Uphoff, supra note 8, at 819.
" See Chused, supra note 50, at 651-55.
'
91d. at 651-53, 655.
o Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
SI d. at 760 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
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defendants." Similarly, a few other jurisdictions seem to give presumptive
control over decisions to 
defendants.8
3
Those who would make the defendant the presumptive decision maker
tend to explain that allocation by invoking the defendant's interest in
dignity and autonomy. For example, Justice Brennan wrote that "[t]he role
of the defense lawyer should be above all to function as the instrument and
defender of the client's autonomy and dignity in all phases of the criminal
process.8 4 Stating the position more colorfully, he added, "I cannot accept
the notion that lawyers are one of the punishments a person receives merely
for being accused of a crime."8 5
Advocates of the defendant preference theory have eloquently
expressed their motivating principles. "Society values autonomy because
we assume people are ordinarily the best judges of their own interests and
because, even if they are not, taking away their opportunity to decide would
show insufficient respect for the person. 8 6 In addition, "[b]eing charged
with a crime and requesting the aid of a lawyer ought not deprive competent
adults of their right to control the decisions which ultimately affect their
lives and their liberty."8" Moreover:
[W]e the citizens of a liberal democracy should be concerned with the
autonomy of all competent adults, even accused criminals. And insofar as
feasible, we should accord to them the dignity of control over their own
destiny. Certain choices, predicated on matters uniquely within their
knowledge and understanding, deeply affecting their own futures, and
fundamental to the process in which they find themselves immersed
should adhere to their primordial autonomy despite a surrender of a
package of discretionary options to their professional guardian. 88
Using the infamous Unabomber case as an example, Professor Joel
Newman stated the position most bluntly: "(1) It was Kaczynski's crime. (2)
82 See id. at 759 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
83 E.g., Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1984); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183,
189 (N.C. 1991).
Jones, 463 U.S. at 763 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
5 Id. at 764 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
86 Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 77, at 1586.
7 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 821-22.
18 Uviller, supra note 21, at 741.
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It was Kaczynski's trial. (3) It was Kaczynski's life." 9
In commentators' statements, one finds at least three distinct intuitions
favoring the defendant's control of decisions. In Part III, this article
examines each of these three intuitions. For now, a brief description will
suffice.
The first, the "autonomy intuition," addresses the matter from the point
of view of trial consequences. This intuition expresses the idea that control
properly lies in the hands of the person most at risk. Therefore, the
defendant, who alone bears the risk of punishment, should control trial
decisions. The second, the "dignity intuition," speaks in defense of human
liberty. It looks not at the consequences of the criminal trial, but at the trial
itself as an important arena of human activity. It proposes that the trial's
conduct matters for its own sake. Fundamentally political in its meaning,
this intuition expresses the idea that, insofar as the defense speaks on behalf
of the defendant, a free society should not tolerate the imposition of an
unwelcome defense on the person defended. The third, the "reliability
intuition," declines to regard the matter from the defendant's point of view.
Instead, this intuition cedes decision-making power to the defendant as a
means of advancing the truth-seeking function of trial.
There is another intuition, the "legal formalism intuition," which is
addressed only in this paragraph. One formalistic argument draws upon the
text of the Sixth Amendment, which establishes a right to the assistance of
counsel.9" The italicized word is supposed to indicate the Founders' view
that disputes between defendant and counsel must be resolved in favor of
the defendant.9' Without further explanation, this plain meaning argument
blends into a second formalistic argument, which holds that future decisions
belong to defendants because they belonged to defendants in the past. When
presented to a judge bound by precedent, the formalistic arguments carry
weight. Part II demonstrates that the prevailing legal regime, in application
as well as in principle, lacks sufficient coherence to justify extending past
tradition to present cases through the doctrine of stare decisis. Legal history
alone, therefore, cannot answer this article's quest for justifications. "It is
revolting to have no better reason for a rule of law than that so it was laid
down in the time of Henry IV. It is still more revolting if the grounds upon
which it was laid down have vanished long since, and the rule simply
' Newman, supra note 71, at 100. Theodore Kaczynski was charged with mailing a
number of bombs to persons he never met, killing three and maiming many more, during the
years preceding his arrest. U.S. v. Kaczynski, 239 F.3d 1108, 1111 (9th Cir. 2001).
' U.S. CONST. amend. VI. ("In all criminal prosecutions, the accused shall enjoy the
fight... to have the Assistance of Counsel for his defence.").
"' Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 820 (1975); Uviller, supra note 21, at 765-66.
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persists from blind imitation of the past."92
2. The Lawyer as Presumptive Decision Maker
The notion favoring the lawyer as the presumptive decision maker has
also won adherents. 93 The Alabama Court of Criminal Appeals, for
example, has expressed a version of the lawyer preference theory under
which virtually all decisions belong to lawyers. That court wrote:
The defendant cannot simultaneously assert his right to court appointed
counsel and conduct his own defense. This Court will not second-guess
tactical decisions of counsel in deciding whether to call certain witnesses.
If such decisions are to be made by the defendant, he is likely to do
himself more harm than good, and ... a contrary rule would seriously
impair the constitutional guaranty of the right to counsel .... One of the
surest ways for counsel to lose a lawsuit is to permit his client to run the
trial. We think that few competent counsel would accept retainers, or
appointment ... to defend criminal cases, if they were to have to consult
the defendant, and follow his views, on every issue of trial strategy that
might, often as a matter of hindsight, involve some claim of constitutional
right.
9 4
92 Oliver Wendell Holmes, The Path of the Law After One Hundred Years, 110 HARV.
L. REv. 991, 1001 (1997).
" E.g., United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that a
defendant is only entitled to decide whether to plead guilty, whether to testify, and whether
to waive ajury); State v. Pratts, 366 A.2d 1327, 1333-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975),
aftd, 365 A.2d 928 (N.J. 1976) (finding that court did not err in refusing to direct defense
counsel to call a witness at the defendant's request).
94 Falkner v. State, 462 So. 2d 1040, 1042 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (citations and
quotation marks omitted) (quoting United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855 (1 lth Cir.
1982)); see Nelson v. State, 346 F.2d 73, 81 (9th Cir. 1965) (finding that counsel is the
manager of the lawsuit and if the defendant were to control that position he would likely do
himself more harm than good); State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 159-60 (Ariz. 1984) (reading
Faretta narrowly, in the context of a represented defendant); People v. Hamilton, 774 P.2d
730, 741 (Cal. 1989), modified by 49 Cal. 3d 501 (1989) ("When the accused exercises his
constitutional right to representation by professional counsel, it is counsel, not defendant,
who is in charge of the case. By choosing professional representation, the accused surrenders
all but a handful of 'fundamental' personal rights to counsel's complete control of defense
strategies and tactics."); People v. Pondexter, 573 N.E.2d 339,345 (111. App. Ct. 1991) ("An
accused has either the right to have counsel represent him or the fight to represent himself;
however, a defendant has no right to both self representation and the assistance of
counsel."); see also Pratts, 366 A.2d at 1333 (finding that when defendant accepts
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This theory responds to the Faretta argument advanced by advocates
ofthe defendant preference theory. Defendants who elect selfrepresentation
have, by that choice, altered the fundamental purpose of the trial. The trials
of represented defendants, conducted by professional advocates on both
sides, aim, through the special genius of the adversary process, to discover
the truth and render an accurate judgment under the law. The trials of
self-representing defendants, on the other hand, undermine the sound
functioning of the adversary process by pitting a professional prosecutor
against a lay defendant, "likely to do himself more harm than good."" Their
trials serve another purpose: they yield virtually certain convictions to the
prosecution, while providing defendants a forum for self-expression.
On one occasion, the Eleventh Circuit endorsed a similarly broad view
of the lawyer's decision-making role. In Watts v. Singletary," the court
confronted a claim made by a defendant who slept through approximately
70% of his murder trial.97 For long stretches during the trial, Watts sat with
his head bowed on his chest.9" He did not rise when the jury entered and left
the courtroom, and his lawyer was occasionally seen, often unsuccessfully,
trying to shake him awake.99 Observing Watts, some prospective jurors
doubted their ability to impartially judge a defendant who would sleep
during his own murder trial. 0 When asked to explain himself, Watts
claimed that he was praying.' Defense counsel and the court, however,
believed he was sleeping off the effects of out-of-court drug abuse. 10 2
On appeal, Watts argued that the trial court erred in failing, sua sponte,
to inquire into his competence to stand trial.1"3 On habeas review, the
Eleventh Circuit reversed the district court's grant of the writ."° In so
ruling, the court concluded that, because very few decisions lie within the
province of the defendant, a sleeping defendant is not, for that reason, an
incompetent defendant.0 5 Considering the defendant's role in light of that
representation by counsel, he consents to counsel's management of the case).
9 Falkner, 462 So. 2d at 1042.
96 Watts v. Singletary, 87 F.3d 1282 (11 th Cir. 1996).
97 Id.





203 Id. at 1286.
104 Id. at 1289.
-o Id. at 1288-89; cf United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855 (11th Cir. 1982)
(reconfirming that decisions about calling witnesses belong to counsel).
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holding, one is reminded of the maxim, prevalent in prior generations,
describing the behavior of good children in polite company: they are to be
seen but not heard. That view of the defendant's role is not new. A French
observer of early nineteenth-century English courts, after seeing so little
participation by the accused, commented that, "his hat stuck on a pole might
without inconvenience be his substitute at trial."10 6
Supporters of the lawyer preference theory focus on the distortion of the
adversarial process resulting from the empowerment of a deeply invested
lay decision maker. Even advocates for the defendant as decision maker
tend to recognize that, as compared to lawyers, defendants generally make
poorer decisions.' 7 To see the force of the point, one need only reflect on
the Rivers case with which this article began.
Rivers could have presented a defense with some chance of winning
outright acquittal, and a still better chance of producing a term-of-years
sentence, or at least a life sentence with the possibility of parole. But
because Rivers rejected those defenses in favor of a hopeless alternative, the
jury may well have returned a verdict that did not reflect the truth of the
case. Certainly, Rivers's decision denied the jury the opportunity to
consider some of the most likely accounts of how the victim died. Giving
this decision to the lawyer reduces the chances of such injustices because
lawyers more likely know the best course of defense. Also, the lawyer's
decisions, if incompetent, are subject to review for ineffective assistance of
counsel.
One final point distinguishing the lawyer preference theory from the
defendant preference theory deserves notice. The defendant preference
gives to the defendant more freedom to act than the lawyer preference gives
to lawyers. Those who advocate a defendant preference, for example, often
identify a defendant's political values as a legitimate, or at least allowable,
basis of trial decisions." 8 The advocates of the lawyer preference, on the
other hand, need not accept the lawyer's political values as a valid influence
on defense decisions. The difference lies in the fact that lawyers, even when
empowered to make decisions for the defense, remain subject to the canons
of professional responsibility and to judicial enforcement of their duty to
zealously represent defendants. In a few cases, defendants have claimed that
'0 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 6 (2003) (citing
CHARLES CoTrU, ON THE ADMINISTRATION OF CRIMINAL JUSTICE IN ENGLAND 88 (London
1822)).
... See, e.g., Decker, supra note 12; Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161
(2000) ("No one... attempts to argue that as a rulepro se representation is wise, desirable,
or efficient.").
"'S E.g., Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 195-96.
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their lawyers acted on personal political preferences to the detriment of the
defense. '09
The capital prosecution of Robert Lee Goldsby in Mississippi in 1954
illustrates the distorting dangers of politically motivated decision making
by lawyers."' Goldsby, an African American World War 11 veteran, was
traveling near the small town of Vaiden, Mississippi, with his family and
two others when, after being refused service by the white proprietors of a
filling station and dairy bar, he retrieved a pistol from his car. Goldsby
opened fire, killing Mrs. Moselle Nelms, one of the proprietors."'
Soon after Goldsby's arrest, members of his family retained George
Leighton, an African American lawyer from Chicago who, many years
later, would become a United States District Judge in Illinois."2 Leighton
promptly prepared a motion challenging the indictment and trial venue on
the ground that officials in Carroll County, Mississippi, discriminated on
the basis of race in selecting persons to serve as grand and petit jurors.'' 3
Before Leighton could file those motions, other members of Goldsby's
family retained a white lawyer from Vicksburg named John Prewitt, who
"told [Goldsby's] relatives ... that he could not work with the Negro
attorney .... "1 Leighton accordingly withdrew, and Prewitt did not file
Leighton's motions. Represented by Prewitt, Goldsby was convicted of
murder and sentenced to death.'
The challenge to the grand and petit jury lists had merit. Although
fifty-seven percent of the adult population of Carroll County was, at that
109 See, e.g., United States v. Lopez, 4 F.3d 1455, 1464 (9th Cir. 1993) (noting that
defendant alleged ineffective assistance because of his lawyer's principled opposition to
representing defendants who wish to enter a plea bargain, which requires cooperation with
the government); Brown v. Doe, 2 F.3d 1236, 1240 (2d Cir. 1993) (noting that a defendant
who belonged to the Weather Underground alleged ineffective assistance against the
"revolutionary lawyers" who represented him at trial and whose political views allegedly
induced them to adopt a "confrontational" posture vis-a-vis the prosecution); United States
v. Lonetree, 35 M.J. 396, 412 (C.M.A. 1992) (raising a similar claim); see also Daniel C.
Richman, Cooperating Clients, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 69, 73-75 (1995); Freedman, supra note
50, at 193.
"
0 Goldsby v. State, 78 So. 2d 762 (Miss. 1955). The extraordinary case of Robert Lee
Goldsby is retold with citations to court records, newspaper articles, and photographs on an
internet web site. Vaiden Mississippi: The Case of Robert Lee Goldsby, (Feb. 15, 2005) at
http://www.vaiden.net/goldsby.html.
I. Goldsby, 78 So. 2d at 765.
' Vaiden Mississippi (Feb. 21, 2005), at http://www.vaiden.net/leighton.html.
"3 Goldsby v. Harpole, 263 F.2d 71, 73 (5th Cir. 1959).




time,-non-white, neither "the Circuit Clerk, the Chancery Clerk, the Sheriff,
the ex-Sheriff who had served for twenty years, the District Attorney, or the
Circuit Judge-could remember any instance of a Negro having been on a
jury list of any kind in Carroll County."' 6 Therefore, Goldsby claimed in
habeas corpus that Prewitt's unwillingness to challenge the institutional
racism ofMississippi's 1950s judicial system deprived Goldsby ofthe relief
to which he would have been entitled had the motions been filed.
Leighton resumed his representation of Goldsby after the trial and
finally prevailed on a federal habeas petition before the Fifth Circuit where
opposing counsel included Ross Barnett, the future segregationist governor
of Mississippi." 7 That court observed that:
Such courageous and unselfish lawyers as find it essential for their clients'
protection to fight against the systematic exclusion of Negroes from juries
sometimes do so at the risk of personal sacrifice which may extend to loss
of practice and social ostracism. As Judges of a Circuit comprising six
states of the deep South, we think that it is our duty to take judicial notice
that lawyers residing in many southern jurisdictions rarely, almost to the
point of never, raise the issue of systematic exclusion of Negroes from
juries.'1 8
Criminal defense lawyers who are tempted to allow their own political
preferences to influence their defense decisions should remember John
Prewitt who, in acting on his political preference, very nearly cost his client
his life. If it were acceptable for lawyers to consider their own political
views in calculating how best to defend clients, I would abandon the
proposal to allocate decisions primarily to lawyers. Because lawyers cannot
do so, I proceed with the argument.
1I. CURRENT ALLOCATION OF DECISION-MAKING AUTHORITY
More than thirty years ago, Welsh White noted that no court had
satisfactorily justified the allocation of decision-making authority between
6Id. at 78.
"7 Id. at 74.
I' ld. at 82. Goldsby was reconvicted and resentenced to death after a second trial, in
which Leighton and then governor-elect Barnett appeared for the defense and prosecution,
respectively. In 1961, Goldsby was put to death in Mississippi's gas chamber. Vaiden
Mississippi: The Case of Robert Lee Goldsby, (Feb. 15, 2005) at http://www.vaiden.net/
goldsby.html (quoting the Winona Times, June 1, 1986, at 1).
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defense counsel and criminal defendant." 9 Courts and commentators have,
in the succeeding years, continued to express discontent with the current
state of the law. 20 Many have particularly mourned the inconsistency in
allocation rulings.'2 ' LaFave and Israel claim that the laws theoretical
incoherence causes this pattern of inconsistent allocations. They write: "The
problems of uncertainty are exacerbated .. . by the absence of any
well reasoned guidelines for distinguishing between those decisions
requiring defendant's personal choice and those subject to counsel's
control over strategy."' Part I noted significant problems affecting the
coherence of most of the theories courts use to justify their allocation
decisions. Part II describes the judicial rulings that have, with or without the
benefit of a guiding principle, established the governing law.
This article's description of the law is organized by placing each
defense decision in one of five categories. The first category contains two
decisions: how to plead and whether to appeal. These deserve separate
treatment because they are threshold decision involving the invocation or
waiver of the adversary process. The second category contains evidentiary
decisions, including which witnesses to call, what questions to ask those
witnesses, and whether to seek exclusion of some of the prosecution's
evidence. The third category includes decisions about the defendant's
active, personal participation in the trial.' It addresses such issues as
whether the defendant should testify, or whether the defendant should
attend the trial and its associated proceedings. The fourth category contains
decisions about the structuring of deliberations. For example, questions
regarding whether the defense should assert insanity, an alibi, or admit
culpability to a lesser included offense are included in this category. The
"9 See White, supra note 34, at 70-71.
20 E.g., Trimble v. State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 279 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (notingthe
"continuing difficulty in determining defense counsel's role in the criminal trial").
12 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 765 & n.7, 777-79 (noting that the rules of ethics give
uncertain guidance and the Constitution dictates very little about allocation).
122 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 765 (quoting WAYNE R. LAFAVE ET AL., CRIMINAL
PROCEDURE 559 (2d ed. 1992)).
23 This third category excludes actions that a lawyer could perform, even if the law
ultimately allows the represented defendant to control those actions. For example, the law
could allow a represented defendant to call witnesses, decide what defenses to advance, and
so forth. Those activities are discussed elsewhere because the law could also assign those
decisions to the lawyer. But the lawyer cannot stand in for the defendant in the act of
testifying, nor in the act of attending the trial; the defendent must do these things himself.
Thus, this category includes those activities that must be the defendant's to perform,
although the law could conceivably assign to the lawyer the decision of whether the
defendant will perform them in a given case.
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fifth category contains a miscellany of decisions, all relating to the structure
of the trial. This category includes such questions as whether to seek a
change of venue, whether to choose a bench or a jury trial, which
prospective jurors to strike, whether to seek a continuance of trial, and
myriad other decisions that do not belong in any other category.
A. Decisions About Whether to Invoke the Adversary Process
The first category includes decisions that invoke or waive the adversary
process of adjudication. Such decisions include whether to plead guilty or
not guilty, and whether to appeal after trial. The law governing this category
of decision displays a good measure of consensus and consistency in
assigning those decisions to defendants. Even here, though, courts have
sometimes forsaken the general rule. 24 Before detailing the consensus and
its exceptions, two points require clarification.
First, in many jurisdictions, one decision discussed here as a
deliberation-structuring choice-whether to raise a defense of insanity-is,
as a formal matter, exercised as a decision about how to plead. In those
jurisdictions, a defendant raises the insanity defense by pleading not guilty
by reason of insanity.'25 This article discusses the insanity defense decision
as a deliberation-structuring choice because the insanity plea is a mode of
defense. It is like other modes of defense in the most basic sense: it contests
responsibility for the charged crime. For that reason, although it has unique
characteristics that might justify allocating it to the defendant, it will be
considered with the other modes of defense. To put the matter plainly, if the
insanity defense decision properly belongs to defendants, it should belong
to defendants regardless of whether a particular jurisdiction requires the
defense to be raised by a plea.2 6 In this first category, only the decision of
whether to insist on adversary adjudication is discussed.
Second, some jurisdictions mandate an appeal from a criminal
conviction in narrowly defined cases. In New Jersey, for example,
defendants sentenced to death must appeal, even if they would prefer not to
do so. 7 By making such a provision, those jurisdictions effectively remove
124 E.g., Massie v. Sumner, 624 F.2d 72 (9th Cir. 1980) (upholding California statute
barring waiver of appeal by condemned prisoner); Cisconti v. United States, 454 F. Supp.
417 (D. Mass. 1978) (holding that defendant has no constitutional right to plead guilty in
absence of statute providing such right).
125 E.g., N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 651:8-a (2004).
126 See Singer, supra note 58, at 651.
127 N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C:1 1-3(e) (West 1995); see also Massie, 624 F.2d at 73-74;
Nelson v. State, 681 So. 2d 252,256 (Ala. Crim. App. 1995); State v. Dodd, 838 P.2d 86,
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the decision of whether to appeal from the defense altogether. Accordingly,
so long as lawmakers seek to protect the reliability of judgments in such
cases by requiring an appeal, no issue of allocation of that decision between
defendant and counsel can arise. Although this article proposes that
decisions regarding pleas and appeals should belong to the defendant, it
does not reach the question of what decisions should be left to, or removed
from, the defense altogether. Thus, by arguing that the defendant should
retain final control over the decision of whether to appeal when the law
commits that decision to the defense, this article does not criticize any
legislative judgment that removes this decision from the defense.12
1. The Decision of How to Plead
In Jones v. Barnes, the Supreme Court recognized that defendants must
retain "ultimate authority to make certain fundamental decisions regarding
the case," including the decisions of whether to plead guilty and whether to
appeal.' 29 The Court cited the ABA Standards for Criminal Justice, which
also assigns those decisions to the defendant. 3 The Model Rules of
Professional Conduct and the Model Code of Professional Responsibility
concur that the decision of how to plead belongs to the defendant. 31 Lower
95 (Wash. 1992) (discussing state laws about waivability of capital appeals).
12' Cisconti, 454 F. Supp. at 418. See also Singer, supra note 58, at 662 (arguing that
a court's only real ground to refuse to allow a guilty plea is where there is doubt about the
voluntariness or intelligence of the plea). There also exists authority suggesting that the State
may similarly remove from the defense the decision of how to plead. For example, in North
Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 38 n.l 1 (1970), the Court wrote: "Our holding does not
mean that a trial judge must accept every constitutionally valid guilty plea merely because
a defendant wishes so to plead. A criminal defendant does not have an absolute right under
the Constitution to have his guilty plea accepted by the court .... Compare Santobello v.
New York, 404 U.S. 257,262 (1971) ("There is, of course, no absolute right to have a guilty
plea accepted.") with Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 276 (1942)
("The Constitution does not compel an accused who admits his guilt to stand trial against
his own wishes.").
129 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
130 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2, 21-2.2 (2d ed. 1980); see also
Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 7-8 (1966) (holding that the Constitution does not permit
counsel to enter a guilty plea over a defendant's objection).
1
31 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2 (a) (2003); MODEL CODE OF PROF'L
RESPONSIBILITY Canon 7-7 (1981).
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courts generally agree. 13 2
However, dissenting voices have spoken. In People v. Massie,133 the
California Supreme Court, applying a California statute,' 34 held that a
capital defendant may not plead guilty to a capital charge against the advice
of counsel. 35 The California rule did not go so far as to reassign to lawyers
the decision of how to plead; in fact, nothing in the rule suggests that a
lawyer could enter a plea of guilty over the defendant's objection. Rather,
the California rule merely withdraws the decision to plead guilty from the
sole province of the defendant by requiring the lawyer's agreement.'36
Perhaps a looming death penalty tends to warp the law. However, even
outside the possibly anomalous context of capital punishment, authorities
sometimes suggest that the pleading decision does not belong exclusively
to defendants. Consider, for example, the non-capital murder prosecution
of Thomas Johnson. 13
7
Johnson, age seventeen, "shot his brother after the two had been
involved in a heated argument."1 38 Before trial, the prosecution offered to
allow Johnson to plead guilty to manslaughter. Although the lawyer
discussed the offered bargain with Johnson, the decision to reject it and
proceed to trial was ultimately made by the lawyer and Johnson's father. At
the time that decision was made, Johnson was, by his own admission, "very
confused. '"39 However, he was found competent to stand trial. 140 In
affirming Johnson's murder conviction, the federal appellate court
acknowledged that "the decision to plead guilty is one that must be made
by the defendant, and is not one in which an attorney may speak for his
132 E.g., People v. Rogers, 363 P.2d 892, 894-95 (Cal. 1961) (noting that the decision
of whether to plead guilty to a lesser offense also frequently reflects strategic concerns, but
that a defendant nonetheless retains personal control over such a plea); Miles v. Sheriff, 581
S.E.2d 191, 192 (Va. 2003) (stating that the decision of whether to appeal belongs to the
defendant).
133 People v. Massie, 967 P.2d 29 (Cal. 1998).
' CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 2003).
131 Massie, 967 P.2d at 37, 59 (confirming holding of earlier appeal in Massie's case);
see also North Carolina v. Alford, 400 U.S. 25, 39 n.12 (1970) (North Carolina law, for a
time, barred defendants from pleading guilty to capital offenses). The North Carolina rule
contemplated in Alford differs from the California rule in that the North Carolina rule
removed the decision of how to plead from the defense altogether, while the California rule
allowed a defendant to plead guilty only with the concurrence of counsel.
136 § 1239(b).
131 Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898 (7th Cir. 1986).
131 Id. at 899.
139 id.
'4 Id. at 902.
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client without consultation.' 41 However, the court found "a significant
difference between the consequences emanating from a decision to reject
a plea agreement and not plead guilty and the decision to enter a guilty
plea." 42 Relying on Johnson's atypical qualities-a seventeen-year-old
defendant charged with the murder of his brother who admitted in
post-conviction proceedings that he was "very confused" at the time the
prosecution offered the plea bargain-the court concluded that his lawyer
could control the decision to reject a plea bargain.'43
The case raises a question of whether the allocation of the power to
decide depends on whether the choice made asserts constitutional rights or
waives them. The law could allow lawyers to enter a "not guilty" plea over
a client's objection because that choice asserts the constitutional right to a
trial, but not allow a lawyer to enter a "guilty plea" over a client's objection,
because that choice waives the right to a trial. That is, should the law let the
lawyer decide how to plead only if the lawyer decides to plead "not guilty?"
The California statute described above gives one answer to the question
by requiring capital defendants and their lawyers to agree before entering
a guilty plea, while allowing the defendant alone to insist on a plea of not
guilty.' 44 The New Hampshire trial court presiding over the 2001 murder
trial of Robert Tulloch answered the question differently when the court
allowed Tulloch, against the advice of his lawyer, to plead guilty to
first-degree murder, thereby guaranteeing a sentence of life imprisonment
without parole. 145 Should defendants who have what their lawyer believes
to be a plausible defense be permitted to plead guilty?
From the point of view of the reliability of trial results, there seems to
be no problem with the New Hampshire resolution, which commits the
decision of how to plead to the defendant alone, regardless of which plea
the defendant chooses to enter. When the defense, by pleading guilty, fails
to play its assigned adversarial role of contesting the charges, that plea
significantly corroborates the truth of the charges. However, courts do not
enter ajudgment of conviction without any further inquiry; they will accept
a guilty plea only if satisfied that the defendant acted voluntarily and
intelligently in so pleading, and only if the record establishes a factual basis
to believe the defendant actually is guilty.'4 6
141 Id. at 900.
'
42 Id. at 901.
14 Id. at 902.
'4 CAL. PENAL CODE § 1239(b) (West 2003).
'41 J.M. Hirsch, Tulloch Admits to Slayings, CONCORD MONITOR, April 5, 2002, at 1,
available at http://199.125.13/stories/news/recent2002/zantop%5mina.
14' Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242 (1969).
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2. The Decision of Whether to Appeal
A substantial consensus exists for assigning the decision of whether to
appeal to the convicted defendant.' 47 The Jones v. Barnes Court listed the
decision among those constitutionally committed to the defendant,'48 and
authorities on legal ethics concur.149 Indeed, the decision of whether to
appeal, as a federal constitutional matter, has even resisted the creation of
a special rule for capital punishment. In Gilmore v. Utah, the Supreme
Court lifted Gary Gilmore's stay of execution upon receipt of documents
establishing Gilmore's intention that his death sentence not be appealed.'50
Justices White, Brennan, and Marshall, in dissent, noted the presence of
substantial appellate claims and argued that "the consent of a convicted
defendant in a criminal case does not privilege a State to impose a
punishment otherwise forbidden by the Eighth Amendment.'
Some ambiguity about the prerogatives of client and of counsel has
clouded the clarity of the consensus. In Anders v. California, the lawyer
appointed on direct appeal decided that Anders's claims had no merit, and
by letter so informed the California appellate court.' The Supreme Court
disapproved of the California procedure that allowed submission of such a
letter, but still concluded that:
[I]f counsel finds his case to be wholly frivolous, after a conscientious
examination of it, he should so advise the court and request permission to
withdraw. That request must, however, be accompanied by a brief
referring to anything in the record that might arguably support the
appeal.
153
117 Again, the exception is that some jurisdictions in capital cases withdraw from the
defense the decision whether to appeal; for example, see N.J. STAT. ANN. § 2C: 1l-3(e)
(West 1995). New Jersey even refuses to allow a defendant under sentence of death to
abandon state post-conviction remedies. State v. Martini, 677 A.2d 1106, 1109 (N.J. 1996).
148 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983).
"9 E.g., MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-7 (1981).
"
0Gilmore v. Utah, 429 U.S. 1012, 1012 (1976).
"s id. at 1018 (White, J., dissenting); see also Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149,172
(1990) (Marshall, J., dissenting).
's2 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738,740 (1967); see also Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S.
259,265-66 (2000); McCoy v. Court of Appeals, 486 U.S. 429,448-49 (1988) (elaborating
on Anders procedure); Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 80-82 (1988).
' Anders, 386 U.S. at 744.
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Thus, although the defendant has the power to decide whether to
appeal, counsel has the power, by filing an Anders brief, to scuttle the
appeal for all practical purposes by telling the court that the issues are
"wholly frivolous." Some jurisdictions, however, reject the Anders
procedure and require an appellate counsel confronted with a frivolous
claim to "argue[] the defendant's case as well as possible."' 5 4 In rejecting
the Anders rule and requiring appellate counsel to argue even meritless
appeals without signaling their weaknesses, the New Hampshire Supreme
Court noted that its procedure preserved "the adversarial nature of criminal
appeals."' 55
The Anders procedure raises an important question. Defense counsel's
declaration that an appeal is wholly frivolous amounts to the abandonment
of an appeal desired by the convicted defendant. A different question is
raised when appellate counsel and the convicted defendant agree to pursue
an adversarial appeal, but disagree about what issues should be presented.
That decision is properly categorized with trial deliberation-structuring
decisions, such as whether to present an insanity defense or some other
defense. Consideration of that decision is deferred, therefore, to Part
II(D)(3) below.
B. Evidentiary Decisions
The second category includes decisions about the admission of
evidence. This article describes the law relating to three evidentiary
decisions: which witnesses to call, what questions to ask testifying
witnesses, and what items of prosecution evidence to oppose with a motion
to suppress or exclude. Mindful of the influence of the death penalty on
rules of criminal law and procedure, I discuss also a specific decision that
arises with some frequency in capital cases: whether to call witnesses in
mitigation of sentence.
In this category, one finds many inconsistencies within and between
jurisdictions.'56 Possibly, the inconsistencies prove only the fallibility of
judges or the diversity of approaches to the problem taken by different
' State v. Cigic, 639 A.2d 251, 254 (N.H. 1994) (citing cases, including Commonwealth
v. Moffett 418 N.E.2d 585, 591 (Mass. 1981)); see also In re Attorney's Fees of Mohr, 32
P.3d 647, 653 (Haw. 2001).
"I Cigic, 639 A.2d at 253.
156 Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 1058 (Md. 1988) ("[T]here is agreement that as to
some matters connected with a criminal trial, counsel has the final say; there is not
agreement, however, as to precisely what those matters are."); Sabelli & Leyton, supra note
6, at 166 (noting "the lack of clarity, under case law and ethical canons, regarding the
allocation of authority within the attorney-client relationship").
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jurisdictions. More likely, howeVer, they demonstrate the difficulty of the
problem. Our justice system deals more comfortably with disputes between
adversaries, and even between adversaries and nonparties such as witnesses,
jurors, co-defendants, and former counsel. When, however, one side of the
adversary equation displays an inability to speak with one voice, the system
strains to form responsive rules.
1. Deciding Which Witnesses to Call
The profession, in its several formulations of ethical rules, has
expressed inconsistent views about who ultimately controls decisions about
which witnesses to call.'57 The American Bar Association's Standards for
Criminal Justice provide that the "decisions on what witnesses to call,
whether and how to conduct cross-examination... and all other strategic
and tactical decisions are the exclusive province of the lawyer after
consultation with the client."' 58 Another provision in the Standards,
however, hints at a different allocation in some circumstances. Standard
4-3.1 provides that "the technical and professional decisions must rest with
the lawyer without impinging on the rights of the accused to make the
ultimate decisions on certain specified matters .... "1  The commentary to
that standard explains that "[i]n questions of means, the lawyer should
assume the responsibility for technical and legal, strategic and tactical
issues, such as what witnesses to call .... But defense counsel should defer
to the client regarding such questions as the expense to be incurred and
concern for third persons who might be adversely affected."' 6° Taken
together, the Standards seem to commit the decision on which witnesses to
call to the lawyer, except when the defendant's opposition relates to
expense or to the interests of third persons.
The Model Code of Professional Responsibility, without speaking
precisely on the point, appears to favor allocation of the decision to the
client.16" ' After discussing the problem of perjured testimony, the Code
provides that "a lawyer should, however, present any admissible evidence
his client desires to have presented" unless the lawyer knows or should
'
57Uphoff, supra note 8, at 778 ("[T]he vagueness of the objectives/means test and the
inconsistencies in the Model Rules and their Comments neither mandate a particular
structure to the attorney-client relationship nor dictate a particular resolution" to the
problem of who decides which witnesses to call).
158ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2(b) (1980).
159 Id. at 4-3.1(b).
110Id. at 4-3.1 cmt. at 148.
"6' MODEL CODE OF PROF'L RESPONSIBILITY EC 7-26 (1981).
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know that the evidence is false. 6 ' The Model Rules provide that "[a] lawyer
shall abide by a client's decisions concerning the objectives of
representation... and shall consult with the client as to the means by which
they are to be pursued."'' 63 Further, the Rules expressly list certain client
decisions by which the lawyer must abide. 16 The decision of whether to call
witnesses is not listed among the decisions committed to the client; this
omission seems to support the allocation of those decisions to lawyers. The
comment, however, notes that "lawyers usually defer to the client regarding
such questions as the expense to be incurred and concern for third persons
who might be adversely affected."' 65 The Rules ultimately decline to resolve
the matter. The comment continues by noting that, "[b]ecause of the varied
nature of the matters about which a lawyer and client might disagree" and
because the actions in question may implicate the interests of a tribunal or
other persons, this rule does not prescribe how such disagreements are to be
resolved."' 66
The Supreme Court has never expressly decided if the Constitution
answers the question of whether lawyer or client has the final authority to
decide which witnesses to call. After comprehensively reviewing the
Court's jurisprudence on the subject, Rodney Uphoff concluded that
"neither the Constitution nor the Supreme Court offers a definitive answer
. . . or significant guidance in resolving the troublesome allocation of
decision-making questions that lawyers, clients, and courts regularly
confront."' 67
Still, at times, justices have made relevant statements. Chief Justice
Burger, concurring in Wainwright v. Sykes, 6' expressed in a footnote that
"[o]nly such basic decisions as whether to plead guilty, waive a jury, or
testify in one's own behalf are ultimately for the accused to make."'6 9 He
thereby implied that choices about which witnesses to call belong to
lawyers. Justice Marshall, dissenting in Alvord v. Wainwright, insinuated
that the decision of which witnesses to call probably belongs to the
62 Id.; Uphoff, supra note 8, at 774 (discussing aforementioned canon).
1 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2002).
6 Id.
165 Id. at 1.2(a) crnt. 2.
166id.
167 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 789.
68 Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72 (1977).
169 Id. at 93 n. 1 (Burger, C.J., concurring); see also Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S.
956, 956, 959 (1984) (Marshall, J., dissenting) (allocating to the defendant decisions to
plead, to testify, and to waive jury).
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lawyer. 70 Also, in Taylor v. Illinois, 171 Justice Stevens stated a fairly strong
version of the lawyer preference. 172 Even Faretta,173 which otherwise states
a strong preference for client control, acknowledged that "law and tradition
may allocate to the counsel the power to make binding decisions of trial
strategy in many areas." 174
Many lower courts also allocate the decision to lawyers.'75 In making
that allocation, courts often reject the argument that the defendant's right of
self representation logically includes within it the power both to demand
counsel and to direct counsel's actions. 76 Those courts hold that, by
accepting counsel, the defendant surrenders the right to decide which
witnesses to call.'77 On the other hand, some courts and commentators give
the defendant the final decision about which witnesses to call. 78 In making
that allocation, courts often reason that the greater right of self
1 70See Alvord, 469 U.S. at 961 ("As this Court has noted, '[w]ith the exception of [the
three] specified fundamental decisions [involving waiver of constitutional rights], an
attorney's duty is to take professional responsibility for the conduct of the case, after
consulting with his client.' When counsel is obliged to make the decision himself, blind
deference to a client's wishes, without any investigation, is unquestionably inappropriate and
constitutionally ineffective." (quoting Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 753 n.6 (1983))
(citation omitted).
"' Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
172 Id. at 417-18 ("Although there are basic fights that the attorney cannot waive
without the fully informed and publicly acknowledged consent of the client, the lawyer
has-and must have-full authority to manage the conduct of the trial. The adversary
process could not function effectively if every tactical decision required client approval.").
"' Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975).
114 Id. at 820.
175 E.g., United States v. Long, 674 F.2d 848, 855 (1 1th Cir. 1982); United States v.
Miller, 643 F.2d 713, 714 (10th Cir. 1981); Eaton v. United States, 437 F.2d 362, 363 (9th
Cir. 1971); State v. Lee, 689 P.2d 153, 158 (Ariz. 1984); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 92
(Conn. 1986); Boyd v. United States, 586 A.2d 670, 673 (D.C. 1991); Ridley v. State, 5 10
S.E.2d 113, 119 (Ga. Ct. App. 1998); Cauley v. State, 416 S.E.2d 575, 577 (Ga. Ct. App.
1992); Levesque v. State, 664 A.2d 849, 852 (Me. 1995); State v. Rubinstein, 531 N.E.2d
732, 740 (Ohio Ct. App. 1987) (declaring that decision regarding what witnesses to call and
what questions to ask belongs to lawyer, but upholding performance of lawyer who, at
client's direction, declined to cross-examine any of state's witnesses).
176 State v. Pratts, 366 A.2d 1327, 1333-34 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1975), aftd, 365
A.2d 928 (N.J. 1976).
177 See id.
17' E.g., Blanco v. State, 452 So. 2d 520, 524 (Fla. 1984) ("[T]he trial court did not err
in allowing appellant to present witnesses. The ultimate decision is the defendant's."); see
also State v. Thomas, 625 S.W.2d 115, 123-24 (Mo. 1981). See generally Uphoff, supra
note 8, at 799-800 (proposing that, generally, allocation of the decision about which
witnesses to call should be to the defendant, unless certain factors are satisfied).
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representation necessarily implies that the defendant retains the lesser right
to decide, even against the advice of counsel, which witnesses to call. 79
In some jurisdictions, one finds contradictory authority on the
question.' For example, in People v. Abt,' 8 ' an Illinois court wrote that
"certain matters involving trial strategy are left to the discretion of trial
counsel, such as: whether to offer certain evidence, whether to call
particular witnesses, which defense theory to present at trial, and whether
and how to conduct cross-examination. 1 8 2 But Abt did not take into
account the earlier case of People v. Roofener.183 In that case, an Illinois
trial court allowed defense cousel to withdraw because Roofener wanted to
call witnesses that counsel refused to call.'" If this decision belongs to
lawyers, Roofener's lawyer should simply have refused to call the witnesses
while continuing representation. The appellate court affirmed the trial
court's resolution of the matter, implying that the decision about which
witnesses to call belongs to the defendant. 85
Such case law inconsistencies can be partially explained by the
diversity of the procedural contexts in which allocation disputes arise.
Sometimes a dispute remains hidden from the judge and does not appear in
the record until a post-trial claim of ineffective assistance of counsel is
filed. The defendant then asserts that the lawyer rendered ineffective
assistance either in taking a decision belonging to the defendant 86 or in
yielding to the defendant the power to make a decision on a matter properly
within the lawyer's province.'87 In either event, what could have been a
pristine trial dispute about the proper allocation of the decision in question
becomes an analytically complex post-conviction dispute about ineffective
17 See Thomas, 625 S.W.2d at 124.
180 Compare Burton v. State, 651 So. 2d 641, 656 (Ala. Crim. App. 1993) (allocating
decision to defendants), ajfd, 651 So. 2d 659 (Ala. 1994), with Falkner v. State, 462 So. 2d
1040, 1041-42 (Ala. Crim. App. 1984) (allocating decision to lawyer). Compare State v.
Gary, 501 S.E.2d 57, 62 (N.C. 1998) (allocating decision to lawyer) with State v. Brown,
451 S.E.2d 181, 187 (N.C. 1994) (allocating decision to defendant) and State v. Ali, 407
S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991) (allocating decision to defendant) and State v. McDowell, 407
S.E.2d 200, 211 (N.C. 1991) (allocating decision to lawyer).
... People v. Abt, 646 N.E.2d 1341 (I11. App. Ct. 1995).
182 Id. at 1348; see also People v. Pondexter, 573 N.E.2d 339, 345 (Iil. App. Ct. 1991).
1"3 People v. Roofener, 420 N.E.2d 189 (111. App. Ct. 1981).
184 Id. at 191-92.
"8
5 See id. at 194.
186 E.g., Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 899 (7th Cir. 1986).
1"7 State v. White, 508 S.E.2d 253, 271 (N.C. 1998); Ryder v. State, 83 P.3d 856, 877




Even when the lawyer or client informs the trial court of the existence
of an irreconcilable dispute about a decision in time for the trial court to
investigate and allocate the decision, the disputants frequently complicate
the issue by invoking unnecessary remedies. The lawyer or client,
influenced by the extreme stress of a criminal trial, may view the dispute as
a complete breakdown in the attorney-client relationship requiring a change
of defense counsel. For example, instead of looking for guidance about who
controls a disputed decision, lawyers sometimes seek to withdraw shortly
before trial is to begin. 89 This action only complicates the allocation
decision by presenting it as a problem to be addressed through the rules
governing motions to withdraw. On other occasions, the defendant
complicates the allocation problem by trying to fire the lawyer and proceed
pro se or with new counsel.9 0 Sometimes, even the trial courts themselves
complicate disputes that the disputants appropriately present to the court as
an allocation problem by limiting the defendant to the choice of proceeding
pro se at trial or deferring to counsel's judgment.' 9
Trial courts that resolve allocation problems by requiring a structural
reorganization of the defense face unsatisfactory options. Rarely will courts
allow the substitution of new counsel mid-trial, because that remedy almost
certainly necessitates a mistrial, and may not even resolve the dispute
because new counsel and the defendant may well reach the same impasse. 192
Therefore, courts that simply treat decision allocations as organizational
problems of the defense turn to Faretta and confront the defendant with the
choice ofyielding to counsel's views or proceedingpro se. Defendants who
want only to control a particular decision can do so only if they can get
" See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 452, 453, 455-56 (5th Cir. 2002)
(finding deficient performance where counsel precluded defendant from testifying, but
affirming conviction upon finding no prejudice after applying the test for ineffective
assistance of counsel under Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 688 (1984)), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 2096 (2004).
'
9E.g., Lowenfield v. Phelps, 817 F.2d 285, 289 (5th Cir. 1987), afftd, 484 U.S. 231
(1988); Roofener, 420 N.E.2d at 190 (noting that, instead of seeking confirmation of
counsel's authority to refuse to call a witness, Roofener's lawyer moved to withdraw from
the case).
190 E.g., People v. Bell, 363 N.E.2d 1202, 1205 (Il1. App. Ct. 1977).
... E.g., State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138, 1141-42 (Kan. 2000).
192 See United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 986 (2d Cir. 1972) (stating that "[o]nce
trial has begun, however, a defendant does not have the unbridled right to reject assigned
counsel and demand another").
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through a mid-trial Faretta self representation colloquy.'93 That control
comes at a high price, however, because the defendant will lose the benefit
of counsel for the rest of the trial. If the defendant cannot get through the
Faretta colloquy, the defendant loses control over the decision even if it
involves a matter that properly belongs to the defendant, such as whether
the defendant should testify. In either scenario, the ability of the defendant
to get through the Faretta colloquy becomes the test for allocation of the
decision. I do not mean to suggest that complete breakdowns in the
attorney-client relationship never happen, or that all such breakdowns are
rooted in a dispute about a particular defense decision. But many
defendant-lawyer disputes present simply decision allocation problems.
Treating those disputes as implicating Faretta needlessly substitutes an
inapt legal analysis, and often exacts from defendants a greater price (loss
of representation) than they owe simply for the right to control one
particular decision.
California cases illustrate this procedural context. In some cases,
California courts have held that the decision of which witnesses to call
belongs to the lawyer.'94 However, in other cases California courts have
found no ineffective assistance of counsel when the lawyer simply defers
to the defendant's preference and calls witnesses that the lawyer firmly
believes should not be called. 95 Thus, these courts have upheld both the
right of the lawyer to decide which witnesses to call and also the right of the
lawyer to abdicate that decision to the defendant.
Courts in some other jurisdictions avoid that inconsistency.'96 The flaw
in the California reasoning lies in its conception of the lawyer's power to
decide which witnesses to call as a right personal to the lawyer, and which
the lawyer can waive by deferring to the defendant. That description
misconceives the issue; the lawyer has no personal right or interest in the
defendant's case. The lawyer's power to decide which witnesses to call is
better understood as an obligation that cannot be abandoned rather than as
a right the lawyer may waive.
193 Recall that in Faretta, the Supreme Court found those criminal defendants have a
constitutional right to refuse legal representation and proceed pro se, but only if they can
convince the trial court that they possess the requisite degree of competence, and that they
have made the choice knowingly and intelligently.
194 People v. Williams, 471 P.2d 1008, 1015 (Cal. 1970) (indicating that the lawyer
decides which witnesses to call), construed in People v. Turner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Cal.
Ct. App. 1992).
19' People v. Gadson, 24 Cal. Rptr. 2d 219, 225-26 (Cal. Ct. App. 1993); People v.
Galan, 261 Cal. Rptr. 834, 835-37 (Cal. Ct. App. 1989).




In sum, significant disagreement exists about the proper allocation of
the decision of which what witnesses to call. Support for both sides may be
found in the American Bar Association's various ethical pronouncements.1
97
Jurisdictions across the country have divided on whether to allocate the
decision to the lawyer or to the defendant. In some jurisdictions favoring
allocation to the defendant, there is unreconciled case law implying that the
decision belongs to lawyers. Thus, on balance, the greater weight of
authority seems to allocate this decision to the lawyer. 98
2. Deciding Which Witnesses to Call in the Capital Penalty Phase
The support for assigning witness decisions to lawyers substantially
diminishes when the question arises in the specific context of mitigation
witnesses in capital sentencing trials. The reduction is rather startling, for
one can scarcely imagine another situation in which society could have a
greater interest in the accuracy of the results of trial and, therefore, greater
reason to entrust the decisions to lawyers. Nevertheless, a substantial
consensus assigns decisions about mitigating witnesses to capital
defendants.
In People v. Lang,'99 the California Supreme Court argued for allocation
of this decision to defendants, in the following terms:
To require defense counsel to present mitigating evidence over the
defendant's objection would be inconsistent with an attorney's paramount
duty of loyalty to the client and would undermine the trust, essential for
effective representation, existing between attorney and client. Moreover,
imposing such a duty could cause some defendants who otherwise would
not have done so to exercise their Sixth Amendment right of self
representation before commencement of the guilt phase in order to retain
control over the presentation of evidence at the penalty phase, resulting in
a significant loss of legal protection for these defendants during the guilt
phase.
200
'9' See supra notes 158-60 and accompanying text.
19 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 792 ("On the specific issue of who ultimately controls the
selection of witnesses, case law is split. The vast majority of state courts that have
confronted the question have resolved the issue by declaring it a tactical matter to be decided
by defense counsel.").
199 People v. Lang, 782 P.2d 627 (Cal. 1989).
200 Id. at 653 (citations omitted).
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The court justified its allocation of the decision to the defendant in part
out of concern for the reliability of outcomes. With that allocation, the court
sought to protect the attorney-client relationship in order to prevent the
greater harm of self representation.2"'
Other courts allocate the decision to defendants,2"2 presumably re-
cognizing that the allocation generally works against the defendant's best
interest, but nonetheless doing so on the ground that the defendant's interest
in dignity and autonomy command it.2"' Apparently, the Supreme Court
also endorses that view, insofar as it has found no constitutional violation
in cases in which a defendant has chosen to present no mitigating
evidence.20" Some commentators also endorse this allocation.2 5
The New Jersey Supreme Court, in State v. Koedatich, decided not to
assign mitigation witness decisions to capital defendants,20 6 instead assig-
2o Id.; see also Kirksey v. State, 923 P.2d 1102, 1112 (Nev. 1996) (following the
reasoning of the Lang Court and finding that defendants cannot claim ineffective assistance
of counsel when counsel merely followed their instructions).
202 See, e.g., State v. Roscoe, 910 P.2d 635, 650 (Ariz. 1996); Koon v. Dugger, 619 So.
2d 246, 250, 251 (Fla. 1993); People v. Burton, 703 N.E.2d 49, 63 (I11. 1998); Trimble v.
State, 693 S.W.2d 267, 280 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985); People v. Lavalle, 697 N.Y.S.2d 241,
242-43 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. 1999); State v. Ashworth, 706 N.E.2d 1231, 1237 (Ohio 1999);
Wallace v. State, 893 P.2d 504, 510 (Okla. Crim. App. 1995); Commonwealth v. Sam, 635
A.2d 603, 611-12 (Pa. 1993); Zagorski v. State, 983 S.W.2d 654, 660-61 (Tenn. 1998);
State v. Woods, 23 P.3d 1046, 1083 (Wash. 2001).
203 E.g., Roscoe, 910 P.2d at 650 (noting a "strong privacy interest"); Lavelle, 697
N.Y.S.2d at 242-43 (describing the decision as "fundamental" and belonging to the client
even if it is "best left to the attorney").
204 See, e.g., Godinez v. Moran, 509 U.S. 389, 392-93, 402 (1993); Blystone v.
Pennsylvania, 494 U.S. 299, 306 & n.4 (1990) (affirming death sentence where "[a]fter
receiving repeated warnings from the trial judge, and contrary advice from his counsel,
petitioner decided not to present any proof of mitigating evidence .... ").
205 Bonnie, supra note 17, at 1387; Michael Mello, Representing Death Row: An
ArgumentforAttorney-Assisted Suicide, 34 CRiM. L. BULL. 48, 60-64 (1998); Slobogin &
Mashburn, supra note 77, at 1638-39; Welsh S. White, Defendants Who Elect Execution,
48 U. PITrr. L. REV. 853, 868-69 (1987).
206 State v. Koedatich, 548 A.2d 939, 993 (N.J. 1988); see also People v. Clark, 833
P.2d 561, 623 (Cal. 1992) (noting that defense was allowed to call mitigating witnesses over
personal objection of defendant); People v. Deere, 710 P.2d 925, 931 (Cal. 1985) (holding
that defense counsel's failure to present mitigating evidence during the penalty phase of a
capital murder trial constituted ineffective assistance of counsel); Muhammad v. State, 782
So. 2d 343, 363-64 (Fla. 2001) (finding that where defendant refused to present mitigating
evidence, trial court erred in failing to provide an alternative means of advising the jury of
available mitigating evidence); Klokoc v. State, 589 So. 2d 219,220 (Fla. 1991) (noting that
the trial court allowed counsel to present mitigating evidence over the objection of the
defendant); Morrison v. State, 373 S.E.2d 506, 509 (Ga. 1988) (finding that the decision of
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ning them to defense counsel. In so ruling, the court relied on "the State's
'interest in a reliable penalty determination.' 27 The court noted that the
constitutionality of the state's death penalty statute depends upon the
presence of procedures enabling the sentencer to distinguish the few
offenders deserving of death from the greater number more appropriately
punished by life imprisonment. The court accordingly assigned the witness
decision to the lawyer because:
A defendant who prevents the presentation of mitigating evidence
"withholds from the trier of fact potentially crucial information bearing on
the penalty decision .... It is self-evident that the state and its citizens
have an overwhelming interest in insuring that there is no mistake in the
imposition of the death penalty .... Without any evidence in the record
of mitigating factors we are missing a significant portion of the evidence
that enables us to determine if the imposition of the death penalty was
appropriate. Hence, we would be unable to discharge our constitutional
and statutory requirement to review a judgment, and, therefore, we would




In United States v. Davis,2 °9 a federal court devised an ingenious
solution to the problem, allowing Davis to represent himself at his capital
sentencing trial, while appointing an "independent counsel... to represent
the interest ofthe public." 10 That lawyer would present mitigating evidence
while the defendant, representing himself, intended to present none.2 ' The
Fifth Circuit, however, rejected the trial court's effort to preserve both the
defendant's autonomy and the quality of the information presented to the
jury. The court relied in part on its conclusion that Davis's "right to self
representation encompasses the right to direct trial strategy," and that
appointment of an independent counsel to present a different theory of
mitigation undermined that right.2 12 In dissent, Judge Dennis rejected the
notion that a capital defendant's right of self representation is:
an insuperable right that is not diminished by the dramatic change in the
defendant's autonomy interest resulting from his criminal conviction; an
impregnable right that so outweighs the national interest in fairness,
whether to present mitigating witnesses ultimately belongs to the defendant, but noting that
the trial court may have an independent duty to investigate mitigating evidence).
207 Koedatich, 548 A.2d at 993 (quoting Deere, 710 P.2d at 931).
201 Id. at 994-95 (citations omitted).
209 United States v. Davis, 285 F.3d 378 (5th Cir. 2002).
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accuracy, and equality in federal capital sentencing proceedings that it
permits of no significant regulation or supplementation by the trial courts;
and a right that is so perfect and untrammeled that the convicted capital
offender may, within his complete discretion, use it either to make a
defense or to condemn himself to death.213
Some commentators join New Jersey and Judge Dennis in preferring to
allocate the mitigating witness decision away from defendants.1 n
Notwithstanding the substantial authority in most jurisdictions
supporting assignment of mitigation witness decisions to defendants, there
exists a sub-theme in the case law reflecting courts' reluctance to live with
the consequences of that allocation. Many federal courts, reviewing habeas
claims brought by condemned prisoners, adopt a kind of intermediate
position. This position grants the defendant final authority to decide
whether to present mitigating evidence, but insists that defense counsel
must first investigate mitigating evidence and, in essence, try to persuade
the defendant to allow its presentation.215 Only upon a thorough showing of
the voluntariness and "intelligence" of the defendant's decision not to
present mitigating witnesses will the courts sustain a death sentence.216
The North Carolina Supreme Court's decision in State v. Wilkinson
2 17
exemplifies the reluctance of courts to allow defendants casually to commit
"' Id. at 387 (Dennis, J., dissenting).
214 E.g., Anthony J. Casey, Maintaining the Integrity of Death: An Argument for
Restricting a Defendant's Right to Volunteer for Execution at Certain Stages in Capital
Proceedings, 30 Am. J. CRIM. L. 75 (2002) (finding that "[i]t is not at all necessary to allow
a prevention of the presentation of mitigating evidence to justify the defendant's need to
admit guilt."); Laura A. Rosenwald, Note, Death Wish: What Washington Courts ShouldDo
When a Capital Defendant Wants to Die, 68 WASH. L. REv. 735, 750-52 (1993) (supporting
appointment of neutral third party to investigate and present mitigating evidence when
defendant wishes to bar it).
215 See Hardwick v. Crosby, 320 F.3d 1127, 1189-90 (11th Cir. 2003); Silva v.
Woodford, 279 F.3d 825,838 (9th Cir. 2002); Coleman v. Mitchell, 268 F.3d 417, 445-50
(6th Cir. 2001); Battenfield v. Gibson, 236 F.3d 1215, 1226-30 (10th Cir. 2001); see also
Marshall v. Hendricks, 307 F.3d 36, 103 (3d Cir. 2002) (rejecting defendant's claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel based on counsel's failure to prevent specific types of
mitigating evidence); State v. Lewis, 838 So. 2d 1102, 1113 (Fla. 2002) (setting a high
standard with respect to knowing and intelligent condition of waiver). But see Anderson v.
State, 574 So. 2d 87, 95 (Fla. 1991) (stating that no inquiry into voluntariness is necessary
when represented defendant wishes to preclude presentation of mitigating evidence).
116 Marshall, 307 F.3d at 103; Battenfield, 236 F.3d at 1226-30.
217 See generally State v. Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d 375 (N.C. 1996).
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what, in essence, is "suicide by jury."21  Wilkinson had been sentenced to
death for murders committed in the course of burglary and rape.219 While
North Carolina courts generally evince a very strong preference for
allocating decisions to defendants, 221 the Wilkinson court upheld the trial
court's allocation of the decision to present mitigating witnesses to
Wilkinson's lawyer.21 The court found, somewhat unpersuasively in light
of the record, that Wilkinson insufficiently stated his determination not to
present mitigating evidence:
MR. MCGLOTHLIN [defense counsel]: ... Mr. Wilkinson has certain
desires on phase two which are inconsistent with what Mr. Carter and I
•feel [is] our responsibility as his lawyers .... He instructed us at one time
this past weekend not to put on certain evidence we had, certain witnesses.
We have expert witnesses. And we would like some guidance from the
Court as to what our responsibilities are when our client instructs us in this
matter ....
THE COURT: .. . Your attorneys have indicated that you have certain
desires in respect to a sentencing proceeding. What are those at this time?
THE DEFENDANT: Your Honor, first of all I would like to have these
extra motions dismissed. I just don't see the need for it. I'm guilty of what
I'm charged with. I've already said that .... I just want to make it as
simple as possible and as easy as possible and get this over with as quickly
as possible. And I do want my lawyers to represent me. And I think
they've done a good job. As far as the sentencing, I would just like
to ....
THE COURT: Well, at this time I'm going to enter a general directive to
your attorneys to simply proceed to offer the evidence that they have
developed in respect to any issues on mitigating circumstances that appear
of record. They have a duty both as... attorneys and as officers of the
Court to at least do that on your behalf .... For our present purposes, I'm
going to direct them to proceed with the evidence they've developed. All
right, sir?
2 Id.; Joseph E. Wilhelm & Kelly L. Culshaw, Ohio 's Death Penalty Statute: The
Good, the Bad, and the Ugly, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 549, 617 (2002) (noting societal interest that
criminal defendants not use the death penalty as a form of state-assisted suicide).
2 9 Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d at 379.
220 State v. White, 508 S.E.2d 253, 271, 273 (N.C. 1998) (allocating even the decision
as to what questions to ask to the defendant).
221 Wilkinson, 474 S.E.2d at 382.
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THE DEFENDANT: All right. Thank you. 222
The trial lawyers then presented the evidence Wilkinson wanted to
block. On appeal, Wilkinson argued that his sentence should be reversed
because the trial court took from him the authority to make a decision that
North Carolina law clearly commits to defendants.223 In affirming the death
sentence, the North Carolina Supreme Court conformed to a sub-theme
which holds defendants to a high standard of clarity when they wish to
prevent the presentation of mitigating evidence. 24 However, in this case the
sub-theme atypically operated against mercy in the appellate court, as the
court affirmed Wilkinson's death sentence.
The discussion thus far has neglected to distinguish two different
versions of a defendant's decision not to call mitigating witnesses. Some
defendants try to keep any mitigating witnesses from testifying, while still
opposing imposition of a death sentence.2 25 Other defendants try to keep any
mitigating witnesses from testifying because, after conviction for capital
murder, they prefer a death sentence to any of the remaining grim
alternatives.2 26 Defendants of the first kind clearly are trying to control an
evidentiary decision. Defendants of the second kind, however, seem be
contesting a different decision, even though it takes the form of a dispute
about calling witnesses.
Defendants who want a death sentence are really making a
deliberation-structuring decision. They wish to control the choices available
to the sentencing jury by withdrawing defense opposition to it, leaving only
the choice of death.227 The case of Vietnam veteran Wayne Felde, convicted
of capital murder in Louisiana, illustrates how a defendant may use closing
argument to control the choices available to the jury.228 The guilt-phase jury
had rejected a defense focused on Felde's post-traumatic stress disorder.229
Felde made the following final argument to the sentencing jury:
222 Id. at 381.
223 id.
224 Id. at 399-400.
22S Grim v. State, 841 So. 2d 455, 459 (Fla. 2003); Chandler v. State, 702 So. 2d 186,
191 (Fla. 1997).226 See, e.g., Felde v. Butler, 817 F.2d 281,282 (5th Cir. 1987); Autry v. McKaskle, 727
F.2d 358, 361 (5th Cir.1984); People v. Sanders, 797 P.2d 561, 592 (Cal. 1990); State v.
Shafer, 969 S.W.2d 719, 738 (Mo. 1998) (en banc); State v. Keith, 684 N.E.2d 47, 55 (Ohio
1997); Wallace v. State, 935 P.2d 366, 370 (Okla. Crim. App. 1997); Commonwealth v.
Sam, 635 A.2d 603, 611 (Pa. 1993).
227 See infra Part II.D discussing the allocation of deliberation-structuring decisions.




All I have to say is . . . whether you all believed what we'd said
-throughout this defense or not, it is true. There are two hundred thousand
other veterans suffering with it and I'm sorry you didn't believe it but,
however, I do pray that you will come back with the death penalty. I'm not
coming out and threatening anybody because that's not what it is. A
walking time bomb, that's what it is. Somebody else will die as a result of
it if I'm not put to death, I am sure. It's happened twice in eight years.
There's been ten years of proof shown to you. I don't know where it went
so, please, return that. I think, as countrymen, you owe me that much. I did
.my part. Please do yours. Okay? Thank you. Thank you, Judge
Humphries, for a fair trial.23°
No court opinions acknowledge the different motivations that induce
capital defendants to oppose the presentation of mitigating testimony. No
court makes the allocation of the mitigating witness decision dependent
upon the nature of the defendant's reason for opposing such testimony.
Courts act correctly in refusing to make the allocation of the witness
decision depend on the defendant's motivation because, for the reasons set
out below, lawyers should control both mitigating witness and
deliberation-structuring decisions. The difference in motivation, thus
should not cause any difference in allocation.
In general, a coherent scheme should allocate ultimate control over
evidentiary decisions and deliberation-structuring decisions to the same
person. Ifevidentiary decisions and deliberation-structuring decisions were
allocated separately-one to the lawyer and the other to the defendant-the
law would thereby create the worst of all possible worlds, protecting neither
reliability nor dignity. For example, imagine that the law gave the lawyer
control over evidentiary decisions, while giving the defendant control over
the deliberation-structuring decision of how to argue the penalty issue to
the jury' The lawyer would possess the power to introduce mitigating
testimony against the defendant's will and thereby wound the defendant's
dignity. However, the defendant could, like Felde, prevent the lawyer from
using closing argument to explain that mitigating testimony to the jury,
thereby undermining the reliability of deliberations and the resulting
sentence.
The only evidentiary decision defendants should control is the decision
of whether the defendant will testify. The assignment of that evidentiary
230 Id. at 285. Felde was executed in 1988. Deborah W. Denno, When Legislatures
Delegate Death: The Troubling Paradox Behind State Uses of Electrocution and Lethal
Injection and What it SaysAbout Us, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 63, 137 (2002) (listing Felde's 1988
execution among botched electrocutions).
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decision to defendants does impose a cost to reliability, but it is a necessary
cost in light of this article's conclusion that the law must vindicate the very
significant dignity interest defendants have in making decisions about their
personal participation in trial.23' In other instances, however, the law should
not allocate to separate persons the ultimate authority over such
closely-related decisions.
3. Decisions About How to Question Witnesses
The pattern of allocation observed in witness-calling decisions appears
in a substantially similar form with respect to witness-questioning
decisions. The case law generally favors the allocation of questioning
decisions to lawyers. However, there is authority to the contrary which
enjoys especially strong support in the context of capital punishment.
The ABA Standards provide that "[s]trategic and tactical decisions
should be made by defense counsel after consultation with the client where
feasible and appropriate. Such decisions include what witnesses to call,
whether and how to conduct cross-examination ... and what evidence
should be introduced. '232 The references to cross-examination and the
introduction of evidence as decisions that "should be made by defense
counsel" supports the allocation of witness-questioning decisions to
lawyers.233
Though it has not expressly decided the issue, the Supreme Court also
seems to favor allocation of questioning decisions to lawyers. In his
separate opinion in Brookhart v. Janis, 234 Justice Harlan declared that "a
lawyer may properly make a tactical determination of how to run a trial
even in the face of his client's incomprehension or even explicit
disapproval. The decision, for example, whether or not to cross-examine a
specific witness is, I think, very clearly one for counsel alone."235 Even
Justice Brennan, who tends to favor allocation of decisions to defendants,
believed that lawyers should decide whether and how to question witnesses,
at least insofar as those decisions must be made quickly:
In the course of a trial, however, decisions must often be made in a matter
of hours, if not minutes or seconds. From the standpoint of effective
administration of justice, the need to confer decisive authority on the
attorney is paramount with regard to the hundreds of decisions that must
231 See infra Part III.B.
112 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2(b) (1993).
233 Uphoff, supra note 8, at 769 (preserving substantial area of lawyer's craft for lawyer
decision making).
234 Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1 (1966).
2351 Id. at 8 (Harlan, J., dissenting).
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be made quickly in the course of a trial.236
In Henry v. Mississippi,237 the Supreme Court further supported
allocating questioning decisions to counsel in declaring that only "where the
circumstances are exceptional" would tactical or strategic decisions made
by counsel, even without consultation with the defendant, not bind the
defendant.238 The Court did not explain, however, what constitutes
"exceptional circumstances."
Lower courts have also frequently declared that decisions about the
questioning of witnesses belong to defense counsel. 239 The court in Rhay v.
Browder2" explained that
when a defendant has counsel,... it is counsel's decision on a question
such as is here involved that must control. Counsel is the manager of the
lawsuit; this is of the essence of the adversary system of which we are so
proud. In the nature of things he must be, because he knows how to do the
job and the defendant does not. That is why counsel must be there.241
Some courts extend the principle to allow counsel to stipulate to the
testimony of a prosecution witness, thereby waiving the defendant's right
to confront that testimony.242 In People v. Campbell, for example, the court
held that counsel could stipulate, without the defendant's consent, to the
testimony of a prosecution witness. 243 The court did, however, limit that
power to stipulations that do not amount to guilty pleas.2 "
Other courts disagree and hold that the decision of whether to stipulate
236 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 760 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting).
237 Henry v. Mississippi, 379 U.S. 443 (1965).
2381 Id. at 451-52.
239 Wilson v. Gray, 345 F.2d 282,286 (9th Cir. 1965); Cruzado v. Puerto Rico, 210 F.2d
789, 791 (1 st Cir. 1954); Fukunaga v. Territory of Hawaii, 33 F.2d 396,397 (9th Cir. 1929);
United States ex rel. Jones v. Meyers, 226 F. Supp. 343, 344 (E.D. Pa. 1964); People v.
Murphy, 503 P.2d 594, 607 (Cal. 1972); People v. Ramey, 604 N.E.2d 275, 281 (Ill. 1992).
240 Rhay v. Browder, 342 F.2d 345 (9th Cir. 1965).
241 Id. at 349.
242 United States v. Calabro, 467 F.2d 973, 985-86 (2d Cir. 1972); Poole v. Fitzharris,
396 F.2d 544, 545-46 (9th Cir. 1968); People v. Campbell, 773 N.E.2d 218, 223 (111. App.
Ct. 2002), aff'd, 802 N.E.2d 1205 (I11. 2003), cert. denied, 125 S. Ct. 149 (2004).
243 Campbell, 773 N.E.2d at 223.
244 Id. An example of such a situation is when the State's entire case is to be presented
by stipulation. For defendant to agree in all aspects of the case is tantamount to admitting
guilt.
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to the testimony of a prosecution witness belongs to the defendant.245 In
Carter v. Sowders,246 the Sixth Circuit wrote that even if defense counsel's
actions
could constitute a waiver of the defendant's rights under the Confrontation
Clause, the waiver would not bind [the defendant] in the absence of a
showing that he consented. As the Supreme Court stated in Faretta v.
California: "It is the accused, not counsel, who must be 'informed of the
nature and cause of the accusation,' who must be 'confronted with the
witnesses against him'. . . The right to defend is given directly to the
accused; for it is he who suffers the consequences if the defense fails."
247
When the death sentence looms, however, it appears that courts tend
to allocate to the defendant decisions about how to question mitigation
witnesses.248 During the penalty phase of State v. White,2 49 defense counsel
called White's aunt to testify about the history of domestic violence and
abuse in the family while White was growing up.21° White told the judge
that he did not want his lawyers to elicit that testimony, explaining that
[m]y family as far as that goes have nothing to do with this
case at all... [;] what they did, ain't got nothing to do with this right
here. I don't feel like it should be brought out. I don't feel like it should
come before anybody in this courtroom. Not even you.251
White further insisted that testimony about childhood abuse he had
suffered would conflict with his guilt-phase claim of innocence. By the
time of the penalty-phase discussion, the jury had of course already
convicted White of murder and rejected his guilt-phase defense. Still, the
245 E.g., United States v. Stephens, 609 F.2d 230, 232-33 (5th Cir. 1980); Phillips v.
Wyrick, 558 F.2d 489, 496 (8th Cir. 1977); Dean v. Commonwealth, 777 S.W.2d 900,
902-03 (Ky. 1989), overruled in part by 120 S.W.3d 635 (Ky. 2003); DeRosa v. First
Judicial Dist., 985 P.2d 157, 163 (Nev. 1999), overruled in part by 100 P.3d 658 (Nev.
2004); Raquepaw v. State, 843 P.2d 364, 366 (Nev. 1992).
246 Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975 (6th Cir. 1993).
147 Id. at 981-82 (citations omitted).
211 See, e.g., Tilley v. State, 963 P.2d 607, 616 (Okla. Crim. App. 1998) (holding that
guidelines require that a court determine whether the defendant understands the effect of
failing to present mitigating evidence); State v. Arguelles, 63 P.3d 731, 754 (Utah 2003).
249 State v. White, 508 S.E.2d 253 (N.C. 1998).




trial court ordered counsel not to ask White's aunt about any childhood
abuse. 2 White was sentenced to death, and the North Carolina Supreme
Court affirmed the judgment. 53
The North Carolina court's judgment follows that jurisdiction's
exceptionally strong preference for allocating all decisions to defendants in
the event of an attorney-client impasse.254 The allocation of witness-
questioning decisions to capital defendants, however, makes less sense in
jurisdictions that assign such decisions to counsel in non-capital cases. One
finds no explanation in the case law that reconciles these two lines of
authority.
Perhaps, in the minds of judges, there is a sense that lines of
questioning ofimitigating witnesses touch a defendant's dignity much more
deeply than does any conceivable line of questioning about prosecution
evidence or a guilt-phase defense. It takes no special powers of imagination
to understand something about the predicament of the capital defendant in
a case involving such evidence. That defendant, already deeply shamed by
the guilt-phase public airing of the horrible details of his crime, next faces
the prospect of seeing his own lawyers systematically demolish the
carefully constructed pretense of wholesome normality which exists least
in the troubled homes that cherish it most. It is no wonder that the capital
defendant, now despised by the world for his crime, rarely relishes watching
his last companions-his family-attacked for the suffering they visited
upon him in years past.
However, the Constitution and experience teach that the defendant's
past is usually relevant to the jury's decision of whether he must die for his
crime. 5 Thus, society's interest in the accuracy of that decision rises in
proportion to the gravity of the wound inflicted upon the defendant's
dignity by the mitigation case. The problem admits of no easy answer.
4. Decisions of Whether to Raise Objections to Prosecution Evidence
The final sub-category ofevidentiary decisions discussed here includes
decisions about whether to seek suppression of prosecution evidence. Most
authorities allocate those decisions to lawyers, but a few assign such
decisions to defendants.
The ABA Standards clearly seem to assign such decisions to lawyers by
providing that "[s]trategic and tactical decisions should be made by defense
252 Id. at 271-73.
253 Id. at 258.
... See supra notes 180 and 187.
... E.g., Wiggins v. Smith, 539 U.S. 510, 535-37 (2003).
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counsel after consultations with the client where feasible and appropriate.
Such decisions include... what trial motions should be made .... 256
The courts are split as to whether decisions to seek suppression of
evidence belong to lawyers or defendants. Many courts assign those
decisions to the lawyer." 7 In People v. Turner,25s for example, Turner
wanted his lawyer to file a motion to suppress certain prosecution evidence.
The lawyer refused to do so, finding no plausible grounds for such a
motion. 9 On appeal, the court declared the matter tactical, even though the
defendant's constitutional rights were involved because the claim
challenged the constitutionality of a search.26 ° Thus, the court drew a sharp
distinction between Turner's competing interests: his Fourth Amendment
interest in the privacy of his home, and his interest in the use of the
exclusionary rule to bar the fruits of the search. Had the lawyer been present
in Turner's home at the time of the search, and at that moment sought to
waive Turner's Fourth Amendment rights by consenting to the search over
Turner's objection, the court apparently would have found that the lawyer
acted beyond his authority. However, if in subsequent criminal proceedings
the fruits of that search were offered against Turner, the court would have
found that the lawyer had the power to waive objection, even against
Turner's wishes. Fundamentally, the court justified the change in the
assignment by recognizing that the latter decision arises in the context of
adversary criminal proceedings.26'
A few courts, however, allocate decisions about whether to challenge
evidence to defendants, at least when the challenge claims a violation of the
defendant's constitutional rights.262 Two premises motivate those courts to
256 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2(b) (3d ed. 1993).
... United States v. McGill, 11 F.3d 223, 227 (1st Cir. 1993) (discussing whether to
object to prosecution introducing to the jury excerpts from the film The Deerhunter); Curry
v. Wilson, 405 F.2d 110, 112-13(9th Cir. 1968) (discussing whether counsel must move to
suppress statements); Jarrell v. Boles, 272 F. Supp. 755, 758 (N.D. W. Va. 1967) (discussing
whether to move to suppress statements); People v. Lanphear, 608 P.2d 689, 697 (Cal.
1980), vacated by 449 U.S. 810 (1980) (discussing whether an objection should be made);
State v. Johnson, 714 S.W.2d 752, 765-66 (Mo. Ct. App. 1986) (discussing whether to
objectto hearsay). Butsee Lovett v. Foltz, 687 F. Supp. 1126, 1135-37 (E.D. Mich. 1988),
affd, 884 F.2d 579 (6th Cir. 1989) (finding that an attorney's failure to challenge a witness's
testimony did not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel).
258 People v. Turner, 10 Cal. Rptr. 2d 358 (Ct. App. 1992).
259 Id. at 360.
'601d. at 362-63.
261 Id. at 362-63.
262 E.g., United States ex rel. Snyder v. Mazurkiewicz, 413 F.2d 500, 502 (3d Cir.
1969); Reeves v. Warden, 346 F.2d 915,926-27 (4th Cir. 1965); State v. Mendes, 210 A.2d
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allocate such decisions to defendants. First, they believe the defendant's
constitutional rights are implicated as much in the use of illegally-seized
evidence at trial as in the illegal seizure itself. Second, they use the rubric
of constitutional rights to identify those rights that cannot be waived by
counsel against the wishes of the defendant.
C. Decisions Involving the Defendant's Direct, Personal Participation
The next category includes decisions about the represented defendant's
direct, personal participation at trial. This category includes only those
activities which no one but the defendant can perform, such as appearing at
trial or testifying. Those activities which the defendant, if the law allowed
it, could perform personally, such as questioning witnesses or making
motions are excluded from this category. Those activities that the law could
allocate to the lawyer are discussed in other sections.
The weight of authority allocates to the defendant the decision of
whether to appear at trial. Here, as elsewhere, a significant minority view
exists allocating the decision to the lawyer. With respect to the decision of
whether the defendant will testify, a substantial consensus exists allocating
that decision to the defendant.
1. The Decision of Whether the Defendant Will Attend Trial
The Constitution protects the right of a defendant to attend trial.263 In
Hopt v. Utah,2 4 the Supreme Court reversed a murder conviction where the
defendant was absent during a portion of jury selection.265 Writing for the
Court, the first Justice Harlan declared that the defendant's
life or liberty may depend upon the aid which, by his personal presence,
he may give to counsel and to the court and triers, in the selection of
jurors. The necessities of the defense may not be met by the presence of
his counsel only .... We are of opinion that it was not within the power
of the accused or his counsel to dispense with the statutory requirement as
to his personal presence at the trial.
266
50, 53, 56 (R.I. 1965); see also Uviller, supra note 21, at 774-76 (discussing mistrial
example).
263 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
264 Hopt v. Utah, 110 U.S. 574 (1884).
263 Id. at 583.
266 Id. at 578-79.
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Thus, Hopt recognized a right of presence waivable neither by lawyer nor
by client because of the possibility that the defendant might aid counsel in
making defense decisions. But that justification alone does not support the
other element of the Hopt rule which bars even the defendant from waiving
his right to be present. 267 To support that element, the Court explained that
society, as well as the defendant, has an interest in the justice of the
defendant's punishment:
268
The great end of punishment is not the expiation or atonement of the
offence committed, but the prevention of future offenses of the same kind.
Such being the relation which [sic] the citizen holds to the public, and the
object of punishment for public wrongs, the legislature has deemed it
essential to the protection of one whose life or liberty is involved in a
prosecution for felony that he shall be personally present at the trial; that
is at every stage of the trial when his substantial rights may be affected by
the proceedings against him. If he be deprived of his life or liberty without
being so present, such deprivation would be without that due process of
law required by the constitution.269
Thus, in Hopt the decision about defendant's presence at trial was taken
from the defense altogether; the defendant had to be present, and neither
counsel nor defendant could waive that right.270
The Supreme Court later limited Hopt, returning the decision to the
defense and noting that, in some circumstances, the Constitution did not
guarantee a defendant's right to be present.27' In Snyder v. Massachusetts,
Justice Cardozo wrote that "[s]o far as the Fourteenth Amendment is
concerned, the presence of a defendant is a condition of due process to the
extent that a fair and just hearing would be thwarted by his absence, and to
267 id.
268 Id. at 579.
269 id.
2"0 See also Lewis v. United States, 146 U.S. 370, 372 (1892) ("[I]n felonies it is not in
the power of the prisoner, either by himself or his counsel, to waive the right to be
personally present during the trial.").
271 See Kentucky v. Stincer, 482 U.S. 730, 747 (1987) (holding there is no constitutional
right to be present at hearing on competency of testifying witnesses); United States v.
Gagnon, 470 U.S. 522, 526 (1985) (holding there is no constitutional right to presence at
discussion between judge andjuror); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,342-43 (1970) (holding
that right to presence may be waived by bad courtroom behavior); Snyder v. Massachusetts,
291 U.S. 97, 108 (1934) (holding there is no constitutional right to presence at the jury's
view of a murder scene), overruled in part by 378 U.S. 1 (1964); Diaz v. United States, 223
U.S. 442, 445 (1912) (finding that the right to presence may be waived by the defense).
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that extent only." 72 In Taylor v. Illinois,2" the Court, in dicta, suggested
that the decision of whether to waive the defendant's presence belongs to
the defendant personally.274 However, the Supreme Court has not
specifically decided that question.
Lower courts have considered the specific question of whether counsel
may waive a defendant's right to be present; some hold that counsel may
waive that right.275 In State v. Levato, the Arizona Supreme Court assigned
the decision to counsel, reasoning that:
an unalterable rule requiring consultation between counsel and the
defendant before the client's right may be waived would interfere with
trials, would frustrate the policy of efficient judicial administration, and
would disserve the courts, attorneys, and litigants who appear in
court-including criminal defendants. To rule otherwise would potentially
force the trial judge to interrupt the proceedings whenever a waiver might
be occurring in order to protect the record on appeal.276
Other courts assign the decision about presence to the defendant. 77
Some confusion remains, however, insofar as courts tend not to allow
defendants to elect to be absent from trial." 8 Of course, a defendant, by
misbehavior, has the power to leave the courtroom, 279 but courts have been
reluctant to make that power a right to leave. This article's proposal that
courts should allocate more decisions to lawyers necessarily implies that
272 Snyder, 291 U.S. at 107-08.
21' Taylor v. Illinois, 484 U.S. 400 (1988).
274 See id. at 417-18.
275 E.g., State v. Levato, 924 P.2d 445, 448-49 (Ariz. 1996); People v. Kidd, 610
N.Y.S.2d 116, 117 (App. Div. 1994); People v. Webb, 520 N.Y.S.2d 629, 630 (App. Div.
1987).
216 Levato, 924 P.2d at 448 n.3 (citations omitted).
277 E.g., Carter v. Sowders, 5 F.3d 975, 981 (6th Cir. 1993); Larson v. Tansy, 911 F.2d
392, 396-97 (10th Cir. 1990); Don v. Nix, 886 F.2d 203, 207-08 (8th Cir. 1989); United
States v. Crutcher, 405 F.2d 239, 243 (2d Cir. 1968); Cross v. United States, 325 F.2d 629,
632 n.8 (D.C. Cir. 1963); State v. Ware, 498 N.W.2d 454, 547 (Minn. 1993).
278 United States v. Meinster, 481 F. Supp. 1112, 1115 (S.D. Fla. 1979) (finding no right
to be absent, but court may in its discretion permit defendant to be absent); State v. Randle,
603 N.W.2d 91, 93-94 (Iowa 1999) (citing authority in otherjurisdictions). But see State v.
Ayer, 834 A.2d 277, 282-93 (N.H. 2003) (reversing murder conviction where trial court
refused to allow defendant to represent himself because of his intention to absent himself
from trial), cert. denied, 124 S. Ct. 1668 (2004).
279 Taylor v. United States, 414 U.S. 17, 20 (1973); Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337,
342-43 (1970).
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courts should exercise their discretion to allow defendants to be absent, at
least where the reason for the absence arises from a disagreement about the
course of the defense.
I close this discussion with an observation about the Rivers case, with
which this article began. Counsel in that case observed in Rivers a sense of
enormous embarrassment in any public discussion of his sexuality, and the
possibility that his relationship with the victim had any sexual component.
Rivers said he could not endure sitting in the courtroom while his counsel
made such claims about him. However, under a rule leaving with the
defendant the choice of whether to attend trial, Rivers could have absented
himself from his trial entirely or in part, and thereby diminished the sharpest
edge of the anticipated humiliation. That solution, of course, has its
drawbacks; some humiliations remains just because he knows that a
despised defense is being made in his name, albeit not in his presence.
Further, there is a price to be paid in terms of appearances before the jury
and ease of consultation with counsel when the defendant is not in the
courtroom. Nevertheless, the rule yielding to the defendant the choice of
whether to appear returns to the defendant some measure of control over his
own dignity.
2. The Decision of Whether the Defendant Will Testify
A substantial consensus exists assigning to the defendant the decision
of whether to testify. The various standards of professional responsibility
agree with this consensus,280 and the Supreme Court has also listed the
decision as belonging to the defendant. 8' In Rock v. Arkansas, the Court
cited Faretta and described as follows the importance ofa defendant's right
to decide whether to testify:
Even more fundamental to a personal defense than the right of self
representation ... is an accused's right to present his own version of
events in his own words. A defendant's opportunity to conduct his own
defense by calling witnesses is incomplete if he may not present himself
280 See, e.g., MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003); ABA
STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2(a) (3d ed. 1993); see generally White, supra note
34, at 76 (recommending that lawyer should decide).
281 See, e.g., Rock v. Arkansas, 483 U.S. 44, 53 n.10 (1987); Jones v. Barnes, 463
U.S. 745, 751 (1983); Wainwright v. Sykes, 433 U.S. 72, 93 n.1 (1977) (Burger, C.J.,
concurring) ("Only such basic decisions as whether to testify in one's own behalf are
ultimately for the accused to make.").
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as a witness .... Every criminal defendant is privileged to testify in his
own defense, or to refuse to do so.
282
In so ruling, the Rock Court acknowledged that constitutional law in this
respect has evolved substantially from the time of the Founders.283 In those
days, under the common law, criminal defendants were disqualified from
testifying because of their interest in the outcome of the trial.2
8 4
Not surprisingly, in light of that evolution of the law, many of the lower
court decisions which allocate to lawyers the decision of whether a
defendant should testify predate the constitutional developments of the last
thirty-five years."' More recent lower court decisions primarily support
allocation of this key decision to the defendant.86
282 Rock, 483 U.S. at 52 (quoting Harris v. New York, 401 U.S. 222, 225 (1971)).
283 Id. at 50.
284 Ferguson v. Georgia, 365 U.S. 570, 574 (1961).
285 See, e.g., United States v. Martinez, 883 F.2d 750, 756-57 (9th Cir. 1989),
vacated by 928 F.2d 1470 (9th Cir. 1991); United States v. Rantz, 862 F.2d 808, 810-11
(10th Cir. 1988) (holding that the decision belongs to the lawyer where the lawyer believes
the client will testify perjuriously); United States v. Poe, 352 F.2d 639, 641 (D.C. Cir. 1965);
United States v. Gargulio, 324 F.2d 795, 797 (2d Cir. 1963); Sims v. State, 208 N.E.2d 469,
472 (Ind. 1965); Kinder v. Commonwealth, 269 S.W.2d 212, 213-14 (Ky. 1954); State v.
Albright, 291 N.W.2d 487, 492 (Wis. 1980) (concluding, before Rock v. Arkansas, that
"counsel... may waive the defendant's fight to testify"); see also Seth Dawson, Comment,
Due Process v. Defense Counsel's Unilateral Waiver of the Defendant's Right to Testify, 3
HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 517, 529 (1976).
296 See, e.g., United States v. Mullins, 315 F.3d 449, 454-55 (5th Cir. 2002), cert. denied,
124 S. Ct. 2096 (2004); United States v. Ortiz, 82 F.3d 1066, 1070 (D.C. Cir. 1996); United
States v. Pennycooke, 65 F.3d 9, 10-11 (3d Cir. 1995) (noting, however, that trial court has
no obligation to ensure that nontestifying defendant's waiver was knowing and intelligent by
explaining the right); Lema v. United States, 987 F.2d 48, 52 (1st Cir. 1993) (assuming,
without holding, that the right to testify may not be waived by counsel); United States v.
Bernloehr, 833 F.2d 749, 751 (8th Cir. 1987); United States v. Curtis, 742 F.2d 1070, 1076
(7th Cir. 1984); United States ex rel. Wilcox v. Johnson, 555 F.2d 115, 118-19 (3d Cir.
1977); United States v. Dougherty, 473 F.2d I113, 1128 (D.C. Cir. 1972); Poe v. United
States, 233 F. Supp. 173, 176 (D.C. Cir. 1964), affd, 352 F.2d 639 (D.C. Cir. 1965); United
States v. Lore, 26 F. Supp. 2d 729, 734-38 (D. N.J. 1998); Hughes v. State, 513 P.2d 1115,
1119 (Alaska 1973); State v. Noble, 514 P.2d 460, 462 (Ariz. 1973); People v. Robles, 466
P.2d 710, 716 (Cal. 1970) (holding that attorney is to decide whether defendant will testify,
but that the defendant cannot be deprived of this right if he insists on testifying); State v.
Curtis, 681 P.2d 504, 513 (Colo. 1984); State v. Rosillo, 281 N.W.2d 877, 878-79 (Minn.
1979); Culberson v. State, 412 So. 2d 1184, 1186 (Miss. 1982); Ingle v. State, 546 P.2d 598,
600 (Nev. 1976) (holding that the decision whether to testify is typically the attorney's, but
a defendant cannot be denied the opportunity to testify); State v. Neuman, 371 S.E.2d 77, 81
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The Eleventh Circuit has considered the question perhaps more fully
than any other court. Before the division of the old Fifth Circuit which
created the Eleventh Circuit, the Fifth Circuit had, in dictum at least,
assigned the decision to defendants. 217 In Wright v. Estelle,288 two
distinguished judges turned their attention and their powers of expression
to the problem. In that case, the en banc court affirmed a panel decision that
assumed, without explicitly holding, that the decision belonged to the
defendant.289 In a concurring opinion, Judge Thornberry, joined by four
other judges, argued that the decision belonged to the lawyer. He began by
explaining society's interest in assuring the best possible defense to accused
persons. By choosing to accept counsel at all, he reasoned:
[T]he defendant has necessarily delegated important decisionmaking
authority to his attorney. The scope of the delegation does not turn on the
importance of the decision-the attorney frequently makes judgments
affecting the very life of the defendant. The question here is twofold: who
is in a better position to judge trial strategy and who is in a better position
to ensure the best interests of the defendant. This court's history is filled
with the recognition of the value of an attorney. No one could seriously
contend that a defendant is in a better position to dictate trial strategy than
his attorney. Moreover, a court-appointed attorney owes a duty to society
to see that his client is given the best possible defense within the law. No
attorney could discharge this duty if he must yield to the personal demands
of his client.
290
After invoking society's interest, Judge Thornberry stated the empirical
premise that counsel best knows how to defend a charge:
Trial attorneys are professional artisans working in a highly competitive
arena that requires all the skills which education, training, and experience
have given them. Criminal defendants are entitled to no less. A defendant
(W. Va. 1988); see also Timothy P. ONeill, Vindicating the Defendant's Constitutional Right
to Testify at Criminal Trial: The Needfor an On-the-Record Waiver, 51 U. Pm. L. REv. 809
(1990).
287 Winters v. Cook, 489 F.2d 174, 179 (5th Cir. 1974) (stating that the defendant's right
to testify is "such an inherently personal fundamental right that it can be waived only by the
defendant and not by his attorney").
288 Wright v. Estelle, 572 F.2d 1071 (5th Cir. 1978) (en banc).
289 Id. at 1072 (adopting panel decision, reported at 549 F.2d 971, 972, 974 (5th Cit.
1977), which did not explicitly hold that the decision belonged to defendant, but found that
lawyer's usurpation of the decision to be harmless error).
290 Id. at 1073 (Thomberry, J., concurring).
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has a right to necessary surgery, but he does not have the right to require
the surgeon to perform an operation contrary to accepted medical practice.
If, despite his counsel's advice, a defendant continues to believe that his
testimony is more important than the continued services of an attorney
who insists he should not take the stand, the conflict must be resolved by
the court. Only in this way may the right to testify be reconciled with
the right to effective assistance of counsel .... While Faretta allows
a defendant to have a fool for a client, there is nothing in its logic that
commands that the defendant may also have a fool for an attorney.... We
are here concerned with constitutional requirements and there is no
constitutional requirement that a court-appointed attorney must walk his
client to the electric chair.29'
In dissent, Judge Godbold, joined by two other judges, argued for
assignment of the decision to the defendant. First, he disputed Judge
Thomberry's assumption that counsel possesses a superior ability to present
the best defense:
In the narrow world of the courtroom the defendant may have faith, even
if mistaken, in his own ability to persuasively tell his story to the jury. He
may desire to face his accusers and the jury, state his position, and submit
to examination. His interest may extend beyond content to the hope that
he will have a personalized impact upon the jury or gain advantage from
having taken the stand rather than to seek the shelter of the Fifth
Amendment.
292
Judge Godbold further noted the possibility that a defendant might have
interests different and broader than the presentation of the best defense:
[W]ithout regard to impact upon the jury, his desire to tell "his side" in a
public forum may be of overriding importance to him. Indeed, in some
circumstances the defendant, without regard to the risks, may wish to
speak from the stand, over the head ofjudge and jury, to a larger audience.
It is not for his attorney to muzzle him .... [O]ur history is replete with
trials of defendants who faced the court, determined to speak before their
fate was pronounced: Socrates, who condemned Athenianjustice heedless
of the cup of hemlock; Charles I, who challenged the jurisdiction of the
Cromwellians over a divine monarch; Susan B. Anthony, who argued for
the female ballot; and Sacco and Vanzetti, who revealed the flaws of their
tribunal. To deny a defendant the right to tell his story from the stand
dehumanizes the administration of justice. I cannot accept a decision that
allows a jury to condemn to death or imprisonment a defendant who
291 Id. at 1073-74 (Thomberry, J., concurring) (citations omitted, italics added).
292 Id. at 1078 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
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desires to speak, without ever having heard the sound of his voice ....
Judge Thornberry's observation that the attorney need not walk his client
to the electric chair is a striking phrase, but is based upon an erroneous
premise. It is the defendant's day in court, not the lawyer's.
293
The Wright debate was seemingly resolved in United States v. Scott,
294
wherein the Eleventh Circuit assigned the decision to the defendant.295 The
court declined to reach the question of whether the decision should belong
to counsel when counsel's reason for not allowing the defendant to testify
is based upon a refusal to participate in perjury.296 Thus, as with so many
other problems of allocation, the controversy resisted final resolution.
In United States v. Teague,297 the Eleventh Circuit again split over
allocating the decision of whether the defendant will testify. The majority
followed Judge Godbold in allocating the decision to the defendant 9 In
summary, the majority wrote that "[bly exercising his constitutional right
to the assistance of counsel, a defendant does not relinquish his right to set
the parameters of that representation. Any other conclusion would be 'to
imprison a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution. "299
Judge Edmondson, joined by two others, rejected the majority's
reasoning. He regarded the right-to-testify decision as encompassing only
the right to be free from government interference, not the right to be free of
interference from one's own lawyer."0 The line between the prerogatives
of counsel and client lies, according to Edmondson, on the far side of the
decision of whether the defendant should testify:
I understand and agree that a defendant must personally decide how he
will plead to the charges against him, whether he will waive trial by jury,
and whether he will appeal. But these decisions are not about trial tactics;
they are materially different. These decisions determine whether there is
to be a fight and who will judge the fight's outcome. But, once the client
decides that there is to be a fight and that he wishes to be represented by
a lawyer, I agree with those judges who say that defense counsel need not
defer to the client's desires on how the fight is to be waged .... To allow
the client to decide absolutely whether the client will testify is potentially
to nullify all of the lawyer's tactical efforts and to make, in fact, a
293 Id. at 1078-80 (Godbold, J., dissenting).
" United States v. Scott, 909 F.2d 488 (11 th Cir. 1990).
295 Id. at 490.
296Id. at 491.
297 United States v. Teague, 953 F.2d 1525 (11 th Cir. 1992).
29 Id. at 1532.
21 Id. at 1533 (quoting Adams v. United States, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942)).
300Id. at 1535 (Edmondson, J., concurring).
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mockery of the very idea that a defendant received a competent defense
by means of the assistance of counsel. Put differently, allowing the client
to override counsel's tactical decisions undercuts the adversarial process
that the Constitution attempts to protect as the essential ingredient to a fair
trial.301
After Teague, Judge Edmondson continued, for a time, to assert the
error of the ruling assigning to the defendant the testifying decision.0 2 By
2000, however, Judge Edmondson evidently changed his mind. That year,
he authored an opinion in a capital case in which the court denied an
ineffective assistance of counsel claim where counsel deferred to the
defendant's decision not to present mitigating evidence.3"3
D. Decisions Involving the Structure of Deliberations
The fourth category includes decisions affecting the possible verdicts
available for the factfinder's consideration. Should the defense argue alibi
or acknowledge presence at the crime but seek conviction on a
lesser-included offense? Should the defense argue that the act was justified
self-defense or excusable by reason of insanity? Rather than discuss every
conceivable form of deliberation-structuring dilemma, this Section
discusses three decisions: (1) the decision of whether to seek a jury
instruction on a lesser-included offense; (2) the decision of whether to
assert the insanity defense; and (3) the appellate version, involving the
decision about which claims to raise an appeal.
1. The Decision of Whether to Seek Instruction on
a Lesser-Included Offense
Allocation of the decision of whether to seek a verdict on a
lesser-included offense, or to put to the jury the choice between conviction
and acquittal, presents a complex problem. By way of illustration, consider
the case of Anthony Anaya.3° Charged as an accomplice to first-degree
murder, Anaya refused a prosecution offer allowing him to plead guilty to
second-degree murder.30 ' His attorneys recommended that he take the
bargain because his only plausible defense lay in a challenge to the element
... Id. at 1536 (citations omitted).
302 Nichols v. Butler, 953 F.2d 1550, 1554 (11 th Cir. 1992) (Edmondson, J., dissenting).
303 Gilreath v. Head, 234 F.3d 547, 550-53 (11 th Cir. 2000); see also Uviller, supra
note 21, at 760.
"' State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142 (N.H. 1991).
305 d. at 1143.
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of premeditation. If they succeeded in raising a reasonable doubt as to
premeditation, the jury would return a second-degree murder verdict.0 6
Accordingly, the lawyers believed that Anaya would not fare any better at
trial than he would with the offered second-degree murder plea. Insisting
on his complete innocence, Anaya refused the bargain and testified at trial
that he had nothing to do with the murder.30 7 Anaya's attorneys presented
the premeditation defense and asked the jury to convict on the lesser offense
of second-degree murder, but the jurors were not convinced.3 8 They
convicted Anaya of first-degree murder.3"9 During post-conviction appeals,
Anaya argued that his views should have prevailed, limiting the jury to a
choice between conviction for first-degree murder and outright acquittal,
preventing his lawyer from arguing for a second-degree murder verdict.310
The State argued that the attorneys' views, if objectively reasonable, should
have prevailed, allowing the lawyers to argue for the second-degree murder
verdict, and allowing the jury to consider it.3 '
The problem is complicated by the dual dimensions of the decision.
First, there is the question of whether the defense should seek a jury
instruction on a lesser-included offense. Second, there is the question of
whether the lawyer may advocate for conviction of that lesser offense. In
theory, it would be possible to frame a rule that would allow the lawyer,
over the defendant's objection, to ask the court to instruct the jury on the
elements of the lesser offense without allowing the lawyer, over the
defendant's objection, to argue that the jury should return a verdict on that
lesser offense.
Indeed, some jurisdictions remove from the defense altogether the
decision of whether to seek jury instructions on lesser offenses. In those
jurisdictions, the trial court must instruct the jury on lesser offenses for
which some evidentiary support exists.3 2 In support of the view
withdrawing the decision from the parties, one court has written:
36 Id. at 1143-44.
307 Id. at 1143.
308 Id. at 1144-45.
3 9 Id. at 1143.
310 Id. at 1144-45.
.. Id. at 1145-46.
312 State v. Haanio, 16 P.3d 246, 248 (Haw. 2001); Commonwealth v. Matos, 634
N.E.2d 138, 142 (Mass. App. Ct. 1994); In re Trombly, 627 A.2d 855, 857 (Vt. 1993)
(stating that even though defendant controls the decision of whether to request a
lesser-included-offense instruction, court may override defendant's refusal of such an
instruction if it "is so ill-advised that it undermines a fair trial").
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"Our courts are not gambling halls but forums for the discovery of
truth .... " A trial court's failure to inform the jury of its option to find the
defendant guilty of the lesser offense would impair the jury's
truth-ascertainment function. Consequently, neither the prosecution nor
the defense should be allowed, based on their trial strategy, to preclude the
jury from considering guilt of a lesser offense included in the crime
charged. To permit this would force the jury to make an "all or nothing"
choice between conviction of the crime charged or complete acquittal,
thereby denying the jury the opportunity to decide whether the defendant
is guilty of a lesser included offense established by the evidence.
313
This statement hints at the deeper philosophical debate implicit in the
question of whether to allow the defense, or for that matter the prosecution,
to limit the possible verdicts available to the jury. Is the truth which the trial
seeks to discover and proclaim in the verdict best understood as objective,
defined by the nature of the crime as it occurred? As applied to Anaya's
case, this view characterizes the trial as aiming to discover whether Anaya
was factually involved in the killing and, if so, whether the killing was
premeditated. Certainly, courts most often assume that trial outcomes
should be measured by their degree of correlation with objective,
independently-defined facts. 14 If the trial's principal purpose is discovery
of truth, then it makes little sense to allow the litigants to limit the possible
verdicts available for the jury's consideration. If lawmakers decide that a
fact, such as the presence or absence of premeditation, marks a moral
distinction among offenders sufficient to justify different verdicts and
sentences, then the factfinder should have the power, in a case where
premeditation is at issue, to reach a verdict representative of that truth.
Alternatively, is the truth which the trial seeks to discover and proclaim
in the verdict best understood subjectively? This view finds the measure of
truth not in the objective facts of the criminal event, but rather in the
interests of the litigants as tested by the court rules of procedure and
evidence. In Anaya's case, the prosecution declared, by the indictment
and by its failure to seek a lesser-offense instruction, that the State's
interest lay strictly in convicting Anaya for first-degree murder. Anaya, by
his resistance to the second-degree murder plea and argument, declared that
313 People v. Barton, 906 P.2d 531, 536 (Cal. 1995) (citations omitted).
' Arizona v. Fulminante, 499 U.S. 279, 308 (1991) (Rehnquist, C.J., delivering the
opinion of the Court with respect to Part II); Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475 U.S. 673, 681
(1986).
" Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276, 304 (1930), overruled in part by Morico v.
United States, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
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his interest lay strictly in obtaining an acquittal.3 16 On the interests-based
view, a second-degree murder verdict has the weakest claim, because it
vindicates neither litigant's interest. Instead, the truth lies in the verdict that
emerges from a well-regulated adversarial contest of interests.
I find no logical fallacy in either view that would justify discarding it
as simply wrong. The choice between them requires a value judgment about
the purpose and stakes of criminal prosecutions. This article argues against
the subjective view because of its narrowly individualistic focus, and argues
for a view that gives some regard not only to the interests of the litigants,
but to the larger community interest in the outcomes of criminal
prosecutions." 7 Blackstone stated the view succinctly: "[T]he king has an
interest in the preservation of all his subjects.) 318
The second dimension of the lesser-offense decision concerns the
lawyer's arguments. May counsel, over the defendant's objection, argue for
a verdict on a lesser offense? The argument decision shares some common
features with the decision of how to plead. Asking the jury to convict the
defendant ofa lesser offense amounts, in a certain sense, to an abandonment
of the plea of not guilty, for the defense now admits guilt of some offense.
Strictly speaking, however, there is a logical distinction between the
decision of how to plead and the decision of whether to argue for a lesser
offense. In pleading not guilty to the charged offense, a defendant denies
culpability for the charged offense; a defendant does not, by that plea,
necessarily deny culpability for an offense lesser than that charged.
Some courts seize on the plea-argument relationship to support a rule
that no lawyer may, over a defendant's objection, concede the defendant's
guilt to the charged offense.319 Courts bar such concessions because, by the
concession, the lawyer essentially withdraws the defendant's plea of not
guilty. The problem posed by arguments conceding guilt calls to mind not
only the pleading decision discussed above, but also the appellate rule of
Anders v. California.32 There, the Supreme Court established a rule that
allowed appellate counsel, by the filing of what has since become known
as an Anders brief, to concede the frivolity of the defendant's appeal.32 '
316 See Anaya, 592 A.2d at 1143.
"' See infra Part IlIl.A.
31Patton, 281 U.S. at 304.
319 E.g., Wiley v. Sowders, 647 F.2d 642, 650-51 (6th Cir. 1981); People v. Jones, 811
P.2d 757, 771-72 (Cal. 1991) (holding that counsel may make decisions about included
offenses, but may not decline to present any guilt-phase defense at all); People v. Hattery,
488 N.E.2d 513, 518 (Ill. 1985); People v. Redmond, 278 N.E.2d 766, 768-69 (I11. 1972).
320 Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967).
321 Id. at 744.
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. The reader will recall that many, though not all, jurisdictions allow
appellate counsel to file Anders briefs. The logic of that position, by
analogy, supports a rule allowing trial counsel to concede a defendant's
guilt of a charged offense. Indeed, the trial lawyer's concession of guilt in
argument often has a stronger tactical justification than does the Anders
brief. An Anders brief concedes frivolity of an appeal in a way that cannot
possibly benefit the defendant. On the other hand, concessions by trial
counsel as to the defendant's guilt for a charged offense tend to occur in
capital prosecutions where counsel hopes to parlay a guilt-phase concession
into a penalty-phase advantage.322
Even if, by the force of analogy to the pleading decision, lawyers may
not concede guilt of the charged offense, the question remains open as to
whether they may argue, over a defendant's objection, for conviction of a
lesser offense. The Anaya case presented precisely that question. The
pattern of disagreement observed in the allocation of other defense
decisions appears again here. The commentary to the ABA Standards for
Criminal Justice, invoking the analogy between the pleading decision and
the decision about whether to seek a lesser-included offense instruction,
proposes that the decision belongs to defendants.323 Some courts allocate the
decision to defendants, often for the same reason.324 Other courts allocate
it to lawyers.32 5 The Florida courts go both ways: the decision belongs to
322 See, e.g., People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396, 401-06 (Cal. 1985).
323 ABA STANDARDS FOR CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2 cmt. (2d ed. 1980). The ABA
Standards provide that it is "important in ajury trial for the defense lawyer to consult fully
with the accused about any lesser included offenses the trial court may be willing to submit
to the jury. Indeed, because this decision is so important as well as so similar to the
defendant's decision about the charges to which to plead, the defendant should be the one
to decide whether to seek submission to the jury of lesser included offenses." See also
Uviller, supra note 21, at 728 (recommending that defendant should make the choice of
defense because defendant should "elect his own grounds of contention"); White,supra note
34, at 74 (suggesting that a defendant should have the final choice in this context because
he "has the greatest stake in the outcome").
324 Frierson, 705 P.2d at 404,405 n.7; People v. Rogers, 363 P.2d 892, 895 (Cal. 1961);
People v. Brocksmith, 692 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (111. 1994); State v. Carter, 14 P.3d 1138,
1148 (Kan. 2000); State v. Anaya, 592 A.2d 1142, 1146 (N.H. 1991); State v. Boeglin, 731
P.2d 943, 945 (N.M. 1987); People v. Petrovich, 664 N.E.2d 503, 504 (N.Y. 1996); State v.
Harbison, 337 S.E.2d 504, 506-07 (N.C. 1985); In re Trombly, 627 A.2d 855, 856-57 (Vt.
1993); State v. Ambuehl, 425 N.W.2d 649, 654 (Wis. Ct. App. 1988).
325 McNeal v. Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674,676-77 (1 lth Cir. 1984); People v. Jones, 811
P.2d 757, 771-73 (Cal. 1991) (indicating that credibility of defendant's preferred defense
is a critical factor in determining whether defendant's view may prevail over lawyer's); Van
Alstine v. State, 426 S.E.2d 360, 362-63 (Ga. 1993); People v. Siverly, 551 N.E.2d 1040,
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defendants when the charged offense carries a possible death sentence, and
to lawyers when the charged offense is not capital.326
The analogy to the pleading decision does not necessarily lose all
application, insofar as the decision to argue for a lesser offense shares
qualities with the decision about whether to accept a plea bargain involving
a plea of guilty to a lesser offense. As noted above, most courts allocate the
decision of whether to accept a plea bargain to the defendant.3 27 The
decision in Johnson v. Duckworth exemplifies a notable exception to that
allocation rule.328
Perhaps the most significant distinctions between the two decisions
arise out of their procedural timing and consequences. The justification for
allocating the pleading decision to defendants lies in the fact that the
pleading decision either invokes or abandons adversary adjudication.
Merely by invoking or waiving adversary adjudication, the defendant does
not skew the truth-seeking operations of the criminal process. The
truth-seeking function in the case of a guilty plea is protected both by the
defendant's confession and by the trial court's independent obligation to
confirm the voluntariness of the plea and the existence of a factual basis to
support the resulting verdict. However, by the time ofjury instruction and
closing argument, the adversary process has been engaged, and the trial
court has no occasion to conduct such an inquiry. A decision to bar a
lesser-offense instruction or the most plausible defense argument in that
setting would skew the truth-seeking operations. In a case where some
evidence supports a lesser-offense verdict, and where the parties are
contesting the defendant's culpability, a decision removing that verdict
from the jury's consideration can leave the jury without the ability to return
the verdict that most accurately reflects the reality of the crime.
Again, Anaya329 illustrates the point. When Anaya rejected his lawyer's
pretrial advice to accept the second-degree murder plea bargain, the trial
had not yet taken place and the lawyer's recommendation was based on
expected evidence. By the time of closing argument andjury instruction, the
1046-47 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990); People v. Jones, 381 N.W.2d 803, 804 (Mich. Ct. App. 1985),
rev'd, 382 N.W.2d 168 (Mich. 1986); People v. Thompson, 245 N.W.2d 93, 94-95 (Mich.
Ct. App. 1976); Alexander v. State, 782 S.W.2d 472, 474 (Mo. Ct. App. 1990); State v.
Edwards, 694 N.E.2d 534 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); State v. Eckert, 553 N.W.2d 539 (Wis. Ct.
App. 1996); see also Faraga v. State, 514 So. 2d 295, 308 (Miss. 1987).
326 Reed v. State, 560 So. 2d 203, 206-07 (Fla. 1990).
327 See supra Part II.A. 1. The decision of whether to plead guilty to a lesser offense also
frequently reflects strategic concerns, but a defendant nonetheless retains control over such
a plea. For example, see People v. Rogers, 363 P.2d 892, 895-96 (Cal. 1961).
318 Johnson v. Duckworth, 793 F.2d 898, 900-02 (7th Cir. 1986).
329 See supra notes 304-16 and accompanying text.
2004-2005]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
evidence was no longer merely expected, but actually presented. At that
point, the decisions confronting the defense were (1) whether to allow the
jury to consider all three verdicts supported by the evidence (first-degree
murder, second-degree murder, and acquittal) or only two of the three, and
(2) whether to argue for the hopeless alternative of acquittal or the plausible
alternative of second-degree murder.
The decisions of whether to accept a plea bargain and whether to allow
counsel to argue for a lesser offense also differ in their consequences. By
accepting a guilty plea a defendant ordinarily waives all appellate
adjudication of the charge, but by insisting on a trial and accepting the
representation of counsel a defendant retains the right to appellate review.
Indeed, the defendant may subsequently bring an ineffective assistance of
counsel claim challenging the lawyer's decision to concede guilt of a lesser
charge. Thus, if the defendant's preferred defense was not hopeless, as the
lawyer assumed, the courts can correct the skewing of the outcome
attributable to counsel's poor performance.
The complexities of allocating the lesser-offense decisions have
produced unreconciled opinions in some jurisdictions. For example, Illinois
courts have variously assigned the decisions to the lawyer and the
defendant. 30 Additionally, the Eleventh Circuit has authority supporting
both sides of the argument.33'
2. The Decision of Whether to Assert the Insanity Defense
The prosecution of Theodore Kaczynski for his crimes committed as the
"Unabomber" raised the question of who should decide whether to assert
the insanity defense. Kaczynski's lawyers planned to raise that defense, but
Kaczynski wanted no part of it.332 This controversy and others like it have
inspired many law review articles.333 Before examining that literature and
330 Compare People v. Brocksmith, 642 N.E.2d 1230, 1233 (111. 1994) (assigning to
defendant the decision of whether to seek lesser offense instruction), with People v. Siverly,
551 N.E.2d 1040, 1046-47 ([11. App. Ct. 1990) (assigning the same decision to the lawyer).
... Compare Mulligan v. Kemp, 771 F.2d 1436, 1441 (1 1th Cir. 1985) (recognizing
defendant's "broad power to dictate .the manner" of his defense), with McNeal v.
Wainwright, 722 F.2d 674, 677 (11 th Cir. 1984) (allocating decision whether to argue for
lesser offense to lawyer).
332 Mello, supra note 39, at 427.
3" E.g., Mello, supra note 39; Newman, supra note 71; Josephine Ross, Autonomy
Versus a Client's Best Interests: The Defense Lawyer's Dilemma when Mentally Il Clients
Seek to Control Their Defense, 35 AM. CRIM. L. REv. 1343 (1988); Slobogin & Mashburn,
supra note 77; Uviller, supra note 21.
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the case law applicable to the present question, a few preliminary
observations deserve mention.
The insanity defense is rarely asserted, and even more rarely
succeeds.334 When the defense does succeed, the defendant is often exposed
to indefinite confinement in grim institutions that are penal in all but
name.335 Certainly, a lawyer concerned with minimizing adverse
consequences to the client should hesitate before opting for a defense that,
even when it succeeds, gravely jeopardizes the client's liberty interests.336
Many courts let the defendant decide whether to raise an insanity
defense.3 7 It appears that most commentators33 and authorities on
professional ethics339 concur with that assignment. However, some courts
still allow counsel to control the insanity defense decision.3'4 A few
33' Hugh McGinley & Richard A. Pasewark, National Survey of the Frequency and
Success of the Insanity Plea and Alternate Pleas, 17 J. PSYCH. & L. 205, 216 (1989).
335 See Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 1060 (Md. 1988).
336 Cf Ross, supra note 333, at 1386 n.88.
337 E.g., United States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (D.C. Cir. 1991); Alvord
v. Wainwright, 725 F.2d 1282, 1289 (1 1th Cir. 1984); Foster v. Strickland, 707 F.2d 1339,
1343 (11 th Cir. 1983); Snider v. Cunningham, 292 F.2d 683, 685 (4th Cir. 1961); State v.
Fayle, 658 P.2d 218,228-230 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); People v. Medina, 799 P.2d 1282, 1301
(Cal. 1990); People v. Geddes, 1 Cal. Rptr. 2d 886, 888 (Ct. App. 1991); Briggs v. United
States, 525 A.2d 583, 591 (D.C. 1987); Frendak v. United States, 408 A.2d 364, 378 (D.C.
1979); Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412,418 (Ky. 1994); State v. Lowenfield, 495
So. 2d 1245, 1252 (La. 1985); Treece, 547 A.2d at 1063; Commonwealth v. Federici, 696
N.E.2d 111, 115 n.4 (Mass. 1998); Johnson v. State, 17 P.3d 1008, 1015 (Nev. 2001); State
v. Cecil; 616 A.2d 1336, 1343 (N.J. Super. Ct. App. Div. 1992); People v. Gonzalez, 229
N.E.2d 220, 223 (N.Y. 1967); People v. McMillan, 561 N.Y.S.2d 512, 514 (N.Y. Sup. Ct.
1990); State v. McDowell, 407 S.E.2d 200,206 (N.C. 1991); State v. Tenace, 700 N.E.2d
899, 908 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997); State v. Peterson, 689 P.2d 985, 991 (Or. Ct. App. 1984);
State v. Bean, 762 A.2d 1259, 1266 (Vt. 2000); State v. Jones, 664 P.2d 1216,1221 (Wash.
1983); State v. Felton, 329 N.W.2d 161, 174 (Wis. 1983); Singer, supra note 58, at 673
n. 184 (reporting that in England the accused gets to decide whether to raise the insanity
defense).
338 David Cohn, Offensive Use of the Insanity Defense: Imposing the Insanity Defense
Over the Defendant's Objection, 15 HASTINGS CONST. L. Q. 295, 318 (1988); Mello, supra
note 39, at 499 (stating that the choice regarding mental state defense belongs to accused);
Newman, supra note 71, at 83; Ross, supra note 333, at 1359 n.64; Singer, supra note 58,
at 651, 667-68; Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 77, at 1632; Uviller, supra note 21, at
744-48 (noting that Justices Brennan and Marshall favor allocation of the decision to raise
insanity defense, or any other defense, to defendant).
339 ABA CRIMINAL JUSTICE MENTAL HEALTH STANDARDS 7-6.3 (1989).
340 See, e.g., Weber v. Israel, 730 F.2d 499, 507-08 (7th Cir. 1984); People v.
Merkouris, 297 P.2d 999, 1009 (Cal. 1956); Hendricks v. State, 10 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Colo.
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commentators have endorsed that assignment, at least under some
circumstances. 4'
The Nevada Supreme Court has identified the three principal arguments
courts routinely offer to justify allocating the insanity defense decision to
defendants.3 42 "First, the insanity defense is essentially a plea of not guilty
by reason of insanity and, as such, it should be entered only by the
defendant, or by counsel after the defendant has consented.,
343
That reasoning fails because it rests on a formalistic analysis that
misunderstands the essential nature of the decision. Some jurisdictions
2000) (stating that, by statute, Colorado authorizes counsel to raise an insanity defense over
the defendant's objection where the court finds raising the insanity defense "necessary for
a just determination of the charge against the defendant"); State v. Samuel, 838 P.2d 1374,
1381-82 (Haw. 1992) (finding that counsel can withdraw insanity defense without securing
waiver from client because it is a "tactical decision"); People v. Anderson, 641 N.E.2d 591,
600 (I1. App. Ct. 1994); see also Alvord v. Wainwright, 469 U.S. 956, 958-61 (1984)
(Marshall, J., dissenting) (suggesting that defendant's determined opposition to the insanity
defense does not excuse counsel's failure to investigate it); State v. Rambo, 699 P.2d 542,
547 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985) (following Vessels v. Estelle, 376 F. Supp. 1303 (S.D. Tex. 1985),
and holding that the right to assert an insanity defense can be waived by the lawyer); Robert
D. Miller et al., Forcing the Insanity Defense on Unwilling Defendants: Best Interests and
the Dignity of the Law, 24 J. PSYCHOL. & L. 487, 487 (1996) (reporting that seventeen
American jurisdictions allow presentation of the insanity defense over a defendant's
objection). But see People v. Gettings, 530 N.E.2d 647, 650-51 (Ill. App. Ct. 1988)
(suggesting that the insanity defense decision belongs to the defendant). For a discussion of
whether courts have discretion to impose the insanity defense on a defendant, see State v.
Femald, 248 A.2d 754, 760 (Me. 1968) (giving a judge discretion to let a defendant
withdraw a guilty plea); State v. Pautz, 217 N.W.2d 190, 192 (Minn. 1974) (holding that
court possesses the power to raise the insanity defense sua sponte); Note, The Right and
Responsibility of a Court to Impose the Insanity Defense Over the Defendant's Objection,
65 MtNN. L. REv. 927, 931 (1980) [hereinafter Note].
34 Miller, supra note 340, at 500-01 (noting a study which found that a minority of
states permitting imposition of mental status defenses over a defendant's objections do so
under various competency schemes); Ross, supra note 333, at 1385-86, (noting factors that
lawyers should consider before substituting theirjudgment for that of the defendant); Sabelli
& Leyton, supra note 6, at 233-36 (arguing lawyer should make insanity defense decision
and providing a review of insanity case law); Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 77, at 1630
("A majority of courts hold that the trial court may not impose an insanity defense over the
defendant's objection, but a sizeable minority hold that this decision is within the trial
judge's (and therefore the attorney's) discretion."); Note, supra note 340, at 930-31 & 931
n.21 (citing many state courts that followed the Whalem approach).
342 Johnson v. State, 17 P.3d 1008, 1015 (Nev. 2001).
343 Id.
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require notice of the insanity defense to be given in the form of a plea.3"
Some do not. 345 The use of a plea as a vehicle for giving notice of the
insanity defense does not change the essential nature of the defense.
Nevertheless, the Nevada court's plea analogy would make the question of
whether a defendant controls the insanity decision turn on that procedural
form. Logic does not justify giving defendants control over the insanity
decision in jurisdictions that use the plea as a form of notice, while giving
the lawyer control of the insanity decision in jurisdictions that use a
non-plea form of notice.346
The Nevada court articulated the second reason for committing the
decision to defendants:
An acquittal on the basis of insanity may result in long-term
institutionalization, and the consequences of a choice between a possible
commitment to a mental health institution or to prison "are so grave and
personal that a competent defendant should have the right to make his or
her own decision as to whether to interpose that plea.
3 47
This reason fares no better. The severity of those consequences tends
to show that raising the insanity defense is very often a bad choice because
the defendant suffers substantially even if the defense succeeds at trial. The
fact that the insanity defense should usually be avoided does not imply
anything about whether the lawyer or the defendant should control the
decision. Allocating such a presumptively unwise choice to the lawyer at
least has the advantage of subjecting the decision to review under the rubric
of ineffective assistance of counsel.
The Nevada court's third reason has more force. "[T]he social
stigmatization that may attach to an assertion or adjudication of insanity
also weighs in favor of leaving the final decision of whether to assert an
insanity defense to the competent defendant and not to counsel."34 In
essence, the court claims that a uniquely serious insult to a defendant's
34 id.
345 See, e.g., People v. Anderson, 641 N.E.2d 591,600 (111. App. Ct. 1994) ("In Illinois
... insanity is not a plea but is an affirmative defense that is raised by the defendant during
trial by the presentation of some evidence in support thereof."); State v. Bean, 762 A.2d
1259, 1266 (Vt. 2000) ("[We] do not require that a criminal defendant enter a special plea
of not guilty by reason of insanity.").
'" See White v. State, 299 A.2d 873, 875 (Md. Ct. Spec. App. 1973) (developing this
line of argument), overruled by Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054 (Md. 1988).




dignity attaches to the insanity defense, thus justifying the allocation of
whether to raise that defense to the defendant.
No. one could deny that the insanity defense touches a defendant's
dignity. However, the hazard posed to dignity by the insanity defense is not
unique, or even especially strong. As the Rivers case shows, defenses other
than insanity may also raise significant dignity concerns. Moreover, no
greater social stigma attaches to mental illness than to criminal conviction
and incarceration, especially where the charged crime is serious and the
term of incarceration lengthy. Certainly, as in other circumstances posing
painful choices, the decision to advance the insanity defense should be
made only after the most careful consideration. A lawyer choosing it must
be mindful of the long odds against success, the hazard to the defendant's
liberty even in the event of success, and the defendant's personal opposition
to the defense.
In Whalem v. United States, although both the defendant and his lawyer
agreed in their opposition to the insanity defense, "' the court nonetheless
held that a trial court may interpose an insanity defense over the objection
of the defense.35 The Whalem court's justification for its decision has been
frequently mentioned by other courts in deciding how to allocate the
decision.3"' The court began by noting the fundamental meaning of the
insanity defense in the criminal law:
One of the major foundations for the structure of the criminal law is the
concept of responsibility, and the law is clear that one whose acts would
otherwise be criminal has committed no crime at all if because of
incapacity due to age or mental condition he is not responsible for those
acts. If he does not know what he is doing or cannot control his conduct
or his acts are the product of a mental disease or defect, he is morally
blameless and not criminally responsible. The judgment of society and the
law in this respect is tested in any given case by an inquiry into the sanity
ofthe accused. In other words, the legal definition of insanity in a criminal
case is a codification of the moral judgment of society as respects a man's
criminal responsibility; and if a man is insane in the eyes of the law, he is
blameless in the eyes of society and is not subject to punishment in the
criminal courts.35 2
... Whalem v. United States, 346 F.2d 812, 814 (D.C. Cir. 1965), overruled by United
States v. Marble, 940 F.2d 1543, 1547-48 (D.C. Cir. 1991).
350 Whalem, 346 F.2d at 814.
331 E.g., State v. Fayle, 658 P.2d 218, 228 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1982); State v. Rambo, 699
P.2d 542, 545-46 (Kan. Ct. App. 1985); Treece, 547 A.2d at 1061.
352 Whalem, 346 F.2d at 814.
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Emphasizing society' sjudgment that insane persons cannot, in fairness,
be punished, the court reasoned that the rules of procedure should not
empower the defense to unilaterally defeat society's policy. The court
wrote:
In the courtroom confrontations between the individual and society the
trial judge must uphold this structural foundation by refusing to allow the
conviction of an obviously mentally irresponsible defendant, and when
there is sufficient question as to a defendant's mental responsibility at the
time of the crime, that issue must become part of the case. Just as the
judge must insist that the corpus delicti be proved before a defendant who
has confessed may be convicted, so too must the judge forestall the
conviction of one who in the eyes of the law is not mentally responsible
for his otherwise criminal acts.
353
Society's interest deserves a more modest place. This article does not
address the question of whether the law should remove the decision from
the defense entirely, as Whalem does. However, the law should assign the
decision to counsel, thereby disempowering the defendant from acting
against the advice of counsel, to remove the issue from a case.
In assigning the decision to counsel without determining how counsel
should decide when to use this desperate defense over a defendant's
objections, this article avoids the hardest question. However, the argument
that the law should commit the decision to counsel comes easier than the
explanation of how a lawyer should decide what to do. The difficult
question of what constitutes the appropriate case for overriding a client's
objection to the insanity defense deserves its own full exposition elsewhere.
However, a clue to the answer arises in Colorado where, by statute and
judicial opinion, the law instructs trial judges on how to impose the insanity
defense against the will of the defendant.354 Colorado judges consider "the
public's interest in not holding criminally liable a defendant lacking
criminal responsibility and the defendant's interest in autonomously
controlling the nature of her defense." 355 Colorado explores those interests
by considering whether there is a "basic rationality" in the defendant's
reasons for opposing the defense, and whether the insanity defense is viable
33 Id.; see also Lynch v. Overholster, 369 U.S. 705, 732 (1962) (Clark, J., dissenting)
(emphasizing duty ofjudge to seek "a just disposition of every case"), superseded by statute
as stated in United States v. Mendelsohn, 443 A.2d 1311 (D.C. 1982).
314 See Hendricks v. State, 10 P.3d 1231, 1236 (Colo. 2000) (construing COLO. REV.





in the particular case.356 Colorado resolves the matter by a measure that
favors the defendant's dignity interest. "[A]n individual's interest in
autonomously controlling the nature of her defense, provided that interest
is premised on a choice that satisfies the basic rationality test, will
predominate over the broader interest of society unless pressing concerns
mandate a contrary result."357 Such factors as these might also properly
inform a lawyer's decision, were the law to commit the issue to the lawyer's
discretion.
The debate over the assignment of the insanity defense decision is not
unique. In allocating the decision of whether to assert other defenses, courts
have also failed to reach anything resembling a consensus. A number of
courts empower defendants to decide whether to raise other defenses,35
while other courts assign the decision to lawyers." 9
3. Choosing the Claims to Raise on Appeal
Decisions about the structure of jury deliberation have an appellate
analogue in the question of what issues to raise on appeal. In Jones v.
Barnes, the Supreme Court held that a defendant has no constitutional right
to insist that the lawyer raise any particular nonfrivolous issue on appeal.
360
The Court reasoned that allocating the decision to the defendant would
"seriously undermine[] the ability of counsel to present the client's case in
356 1d. at 1241-44.
3171d. at 1243.
311 People v. Frierson, 705 P.2d 396, 403-04 (Cal. 1985) ("[A]lthough the defendant's
insistence on the presentation of a defense at the guilt/special circumstance stage may in the
final analysis be harmful to his case ... the right is of such importance that every defendant
should have it .... ) (brackets and quotations omitted); People v. Morton, 570 N.Y.S.2d
846, 849 (App. Dir. 1991) ("[C]ounsel had no authority to pursue any defense other than the
one authorized by defendant."); People v. MacDowell, 508 N.Y.S.2d 870, 872 (Crim. Ct.
1986) ("[T]he decision of whether to forego a legal defense is ultimately for the client and
not for the lawyer.").
319 Meeks v. Bergen, 749 F.2d 322, 327-28 (6th Cir. 1984) (finding that criminal
defense counsel may make the strategic decision to assert self-defense rather than battered
wife syndrome as a defense at a client's murder trial); Anderson v. Sorrell, 481 A.2d 766
(D.C. 1984); People v. Jones, 8 11 P.2d 757, 771 (Cal. 1991) (finding that counsel controls
choice of defense); State v. Davis, 506 A.2d 86, 89 (Conn. 1986); People v. Ramey, 604
N.E.2d 275, 281 (111. 1992).
360 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 751 (1983); cf. State v. Korth, 650 N.W.2d 528, 536
(S.D. 2002) (requiring lawyer to brief claims desired by client, where lawyer otherwise
intends to file Anders brief advising court that no meritorious issues exist).
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accord with counsel's professional evaluation." 3 61 Quoting Justice Robert
Jackson, the Court remarked that:
Legal contentions, like the currency, depreciate through over-issue. The
mind of an appellate judge is habitually receptive to the suggestion that a
lower court committed an error. But receptiveness declines as the number
of assigned errors increases. Multiplicity hints at lack of confidence in any
one . . . . [Experience] on the bench convinces me that multiplying
assignments of error will dilute and weaken a good case and will not save
a bad one.
362
The unstated premise of the Court's holding involves a concern for the
reliability of appellate outcomes. Justice Jackson's advice posits that an
appellate court might overlook a meritorious claim of error if that claim lay
in the appellant's brief among a multitude of meritless issues. Thus, an
advocate employing a scatter-shot approach might lose an appeal that
should have been won and, conversely, a verdict will stand that, under the
law, should be reversed.
In his dissent, Justice Brennan argued that the decision whether to raise
nonfrivolous claims on appeal belongs to the appellant personally, and that
the appellant may act "against the advice of counsel if he chooses. 363 In
support of his view, Justice Brennan reasoned that the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel protects more than "the State's interest in substantial
justice."3 Respect for the defendant/appellant as an individual requires




Faretta establishes that the right to counsel is more than a right to have
one's case presented competently and effectively. It is predicated on the
view that the function of counsel under the Sixth Amendment is to protect
the dignity and autonomy of a person on trial by assisting him in making
choices that are his to make, not to make choices for him, although
361 Jones, 463 U.S. at 751.
362Id. at 752 (quoting Robert H. Jackson, Advocacy Before the United States Supreme
Court, 25 TEMPLE L. Q. 115, 119 (1951)).
363 Id. at 758 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
3Id. (citing Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806 (1975)). However, in Jones Justice
Brennan also doubted the majority's premise that appellate courts would fail to find the
meritorious issues presented in a brief raising a multitude of frivolous claims. Id. at 762-63.
365 See State v. Boyer, 712 P.2d 1,4-6 (N.M. Ct. App. 1985) (holding that the decision
as to which claims to raise on appeal belongs to the defendant/appellant).
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counsel may be better able to decide which tactics will be most effective
for the defendant.
366
E. Decisions Involving the Organization of the Trial
The last category of defense decisions encompasses matters relating to
the organization of the trial. Should the defense insist on trial by jury or
accept a bench trial? Should the defense seek to recuse the judge? How
should the defense exercise its peremptory strikes? Should the defense seek
a change ofvenue? The number of such trial-structuring decisions is almost
infinite. However, the discussion need not expand infinitely; the topic can
be adequately covered in two sections. The first section addresses the
question ofwhether to demand or waive trial by jury. The second discusses
all other trial-structuring decisions collectively. Most courts allocate every
trial-structuring decision to lawyers, with a single exception: defendants
retain the decision of whether to waive trial by jury.
1. The Decision of Whether to Demand or Waive Trial by Jury
Longstanding tradition supports allocating to the defendant the decision
of whether to stand trial by jury. In the earliest days of the common law,
trial by jury was but one form of adjudication, an alternative to trial by
ordeal, by battle, or by compurgation.367 Long after those alternatives fell
into disuse, a defendant technically retained the right to choose them.368
Courts, however, developed methods of influencing the defendant's choice.
In the English common law courts, after the decline of the alternative
methods of trial, upon arriving in the courtroom from jail and entering a
plea of not guilty,
[t]he prisoner was asked how he wished to be tried and was instructed in
his right of challenge .... These courteous preliminaries established, first,
that the prisoner consented to be tried and chose trial by jury. This consent
was real, despite the severe consequences to the prisoner of a refusal, for
until 1827 a prisoner who would not plead or select trial by God and
366 Jones, 463 U.S. at 759.
367 Singer v. United States, 380 U.S. 24, 27 (1965) ("Compurgation" refers to a trial in
which a defendant could present witnesses to testify that he was telling the truth, BLACK'S
LAW DICTIONARY 283 (7th ed. 1999)).
368 id.
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country could not be tried. 69
The consequences of refusing to plead and select a jury trial were
indeed serious: "[a]t common law the uncooperative prisoner was induced
to plead or select his mode of trial by peineforte et dure, and was pressed
to death if he remained obstinate." 370
For many years, American law has specifically allocated to defendants
the decision of whether to stand trial by judge or by jury. The Supreme
Court has listed the decision as among those belonging to defendants;37" ' the
authorities on professional ethics concur,372 as do most courts.373 A few
hold-outs persist, often taking the choice away from defendants only in
special circumstances. 74
The substantial unanimity of the assignment of the decision to the
defendant seems to have freed most courts of the obligation to explain or
justify that assignment. Perhaps the most elaborate explanation for the
allocation is the Sixth Circuit's:
The purpose of the jury trial is to prevent governmental oppression and
arbitrary law enforcement. The jury trial gives the defendant an
inestimable safeguard against the corrupt or overzealous prosecutor and
against the compliant, biased, or eccentric judge. The protection a jury
affords lies in the interposition of the commonsense judgment of a group
of impartial laymen between the defendant and the potentially biased
prosecutor and judge. This protection creates a great societal interest in
369 DAVID J. A. CAIRNs, ADVOCACY ANDTHE MAKING OFTHE ADVERSARIAL CRIMINAL
TRIAL: 1800-1865 15 (Oxford 1998).
3701d. at 15 n.35. "Peine forte et dure" refers to the punishment of a felon who refused
to plead, whereby accused was crushed until he either pled or died. BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 1153 (7th ed. 1999).
' Jells v. Ohio, 498 U.S. 1111, 1113 (1991) (Marshall, J., dissenting); Jones, 463 U.S.
at 75 1; Brookhart v. Janis, 384 U.S. 1, 6-7 (1966); Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann,
317 U.S. 269,275 (1942); Patton v. United States, 281 U.S. 276,298, 312 (1930), overruled
in part by Morico v. United States, 399 U.S. 78 (1970).
372 MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) (2003).
17' E.g., United States v. Cochran, 770 F.2d 850, 852 (9th Cir. 1985); United States ex
rel. Williams v. DeRobertis, 715 F.2d 1174, 1182 (7th Cir. 1983); United States v. Martin,
704 F.2d 267,271 (6th Cir. 1983); United States v. Woods, 450 F. Supp. 1335, 1337-38 (D.
Md. 1978); Townsend v. Superior Court, 543 P.2d 619,624 (Cal. 1975); People v. Novotny,
244 N.E.2d 182, 186 (Ill. 1968).
374 E.g., ALA. CODE § 13A-5-42 (2004) (requiring a jury in a capital case, even if the




having criminal trials conducted before juries. In fact, the public interest
in jury trials is so great that defendants cannot waive their right to trial by
jury except under certain conditions. 375
In short, the decision belongs to defendants simply because the right to
a jury is singularly important. Other courts and commentators join in
allocating the decision to defendants out of a regard for the importance of
the decision, often drawing an analogy to the importance of the pleading
decision.376
The singular importance of the jury does not, by itself, justify
commitment of the decision to the defendant. Based on the premise that
juries play an essential role in preventing oppression, one might conclude
that juries should not be waivable at all, or waivable only by agreement of
defendant and counsel. However, the rule assigning the decision to
defendants allows them to waive a jury against the advice of counsel.
On close inspection, the analogy of the jury waiver decision to the
pleading decision also fails to support assigning the decision to the
defendant. In most instances, the decision to waive a jury trial may
substantially increase the chances of conviction because the defendant loses
the chance that the jury-a collective decision maker generally is required
to be unanimous-might prove unable to agree. There are no hung juries in
bench trials. However, many defense decisions that substantially affect the
chances of success at trial are not committed to defendants. 377 Certainly, the
choice of fact finder is less like the pleading decision than is the decision of
whether to offer an instruction and argue for a verdict on a lesser-included
offense. An analogy linking the choice of decision maker with other
trial-structuring decisions seems truer to the essential nature of such a
decision.
2. Other Trial-Structuring Decisions
Very broad support exists for committing every other kind of
trial-structuring decision to lawyers. For example, courts and other
authorities generally allocate to lawyers other jury-related decisions, such
311 Martin, 704 F.2d at 271 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
376 E.g., Virgin Islands v. Weatherwax, 77 F.3d 1425, 1435 (3d Cir. 1996) ("[Tlhese
decisions are so personal and crucial to the accused's fate that they take on an importance
equivalent to that of deciding the objectives of the representation.").
377 See infra Part I.A.2.
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as which jurors to strike,378 whether to raise a claim of jury misconduct,379
whether to poll the jury on its verdict,38 or whether to seek a change of
venue to get a different jury pool."' The majority of courts that assign such
decisions to defendants do so simply as an application of a general rule
allocating all decisions to defendants in the case of a conflict between
defendant and lawyer." 2
Trial-structuring decisions not involving the jury also generally belong
to lawyers. For example, courts have held that the following decisions
belong to lawyers: whether to move to recuse a judge;383 whether to insist
on a public trial;"84 whether to oppose jury instructions not involving the
elements of a lesser offense. 85 Again, those courts that assign such
decisions to defendants tend to do so not for any reason relating to the
nature of the decision, but rather on the strength of a broader principle
assigning decisions generally to defendants. 86
F. Conclusion of Part II
Part I examined the various theories of allocation and found most of
them wanting. Some theories had significant internal contradictions. Other
theories avoided internal inconsistency only by using a measure so
ambiguous as to offer courts little meaningful guidance. The only allocation
theories that avoided those flaws were those that established a presumption
in favor of either the lawyer or defendant and justified specific departures
from that presumption.
Part II detailed the struggles of courts to find and apply consistent rules
of allocation. There are many decisions for which there is no national
consensus about proper allocation, and in too many jurisdictions, courts
17' E.g., People v. Colon, 682 N.E.2d 978, 979 (N.Y. 1997); ABA STANDARDS FOR
CRIMINAL JUSTICE 4-5.2 (2d ed. 1980).
3'9 E.g., Weatherwax, 77 F.3d at 1435-36.
38o State v. Eckert, 553 N.W.2d 539, 545 (Wis. Ct. App. 1996).
1 E.g., People v. Guzman, 755 P.2d 917,937 (Cal. 1988); Price v. Superior Court, 25
P.3d 618 (Cal. 2001); State v. Hereford, 592 N.W.2d 247, 252-53 (Wis. Ct. App. 1999).
32 Cain v. State, 565 So. 2d 875, 876 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1990); State v. McDowell,
407 S.E.2d 200, 209-10 (N.C. 1991); State v. Ali, 407 S.E.2d 183, 189 (N.C. 1991).
383 E.g., In re Horton, 813 P.2d 1335, 1344 (Cal. 1991).
'a' See, e.g., United States ex re!. Bruno v. Herold, 408 F.2d 125, 128-29 (2d Cir.
1969).
'' E.g., State v. Stewart, 780 A.2d 209, 215 (Conn. App. Ct. 2001).
386 See, e.g., Townsend v. Superior Court, 543 P.2d 619, 624-25 (Cal. 1975) (holding
that while the decision whether to waive a statutory speedy trial right belongs to the lawyer,
only the defendant can waive the constitutional speedy trial fight).
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have failed to maintain consistent allocation rules. Part II found also
allocation rules that vary, often for no expressly stated reason, depending
on whether the question arises in a capital or non-capital case.
This article proposes that courts can best solve their theoretical and
practical problems by adopting an allocation theory that makes either the
lawyer or defendant the presumptive decision maker, with specified and
justified exceptions. Two questions remain: First, which presumption
should the law approve? Second, having chosen a presumptive decision
maker, which specific decisions should the law assign to the other actor?
In Part III, this article examines and rejects the case for making the
defendant the presumptive decision maker. In rejecting that presumption,
certain specific decisions are identified which must remain with the
defendant, even in a scheme making the lawyer the presumptive decision
maker. In Part IV, this article defends a preference for the lawyer as the
presumptive decision maker.
III. THE CASE FOR THE DEFENDANT'S AUTHORITY TO DECIDE
As noted above, those who favor presumptive allocation of decisions
to defendants principally rely upon three intuitions. The autonomy intuition
makes the observation that trial outcome risks center on the defendant, not
on the lawyer. The dignity intuition proposes an inconsistency between the
allocation of decisions to lawyers and the ideals of a democracy in which
"respect for the individual.., is the lifeblood of the law." 387 The reliability
intuition contends that, in a variety of ways, allocation of decisions to
lawyers skews, rather than advances, the truth-seeking function of the
adversary process.
For the reasons given below, the dignity intuition provides a good
reason to allocate certain specific decisions to defendants. The autonomy
and reliability intuitions yield no good reasons to do so.
A. The Autonomy Intuition
The autonomy intuition grants the defendant control of defense
decisions because the trial will conclude by acquitting or convicting the
defendant-not the defendant's lawyer.3" And, if the trial of serious
387 Illinois v. Allen, 397 U.S. 337, 351 (1970).
388 See, e.g., Jacobs v. Commonwealth, 870 S.W.2d 412, 417 (Ky. 1994) ("The Sixth
Amendment constitutionalizes the right in an adversary criminal trial to make a defense as
we know it. It is not stated in the amendment in so many words the right to make one's own
defense personally, but it is implied by the structure of the amendment. It is a foregone
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charges should end in conviction, the sentence will take the defendant's life
or liberty while the lawyer ordinarily remains at large.
This article rejects the autonomy intuition, but not for any flaw in its
factual accuracy. It is dispiriting to a decent defense lawyer when a jury
convicts a client, and profoundly worse to hear a jury condemn a client to
death. The worst of those consequences, though, is nothing compared to
what the defendant endures. Accordingly, if one conceives ofthe allocation
problem as a test of the relative force of the defendant's and the lawyer's
interests in the outcome of the trial, the defendant's are great, the lawyer's
are slight, and the result is obvious.
To conceive of the allocation problem in those terms, however, is to
adopt a view of the stakes of a criminal prosecution so narrowly
individualistic as to be almost antisocial. To regard a defendant wrongly
convicted or unjustly condemned because of an ill-advised trial decision as
the only victim of the error is to forget the heartbroken mother, the
orphaned children, and the unsupported spouse. The damage does not stop
there. Authors have written powerful accounts of verdicts' rippling effects
through communities and across generations." 9 Those more inclined to
measurement in economic, than in human, terms also can readily appreciate
the enormous costs of criminal justice in a country that incarcerates a
greater proportion of its population than any other.390
These costs, though heavy, are justified when the verdicts that bring
them are right, and they are excused when the verdicts are wrong, as
sometimes happens in a system staffed by imperfect people. That guilty
defendants, by their crimes, jeopardize their families and communities is an
unavoidable fact. Whether not-yet-convicted defendants, by their poor trial
decisions, may increase that jeopardy is for the law to accept or prohibit.
The interests of the defendant in the outcome of trial are very great,
almost always greater than those of any other person. The interests of the
lawyer are slight. However, the interests of lovers, parents, children,
conclusion that it is the accused who will suffer the consequences if the defense fails.");
Freedman, supra note 50, at 202-03 (expressing the idea that control belongs to the
defendant because he suffers the consequences of trial).
"9 E.g., Fox BUTTERFIELD, ALL GOD'S CHILDREN: THE BOSKET FAMILY AND THE
AMERICAN TRADITION OF VIOLENCE (Avon 1996); MIKAL GILMORE, SHOT IN THE HEART
(Doubleday 1994) (relating the family history of murderer Gary Gilmore); STEVE ONEY,
And THE DEAD SHALL RISE: THE MURDER OF MARY PHAGAN AND THE LYNCHING OF LEO
FRANK (Pantheon Books 2003).
390 The United States, at present, has the highest rate of incarceration ever recorded.
King's College London, International Centre for Prison Studies, World Prison Brief at




friends, employers, taxpayers, and victims, in the prevention of wrongful
imprisonment or unjustly severe punishment, carry weight. Thus measured,
the community's collective interest in a just outcome must outweigh the
defendant's separate interest in autonomy-in the power to influence the
outcome.39'
B. The Dignity Intuition
The autonomy intuition regards the allocation of trial choices as
important because such choices influence trial outcomes, and trial outcomes
are important. The dignity intuition regards the allocation of choice as
important because a trial can be a valuable forum for the expression of
ideas, and principles of liberty cannot abide the involuntary silencing of a
defendant at his own trial. The dignity intuition thus differs from the
autonomy intuition in that it finds significance in the manner in which the
defendant is treated, even when that treatment has no influence on the
outcome of the trial. Justice Frankfurter nicely summarized this intuition
when he wrote that to require a defendant to accept counsel "is to imprison
a man in his privileges and call it the Constitution." '392
Circumstances other than the allocation of choice may touch the
defendant's dignity. Mark Curriden relates a story illustrating a different
dignity-based concern about ajury's treatment of a defendant.393 After the
deliberations in a murder trial had continued for some time, a bailiff entered
the jury room to make meal arrangements and discovered the jury
contentedly playing cards. When called on to explain their behavior, the
jurors said that they had early on determined to acquit the defendant,
finding him to have acted in self-defense. However, because the jury
disapproved of the defendant's conduct-the defendant was charged with
killing an enraged husband who found the defendant inflagrante with his
wife-the jury had decided to make the defendant worry over the verdict
for some time before announcing the acquittal. That jury's treatment of the
defendant had no influence on the already determined, but undisclosed,
391 See Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 163 (2000) ("The requirement of
representation by trained counsel implies no disrespect for the individual inasmuch as it
tends to benefit the appellant as well as the court.").
392 Adams v. United States ex rel. McCann, 317 U.S. 269, 280 (1942); see also
Martinez, 528 U.S. at 165 (Scalia, J., concurring) ("Our system of laws generally presumes
that the criminal defendant, after being fully informed, knows his own best interests and
does not need them dictated by the State. Any other approach is unworthy of a free
people.").
... Mark Curriden, Small-Town Justice, A.B.A. J. July-Dec. 1994, at 64.
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outcome of the trial. By stepping outside its role as fact finder to act as a
conscious instrument for the defendant's moral correction, the jury's action
implicated the defendant's dignity.
The dignity intuition finds support in the fact that our law has, when
faced with choices pitting the reliability of the outcomes of criminal trials
against other values, sometimes preferred the other values. Indeed, few of
us would wish to live in a society which ranked the efficient and accurate
management of criminal justice as its highest priority. Some interests matter
more than convicting the guilt, and are asserted to limit the devices the
government may employ in its pursuit of the culpable.
The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule bars use at trial of evidence
seized in an illegal search.394 Courts recognize that application of the rule
diminishes the reliability of trial outcomes,395 but they accept that cost as the
price of protecting persons against unreasonable searches by overzealous
police. "'At the very core' of the Fourth Amendment 'stands the right of a
man to retreat into his own home and there be free from unreasonable
governmental intrusion."' 39
6
Another exclusionary rule also bars the admission of involuntary
confessions, exemplifying the law's preference for certain values above
accuracy of outcomes. In part, courts exclude confessions coerced by the
police out of concern that such confessions may be false.397 That concern,
however, does not alone support the rule. Courts bar even clearly true,
although involuntary, confessions in order to promote the humane and
dignified treatment of suspects by police. 9
Although concerns for dignity motivate the law to prefer it above
reliability in those contexts, a critical difference distinguishes those issues
from the allocation of choice problem. Both exclusionary rules, although
they operate by excluding evidence from a trial, aim to protect the dignity
of persons outside the adversary trial. The ban on the use of coerced
confessions aims to protect the dignity of suspects against harsh treatment
'94 See Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643,648 (1961); Weeks v. United States, 232 U.S. 383,
391-93 (1914), overruled by Mapp v. Ohio, 367 U.S. 643 (1961).
39 E.g., United States v. Leon, 468 U.S. 897, 907 (1984).
396 Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 31 (2001) (quoting Silverman v. United States,
365 U.S. 505, 511 (1961)); see also Louis Michael Seidman, The Problems with Privacy's
Problem, 93 MICH. L. REv. 1079, 1087-88 (1995) (stating that harm sought to be prevented
by the Fourth Amendment involves violation of the dignity inherent in the "violence,
disruption, and humiliation" of police search of private places).
397 See Spano v. New York, 360 U.S. 315, 320 (1959).
39s See Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 460 (1966); Spano, 360 U.S. at 320-21;
Brain v. United States, 168 U.S. 532, 543-44 (1897)..
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in interrogation rooms.399 The Fourth Amendment's exclusionary rule seeks
to deter the police from searching homes and seizing persons at random,
with orwithout grounds for suspicion. Though by random and suspicionless
searches and by forceful interrogations the police could undoubtedly better
discover proof of guilt, the law chooses not to enjoy that benefit. All of us,
whether involved in the adversary process or not, would suffer the indignity
and insecurity of being perpetually at risk of the invasion of our privacy by
the police.
On the other hand, the allocation of defense decisions at an adversary
trial does not implicate the interests of everyone at all times. The allocation
of decisions threatens only criminal defendants, and then only so long as
they remain criminal defendants-i.e., for the duration of adversary
proceedings. Moreover, the fundamental purpose of an adversary trial is to
ascertain the truth of a charge; adversary trials do not exist to provide a
forum for self-expression or to define a sphere of privacy.4" Therefore, the
value of reliability in the adversary process carries greater weight relative
to the promotion of dignity or self-expression than it would in a context
such as protection of privacy in the home or protection of the freedom to
speak on political matters in a political forum.
The advocate of the dignity intuition responds that, even in the
adversary trial process, the law has, in some instances, valued the dignity
interest above the reliability interest. The Fifth Amendment privilege
against compelled self-incrimination operates within the adversary trial to
prevent the government from requiring a defendant to testify.4"' A rule
requiring a defendant to testify would certainly advance the truth-seeking
function of the trial by forcing the defendant from the safe haven of
ambiguous silence onto the dangerous reefs of explanation and
cross-examination. However, the law has long protected defendants against
such compulsion, on the grounds that it offends human dignity to compel
defendants to account for themselves in courtrooms.0 2 Ultimately, the law
understands that a rule forcing an unwilling defendant to speak, while
suffering under the fear of criminal conviction, strips away too much
dignity.4 3
39Miranda, 384 U.S. at 457-58.
4 Portuondo v. Agard, 529 U.S. 61, 73 (2000); Estes v. Texas, 381 U.S. 532, 540
(1965).
401 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
402 Miranda, 384 U.S. at 460.
401 Certainly, the law is willing to force other witnesses to speak and can abrogate the
rule against compelled speech by giving a reluctant witness immunity from prosecution.
Murphy v. Waterfront Comm'r of N.Y., 378 U.S. 52,93-94 (1964) (White, J., concurring).
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This article proposes no modification of this law, and fully
acknowledges the rightness of the preference for dignity over reliability in
that context. Therefore, in that narrow category of decisions that involve the
scope of the defendant's personal participation in the trial, I join the
consensus committing those decisions to the defendant personally, even
over the settled and well-founded opposition of counsel. The defendant
may choose to testify over counsel's objection, and may choose not to
testify despite counsel's contrary preference. The defendant may choose to
be present at trial, even though counsel would waive the defendant's
presence. And the defendant may choose not to sit in the courtroom during
trial, even though counsel would insist that he appear.
The underlying policy of the Fifth Amendment, however, does not
directly affect the allocation of decisions in the other categories: evidentiary
decisions, deliberation-structuring decisions, and trial-structuring
decisions. Those other decisions, because they do not call upon a
represented defendant to personally take any action, do not affect the
defendant's dignity in the same direct way as the decisions of whether to
testify and whether to appear.
The advocate of the dignity intuition could respond by describing a
scenario often advanced to show how other defense decisions put a
defendant's dignity at risk. Recall the cases of the African American civil
rights activists prosecuted for violations of Jim Crow laws.4" Charged with
trespassing at whites-only lunch counters, the defendants often preferred,
when they did not plead guilty, to advance a defense that admitted their
commission of the charged acts, but proclaimed that the criminal
prosecution itself was unjust. Imagine an appointed defense lawyer,
unsympathetic to the defendant's political views. Would not such a lawyer,
the dignity intuitionists would say, insist on a defense of insanity? And does
it not deeply offend the activist's dignity to endure a defense that denies
everything the defendant believes in and has suffered for?. 05 The aborted
trial of Theodore Kaczynski presents a much discussed, 6 recent instance
of that scenario, notwithstanding the very different quality of Kaczynski's
political views.
There is a strong argument that the activist's lawyer would, in raising
the insanity defense, render ineffective assistance of counsel under any fair
interpretation of that doctrine by subjecting a defendant facing minor
criminal charges to the hazard of indefinite confinement in a prison
"o Cf. Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 194-95 (discussing a criminal defendant's
dignity in the context of Theodore Kaczynski's struggle with his counsel over whether to
argue mental illness as a defense).
405 See, e.g., Treece v. State, 547 A.2d 1054, 1060 (Md. 1988).
" See supra note 39 (citing article about the Kaczynski trial).
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psychiatric hospital. However, taking the scenario on its face, one discovers
two considerations that satisfactorily answer the challenge it poses.
,First, the activist, like all other competent defendants under the
formulation of the rules here proposed, retains the power to testify against
the, advice of counsel. By controlling that decision, the activist may
proclaim the injustice of the prosecution and denounce the lawyer's
preferred defense. Second, the law generally discourages the use of criminal
trials for overtly political ends, and for good reason. Courts do not allow
defendants to get a jury instruction on the justification defense when the
basis for the defense is that the defendant acted out of a belief in the
injustice of the law.4"7 Courts also do not allow defendants to get a jury
instruction advising the jury of its power to nullify a criminal law by
acquitting because courts do not acknowledge the legitimacy of that ground
for acquittal.40 8 In a mature democracy, the wisdom and justice of criminal
laws should be debated and decided in proper political arenas, i.e., in
legislatures and in election campaigns. Juries should apply the laws and try
defendants; they should not try the laws.
As recently as the decision in Sell v. United States, 409 the Supreme
Court reaffirmed the principle that promoting the reliability of the adversary
process sometimes outweighs a defendant's interest in dignity. In Sell, the
Court held that prosecuting authorities may, upon a sufficient showing,
medicate an unconsenting defendant in order to make him competent to
stand trial.410 Thus, where the decision involves direct, personal action by
the defendant, the interest in dignity requires that defendants retain final
control of the decision. However, where the decision requires no direct
action by the defendant, jeopardy to the defendant's dignity decreases and
the countervailing interest in reliable outcomes justifies final assignment of
the decision to counsel."'
Those who favor assigning decisions to defendants often accuse their
opponents of paternalism and arrogance for presuming that the lawyer,
rather than the client, knows the course that best serves the defendant's
interests. I understand the dilemma differently. Criminal trials, unlike civil
lawsuits, explicitly name the community as a party to the suit, and the
407 E.g., United States v. Schoon, 971 F.2d 193, 195-96, 199-200 (9th Cir. 1991);
United States v. Cullen, 454 F.2d 386, 391 & n.12, 392 (7th Cir. 1971); Matthew Lippman,
Reflections on Non-Violent Resistance and the Necessity Defense, 11 Hous. J. INT'L L. 277,
278, 294-305 (1989).
411 See, e.g., State v. Ragland, 519 A.2d 1361, 1367 (N.J. 1986).
41 Sell v. United States, 539 U.S. 166, 179-83 (2003).
41 Id. at 168.
41 See U.S. CONST. amend. V.
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verdicts in criminal trials purport to speak for us all.412 Therefore, in
allocating the power to decide, the law must choose whether and when to
sacrifice society's interest in the justice of verdicts to protect the dignity of
an individual defendant.
If we lived in a society in which the principal consequences of a
criminal conviction were shame and loss of dignity, then the law should
rarely allocate decisions away from defendants. In that society, the lawyer
imposing an unwelcome defense would be taking from the defendant,
before conviction, the very thing the prosecution seeks to take by the
conviction.
We do not live in that society. In our prisons, convicted defendants too
often suffer deprivations and indignities far more brutal and enduring than
the loss of control over trial decisions.4 13 The defense lawyer's fundamental
responsibility is to reduce, as far as possible, the client's exposure to those
deprivations and indignities. Society's compelling interest in inflicting them
only when, and only to the extent, absolutely necessary requires that the law
assign control over decisions to lawyers, as the persons best qualified to
know the course most likely to minimize exposure to punishment. To assign
such decisions to defendants undermines society's interest in reliable
judgments, and would, in the name of defending their dignity, more
frequently consign defendants to a program of punishment that extinguishes
their dignity.
C. The Reliability Intuition
The reliability intuition proceeds from a very different premise. The
autonomy and dignity intuitions place the defendant at the center of the
argument for allocating decisions to defendants. However, the reliability
411 Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 206:
The fairness of the criminal process... also has societal value-a value beyond
the interest of an individual criminal defendant. All persons associated with the
criminal justice process, directly or indirectly, share an interest in the fairness of
the process. All of us suffer harm if the criminal process is unjust; we may fear
that similar injustice will be visited upon us directly or we may be offended
knowing that we support... a process that fails to treat human beings in a just
manner. The criminal justice system speaks in our name and, therefore, each of
us is implicated when that voice offends shared notions of 'decency and fairness.'
Id. (citations omitted).
4 13 David Grann, The Brand: How the Aryan Brotherhood Became the Most Murderous
Prison Gang in America, NEW YORKER, Feb. 16 & 23, 2004, at 157-71; Will S. Hylton, Sick




intuition starts where advocates for assigning decisions to lawyers start-by
focusing on society's interest in reliable outcomes. The reliability intuition
disagrees with the assertion that, at least for some decisions, assigning
decisions to lawyers better serves society's interest.
The suspicion that defense lawyers distort the truth-seeking function
has venerable precedents. English courts did not allow defense lawyers at
all in felony trials until Parliament passed the Treason Trials Act of 1696.414
For the next thirty-five years, English courts limited counsel to treason
trials. However, by the 1730's courts had begun to permit counsel in the
trial of other felonies.415 Treatises explicitly justified the rule against
counsel by reference to the goal of promoting reliable trial results. In a 1724
treatise, William Hawkins wrote:
generally every one of common understanding may as properly speak to
a matter of fact as if he were the best lawyer, and.., it requires no manner
of skill to make a plain and honest defence, which in cases of this kind is
always the best; the simplicity, the innocence, the artless and ingenuous
behtaviour of one whose conscience acquits him, having something in it
more moving and convincing than the highest eloquence of persons
speaking in a cause not their own .... Whereas, on the other side, the
very speech, gesture, and countenance and manners of defence of those
who are guilty, when they speak for themselves, *may often help to
disclose the truth, which probably would not so well be discovered from
the artificial defence of others speaking for them.
416
When discussing the problem of allocating choice in a system that
permits defense lawyers, modem scholars have asserted a variety of
distortion mechanisms that follow from the assignment of decisions to
counsel. In his dissent in Jones v. Barnes,4 7 Justice Brennan stated one
version of the argument that commission of decisions to the defendant
actually advances the truth-seeking function of the trial. In that opinion, he
wrote:
A lawyer and his client do not always have the same interests. Even with
paying clients, a lawyer may have a strong interest in having judges and
prosecutors think well of him, and, if he is working for a flat fee-a
common arrangement for criminal defense attorneys-or if his fees for
court appointments are lower than he would receive for other work, he has
414 JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL 67-68 (Oxford
Univ. Press 2003).
41 id. at 106.
41
6 CAIRNS, supra note 369, at 77-78.
417 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
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an obvious financial incentive to conclude cases on his criminal docket
swiftly. Good lawyers undoubtedly recognize these temptations and resist
them .... It would be naive, however, to suggest that they always
succeed ....
In short, Brennan spoke in favor of assigning decisions to defendants on the
ground that lawyers, left to their own devices, would too often allow
self-interest to color their judgment about the best course of defense.
False friends and those who, with the lives of others in their trust,
neglect their duties undeniably deserve to be regarded with contempt.
Brennan's concern that a number of American criminal defense lawyers
disgrace themselves in such a way regrettably has some basis in fact.4" 9
However, reassigning decisions to defendants is ineffective no remedy for
the distortion of the truth-seeking function caused by lawyers' assistance.
First, the reassignment of decisions would take decisional control from both
effective and ineffective lawyers. Thus, the well-tailored solution to the
negligent counsel problem is vigorous enforcement of the standards of
effective assistance. Second, allocating decisions to lawyers, even knowing
that some lawyers will render ineffective assistance, still leaves the law with
a corrective measure through the ineffective assistance claim. There is no
recognized claim of ineffective selfrepresentation. Accordingly, the law has
no means to correct distortions of the truth-seeking function caused by the
poor decisions of clients, but it does retain a doctrine allowing the
correction of such distortions caused by lawyers' poor decisions.
A second version of the reliability argument proposes that decisions
should ultimately belong to defendants because they best know the facts of
the case.420 Richard Uviller, for example, "would expand somewhat on the
conventional allocation to assign to the accused full power, upon advice of
counsel, to elect the theory of defense, [because] the decision hinges on
facts that the accused is in the best position to know.""42
Ultimately, this argument proposes an empirical premise about real
defendants and real defense lawyers that lies beyond the scope of this
article. I assume that lawyers generally make better decisions than
defendants about minimizing the risk of exposure to serious sentencing
consequences. Certainly, lawyers also have the obligation to investigate the
41 ld. at 761-62 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
419 The law reports are filled with cases discussing claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, many of which courts have found meritorious.
420 Uviller, supra note 21, at 779 (allocating the decision about the theory of defense





facts known by the client and, in complex cases, many facts beyond the
client's knowledge or understanding.
A broad consensus about this point supports the assumption. For
example, Justice Stevens, in Martinez v. Court of Appeal,422 wrote:
In both trials and appeals there are, without question, cases in which
counsel's performance is ineffective. Even in those cases, however, it is
reasonable to assume that counsel's performance is more effective
than what the unskilled appellant could have provided for himself. No
one ... attempts to argue that as a rule pro se representation is wise,
desirable, or efficient." 
423
A third version of the reliability intuition proposes that the allocation
of decisions matters to the truth-seeking function of trial to a lesser extent
than might be supposed. It can be conceded that lawyers generally exercise
better judgment than defendants with respect to all types of defense
decisions, without conceding that the difference substantially affects the
reliability of trial outcomes. The deficiencies in decisions made by a
client-controlled defense are, on this view, very often corrected by other
actors in the adversary system, such as prosecutors and judges who owe
their final allegiance to impartial justice. For example, advocates of this
view could point to the conduct of Judge Zobel in Commonwealth v.
Woodward.424 In that briefly famous case, a British nanny was prosecuted
in Massachusetts for the murder of the child in her care.425 In her defense,
she denied causing the injuries that killed the child.426 After consultation
with Woodward, her lawyers announced that they wanted no manslaughter
instruction, preferring instead to put the jury to the all-or-nothing choice
of convicting Woodward of murder or acquitting her.4 27 The jury chose
conviction.428
If client and counsel had disagreed about the matter, Judge Zobel would
have faced the question of allocating the power to decide. In the end, Judge
Zobel entered an order vacating the murder conviction and entering a
conviction for manslaughter.4 29 By correcting what he perceived to be an
422 Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152 (2000).
423 Id. at 161; see also Decker, supra note 12, at 518-19.
424 Commonwealth v. Woodward, 694 N.E.2d 1277 (Mass. 1998); see also Uphoff,
supra note 8, at 1-2.
425 Woodward, 694 N.E.2d at 1281.
426 Id. at 1281 n.4.
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injustice caused by an unwise defense decision, Judge Zobel gave support
to the hypothesis that allocation of defense decisions does not matter much
in a system in which other actors can correct the wrong outcomes produced
by bad choices.
Justice Brennan championed a modest form of this argument in Jones
v. Barnes.43" Concerning the question of appellate issue selection, he wrote:
While excellent presentation of issues, especially at the briefing
stage, certainly serves the client's best interests, I do not share the Court's
implicit pessimism about appellate judges' ability to recognize a
meritorious argument, even if it is made less elegantly or in fewer pages
than the lawyer would have liked, and even if less meritorious arguments
accompany it. If the quality of justice in this country really depended on
nice gradations in lawyers' rhetorical skills, we could no longer call it
"justice." Especially at the appellate level, I believe that for the most part
good claims will be vindicated and bad claims rejected, with truly skillful
advocacy making a difference only in a handful of cases.43'
Again, the flaw in the argument lies in an empirical premise that this
article cannot here prove. Specifically, judges very rarely act as Judge Zobel
did. In some jurisdictions, judges lack the power to set aside criminal
convictions on the ground that they are against the weight of the
evidence.432 Certainly, commentators have noted the extraordinary rarity of
judicial orders of the Zobel type.4 3 This article also assumes that the quality
ofdefense decision making influences ultimate trial and appellate outcomes.
Empirical research indicates that defendants get much better outcomes with
legal representation than without.434 Finally, a substantial consensus exists
among trial judges that outcomes do vary according to the quality of
430 Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745 (1983).
411 d. at 762 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
432 E.g., People v. Prato, 700 N.Y.S.2d 365, 366 (Dist. Ct. 1999) (holding that the trial
court does not have the authority to set aside a verdict as against the weight of the evidence),
affd, 719 N.Y.S.2d 799 (App. Term 2000); People v. Mulqueen, 589 N.Y.S.2d 246,247-48
(Dist. Ct. 1992) ("trial court is not authorized to set aside a verdict as against the weight of
the evidence").
4" E.g., Uphoff, supra note 8, at 2-3.
44 See, e.g., Douglas L. Colbert et al., Do Attorneys Really Matter? The Empirical and
Legal Case for the Right of Counsel at Bail, 23 CARDozO L. REv. 1719, 1783 (2002)
(reporting the results of an empirical study which found that represented defendants get




However, one category of defense decision does not affect the
reliability of outcomes and may be assigned to defendants without risking
wrong results. This category includes decisions of whether to invoke the
adversary process: how to plead, and whether to appeal. By pleading not
guilty and insisting on a trial, a defendant invokes the full panoply of
adversarial rights. Thus, the decision to stand trial, even if ill-advised, does
not itself undermine the reliability of the adversary process. Much more
rarely, a defendant may insist on pleading guilty against the advice of
counsel. The law imposes on trial courts the obligation to prevent
involuntary guilty pleas and to assure that a factual basis exists, independent
of the defendnat' s mere desire to plead guilty, to support the conclusion that
the defendant is in fact guilty.4
3 6
The same considerations apply to the appellate analogue. No defendant,
simply by appealing and invoking the adversary appellate process, can be
said to undermine the reliability of the outcome of that process. Therefore,
those threshold, process-invoking decisions can be assigned to defendants
at no cost in terms of the reliability of the outcomes of those processes.
One might object that this article has passed too quickly over the
situation of a defendant who turns down a favorable plea bargain in order
to stand trial in a case involving overwhelming evidence of guilt. That
unwise pleading decision may, with some accuracy, be described as the
cause of an enhanced sentence. In what respect, one might ask, does this
unwise pleading decision differ from other unwise decisions-about the
nature of the defense; for example-which produce increased sentences?
The results of those other decisions may be considered unreliable, and the
use of that label justifies assigning the decisions to counsel.
The answer lies in a difference concealed by the use of the identical
word "produces" in the two scenarios. Recall the Rivers case in which the
defendant decided to advance an absolute innocence defense when proof of
his participation in the killing was overwhelming. Rivers had a plausible
mental state defense, admitting participation in the homicidal acts but
reducing the level of culpability from murder to manslaughter. That bad
decision skews the adversary process in favor of the prosecution. The
prosecution's case for guilt of murder is met with a frivolous other-
perpetrator defense instead of by a substantial mental-state defense.
Rivers's decision, through the malfunctioning of the adversary process,
produced an increased likelihood of conviction and enhanced punishment.
43'E.g., Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 161 (2000); Faretta v. California,
422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
436 Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238, 242-44 (1969).
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On the other hand, a decision to insist on a trial with no promising
defense does not skew the adversary process in favor of the prosecution.
The underlying merits of the case already substantially favor the
prosecution, and the defendant's decision to reject the favorable plea
bargain does not strengthen the state's case or weaken the defense case.
A fourth reliability argument redefines the measure of trial outcomes.
The previously described reliability arguments accept the premise that
outcomes are judged by their objective effects: acquittal is better, from the
defense perspective, than conviction; conviction of a lesser offense is better
than conviction of a greater; a lighter punishment is better than a harsher
one. This line of argument rejects that premise, finding that the best defense
is to be measured by whatever criteria the defendant prefers. Viewed in that
light, lawyers' and defendants' judgments about the measure of success are
essentially subjective. Each actor's preferred criterion of success is
informed by that actor's education, experience, and background. Therefore,
no lawyer can presume to know what best serves the client's interest, at
least when the client disputes the lawyer's account of the client's
interests.437
For example, consider the defendant who cares more about protecting
a third person-perhaps a fragile witness, loved by the defendant, who
possesses exculpatory information but may not be able to survive the rigors
of testifying-than about avoiding criminal conviction. Rodney Uphoff
describes a case of this sort in which the defendant, after a first trial ended
in mistrial, demanded that his lawyer not call the defendant's father to
testify again at the retrial.438 The defendant feared his father's health was
too frail to survive the stress of testifying again, and fully understood the
risks of proceeding to trial without his father's supporting testimony.439
Should the decision whether to call the father to testify belong to the lawyer
or to the defendant? Uphoff describes the levels of investigation that a
competent lawyer should undertake before he concedes that the choice is in
fact as stark as it initially appears."' Uphoff further details other facts that
might influence the decision-making process. How serious are the charges
facing the defendant? Would the witness come to trial willingly, or
reluctantly, harboring hostility that might undercut the exculpatory value of
the witness's testimony?4 ' Though the case is indeed a troubling one, it
411 Marcy Strauss, Toward a Revised Model of Attorney-Client Relationship: The
Argument for Autonomy, 65 N.C. L. REv. 315, 326-29 (1987). For an account of a lawyer
who has faced such a dilemma, see Ross, supra note 333, at 1346, 1371.






does not justify reassigning the decision about which witnesses to call to the
defendant.
.The scenario does raise two questions, each warranting separate
analysis. First, should the defendant or the lawyer have the power to decide
whether to call the witness? Second, if the lawyer retains the power, what
constraints should guide the lawyer's decision? As discussed below, the rule
assigning the decision of which witnesses to call should continue to be the
lawyer's, regardless of the reasons for calling or not calling a witness.
Furthermore, the lawyer in the hypothetical should, if the facts are as the
defendant describes them, usually not call the witness.
The canons of ethics not only govern the control of decisions, but also
guide lawyers when making the decisions that are theirs to make." 2
Endorsement of a rule assigning decisions to lawyers does not necessarily
imply that lawyers must take a narrow view of what minimizes damage to
the defendant. For example, the lawyer should not choose an insanity
defense over some other defense to a minor charge merely because, in some
dry, textbook sense, acquittal by reason of insanity is a better result than
conviction. Acquittal by reason of insanity often exposes a defendant to the
risk of indefinite confinement in a facility that amounts to a prison, in all
but name. It would be an odd and unjustifiably narrow interpretation of the
goal of minimizing damage to regard such a result as better than a
conviction. Therefore, with a possible exception where a witness, such as
the father, is critical to the defense in a prosecution alleging very serious
charges, the lawyer should not call the father to testify.
The fact that a lawyer should broadly interpret the imperative of
minimizing damage to the client does not require reassignment of that
decision to the defendant. Reassigning the decision to the defendant would
mean that the father does not testify as a witness, even if the defendant's
beliefs about the risks to his father's health are unreasonable. By assigning
decisions to lawyers, the law does not license them to exercise that power
without consultation, without deference to a client's values, and without
sensitivity to the complexities of human crises. By assigning decisions to
lawyers, the law strikes a better balance between the interests of dignity and
autonomy, on the one hand, and on the other hand the broader social
interest in inflicting the sanctions of criminal justice only when absolutely
necessary.
The assertion that the establishment of defense goals is inherently
subjective has even less force in the more general run of cases, in which the
442 See MODEL RULES OF PROF'L CONDUCT R. 1.2(a) cmt. 2 (2003) (indicating that
lawyers should ordinarily defer to a client's preferences when the defendant's goal is
protection of a third person).
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defendant has no interest at stake anywhere near as important as the interest
in winning the case. Certainly, elsewhere the law regards strategic defense
decisions as objectively reviewable. In the context of ineffective assistance
of counsel claims, the Supreme Court requires a defendant to show that
"counsel's representation fell below an objective standard of
reasonableness." 43
A fifth challenge to the proposal that defense decisions be allocated to
defendants points out that the rule assigning more decisions to lawyers may,
as a practical matter, prove enforceable only in the case of indigent
defendants. Defendants wealthy enough to retain counsel can, by contract
with their lawyers, retain final authority over defense decisions.'" While
this observation is true, several considerations substantially undermine the
force of this objection. In a variety of ways, wealth matters in expanding the
choices available to defendants. For example, indigent defendants must
make a showing of need before they can require a court to provide funds for
expert or investigative assistance." 5 Wealthy defendants, ofcourse, can hire
whatever experts they choose without proving their necessity.
The law, however, tries to resist establishing distinctions between the
wealthy and the poor which would affect the justice defendants receive.
Thus, rich and poor defendants alike can raise a claim of ineffective
assistance if their lawyers' decisions are prejudicially deficient. By
contracting for control of decisions that otherwise lawyers would make,
wealthy defendants may put themselves in a worse position than indigent
defendants. The lawyers of indigent defendants remain responsible for a full
range of attorney decisions, and cannot escape review of poor decisions
under the rubric of ineffective assistance. Wealthy defendants, by
purchasing the right to make more decisions against the advice of counsel,
both weaken the quality of their defense and risk losing the right to bring
any ineffective assistance claims with respect to these decisions.
Finally, a few authorities have advanced a sixth reliability argument.
The argument proposes that insofar as the decision whether to testify
belongs to the defendant, other decisions must also follow that assignment
for fear that "[c]ounsel and client at cross purposes on the essential theory
of defense will turn a trial into a farce." 6 That possibility, however real it
,43 Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 688 (1984).
' I am grateful to Professor Carol Steiker of Harvard Law School for calling this
argument to my attention.
"4See Ake v. Oklahoma, 470 U.S. 68, 77 (1985).
4Uviller, supra note 21, at 754; see also McKaskle v. Wiggins, 465 U.S. 168, 177
(1984) ("The right to speak for oneself entails more than the opportunity to add one's voice
to a cacophony of others.").
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may be, does not automatically lead to the conclusion that most other
decisions must be reassigned to the defendant to avoid a defense speaking
with&two voices. Because of the importance of speaking with one voice, the
atmosphere 'of pervasive uncertainty surrounding many defense decisions,
and'the extraordinary value to the defense of a good attorney-client
relati6nship, lawyers sometimes make decisions they would not otherwise
make but for the defendant's preference. Thus, if the defendant's preferred
defense is even modestly plausible, or not substantially more implausible
than the lawyer's preferred defense, the lawyer should accept the
defendant's choice. That choice represents the effective lawyer's best
alternative under the constraining circumstances of a stubborn defendant
possessed of the absolute power to testify. The spectacle of the farcical
two-tongued defense should rarely appear in lieu of a defendant's plausible
preferred defense. Rather, an effective lawyer should only speak in
competition with the defendant when the defendant's preference is entirely
absurd and the lawyer, by introducing a competing plausible defense, offers
the only hope of success.
IV. THE CASE FOR THE LAWYER'S AUTHORITY TO DECIDE
Theories favoring the lawyer as the decision maker for the defense
justify that presumption with one theoretical and one empirical premise.
The theoretical premise proposes that the motivating purpose of an
adversarial criminal trial is the discovery of truth. The empirical premise
proposes that lawyers, in general, recognize the best course of defense
better than defendants. The discussion of this theory begins with a few
words about each of these premises.
The Supreme Court has declared that "the central purpose of a criminal
trial is to decide the factual question of the defendant's guilt or
innocence."" 7 Often, the Court has justified rulings by reference to the
truth-seeking function of trial."8 Other purposes of trial exist, such as the
"
7 Neder v. United States, 527 U.S. 1, 18 (1999) (quoting Delaware v. Van Arsdall, 475
U.S. 673,681 (1986)); see also United States v. Scheffer, 523 U.S. 303, 309 (1998); United
States v. Robinson, 485 U.S. 25, 33 (1988); Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 166
(1986); United States v. Bagley, 473 U.S. 667, 692 (1985) ("[T]he purpose of a trial is as
much the acquittal of an innocent person as it is the conviction of a guilty one.").
"8See, e.g., Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977) (plurality opinion) ("Our
belief that debate between adversaries is often essential to the truth-seeking function oftrials
requires us also to recognize the importance of giving counsel an opportunity to comment
on facts which may influence the sentencing decision in capital cases."); Estes v. Texas, 381
U.S. 532, 558 (1965) (tracing the history of trial byjury and noting a growing understanding
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instruction of the public in civic virtues, but the Court has never given
primacy to them.449 Indeed, the Court has declared that "the government's
interest in ensuring the integrity and efficiency of the trial at tines
outweighs the defendant's interest in acting as his own lawyer."'45
The empirical premise finds equally strong support in the decisions of
the Supreme Court. The Faretta majority, even as it recognized a
constitutional right of self representation, conceded that "[i]t is undeniable
that in most criminal prosecutions defendants could better defend with
counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled efforts."45 In so writing, the
Faretta court recalled Justice Sutherland's powerful statement for the Court
in Powell v. Alabama:
Even the intelligent and educated layman has small and sometimes no skill
in the science of law. If charged with crime, he is incapable, generally, of
determining for himself whether the indictment is good or bad. He is
unfamiliar with the rules of evidence. Left without the aid of counsel he
may be put on trial without a proper charge, and convicted upon
incompetent evidence, or evidence irrelevant to the issue or otherwise
inadmissible. He lacks both the skill and knowledge adequately to prepare
his defense, even though he have a perfect one. He requires the guiding
hand of counsel at every step in the proceedings against him. Without it,
though he be not guilty, he faces the danger of conviction because he does
not know how to establish his innocence. If that be true of men of
intelligence, how much more true is it of the ignorant and illiterate, or
those of feeble intellect,
452
On a number of occasions, the Supreme Court has reconfirmed that "the
help of a lawyer is essential to assure the defendant a fair trial.""4 3
These two premises, in combination, favor allocation of decisions to
lawyers. Our system of adjudication entrusts the discovery of truth to a
of truth-seeking purpose of trial).
4'9 See DAVID LuBAN, LAWYERS AND JUSTICE: AN ETHICAL STUDY 63 (1988) (positing
that "criminal defense is an exceptional part of the legal system, one that aims at the
people's protection from the state rather than at accurate outcomes"); William J. Brennan,
Jr., The Criminal Prosecution: Sporting Event or Quest for Truth?, 68 WASH, U. L.Q. 1, 13
(1990).
450 Martinez v. Court of Appeal, 528 U.S. 152, 162-63 (2000) (noting the "overriding
state interest in the fair and efficient administration of justice").
451 Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806, 834 (1975).
452 Id. at 833 (quoting Powell v. Alabama, 287 U.S. 45, 69 (1932)).
453 Id. at 832-33; see also Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335,344 (1963) (describing
lawyers as "necessities, not luxuries").
2004-2005]
KENTUCKY LAW JOURNAL
process managed by partisan adversaries."' That being so, any rule that
causes imbalance in the adversary battle undermines the search for truth.
Insofar as lawyers tend to know the best course of defense better than
defendants, a rule that permits defendants to overrule their lawyers'
judgment undermines the strength of the defense and leaves the strength of
the prosecution untouched.
Judge Reinhardt, concurring in United States v. Farhad,455 connects
these two premises with the constitutional analysis that vindicates the
allocation of decisions to counsel. He eloquently reconciles the Sixth
Amendment's right to counsel with the Fifth Amendment's promise of due
process and a fair trial:
The right to a fair trial is the most fundamental of all freedoms, essential
to the preservation and enjoyment of all other rights. Moreover, the right
is not solely individual in nature; it is an essential part of the architecture
of American constitutional democracy-more than an instrument ofjustice
and more than one wheel of the Constitution. It is the lamp that shows
that freedom lives. The guarantee of a fair trial lies at the base of all our
civil and political institutions.
456
Tuming next to the Sixth Amendment, Judge Reinhardt described its
role differently; it is instrumental whereas the Fifth Amendment is essential:
Unlike the right to a fair trial, the right to self representation is not
absolute. The primary purpose of the Sixth Amendment's specific
procedural guarantees is to ensure that convictions are obtained in fair
trials. In other words, the Sixth Amendment rights are intended to
implement the Fifth Amendment due process guarantees. While those
rights are unquestionably important in themselves, elevating a Sixth
Amendment procedural right over the fundamental right to a fair trial, as
Faretta implicitly does, impermissibly elevates form over substance.
457
A few points about the justification for the lawyer preference warrant
special notice. First, in Faretta the Court accepted the empirical premise
only as a general rule.41' That is, the Court did not subscribe to the view that
4' For an argument that an inquisitorial, rather than an adversarial, process best
discloses the truth, see LANGBEIN, supra note 414, at 331-43.
... United States v. Farhad, 190 F.3d 1097 (9th Cir. 1999).
456 Id. at 1105 (citations and quotation marks omitted).
411 Id. (citations and quotation marks omitted).
418 Faretta, 422 U.S. at 834 ("It is undeniable that in most criminal prosecutions
defendants could better defend with counsel's guidance than by their own unskilled
efforts.") (emphasis added).
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lawyers always exercise betterjudgment than defendants. Indeed, it would
say something extraordinary about both the criminal defense bar and the
population of criminal defendants if it were true that lawyers always know
better than defendants what course of defense to follow. Thus, if sometimes
defendants have better instincts than lawyers, should not the rule assigning
decisions to lawyers be qualified in some way to allow for the exceptional
case?
The problem with a rule sufficiently nuanced to allow defendants to
make decisions when defendants know better than their lawyers, is that such
a rule requires an arbitrator to resolve, in any particular case, whether the
lawyer's or the defendant's judgment is superior. In other words, a nuanced
rule would place a trial judge in the position of having to decide whether it
better serves the defense to follow the lawyer's course or the defendant's
course. In effect, the nuanced rule would give to a judge the power to
decide about the best defense, notwithstanding that the judge has less
exposure than either the lawyer or defendant to the tactical and investigative
background motivating the lawyer-client dispute.
The problem of allocation of decision, therefore, requires a general rule
that does not vary according to the merits of the particular decision in
dispute. That being the case, the allocation of decisions to lawyers has the
advantage of committing the decision to the discretion of the actor who,
most of the time, exercises better judgment. The lawyer preference has the
further advantage of allowing for judicial review of ill-advised lawyer
decisions. No doctrine exists allowing for judicial review of ill-advised
defendant decisions.
Second, some authorities have noted other reasons for allocating
decisions to lawyers. For example, considerations of trial efficiency support
this allocation because many trial decisions must be made quickly,459 and
mandatory consultation between lawyer and defendant would significantly
slow trials. This article does not rely on such arguments. Instead, the lawyer
preference proposed here rests on the truth-enhancing tendencies of that
allocation.
Third, to accept discovery of the truth as the central purpose of the
criminal trial is to accept the existence of a truth that exists independently
of the trial. Outside the more solipsistic reaches of speculative philosophy,
little doubt exists that there is a "truth" that trials, in some meaningful
sense, can hope to discover. Did the defendant, or some other person, inflict
the fatal blows upon a murder victim? Did the defendant act under
provocation sufficient to reduce a homicide from murder to manslaughter?
... See, e.g., Jones v. Barnes, 463 U.S. 745, 760 (1983) (Brennan, J., dissenting)
(referring to "hundreds of decisions that must be made quickly in the course of a trial").
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The placement of the burden of proof on the prosecution allocates the risk
of error away from the defendant, but does not limit the truth-seeking
object of a criminal trial.
An example may help illustrate the reliability argument for the
allocation of decisions to lawyers. In capital murder prosecutions, it
sometimes happens that defendants decide that they do not wish to present
mitigating evidence to the jury.460 Such defendants often act out of a sense
of shame about the substance of the mitigating evidence, or out of a desire
to protect other persons from the experience of testifying.46 Other defend-
ants refuse to present mitigating evidence because they prefer a sentence of
death to that of perpetual imprisonment." 2 In any case, the effect of
allowing such a defendant to make that decision is the same: the defense
presents nothing, or less than all it could present, in mitigation of the
sentence.
That defendant's subversion of the defense case in the penalty phase
raises a significant constitutional concern.463 The United States Supreme
Court's modem jurisprudence of capital punishment has discovered two
fundamental principles in the Eighth Amendment's cruel and unusual
punishment clause. First, state law must establish principles to guide the
discretion of capital sentencers to achieve consistency in the selection from
among all murderers, those few sentenced to death. 464 Most state legis-
latures accomplish this task by enacting statutory aggravating
circumstances, which in theory identify from among all murders those
singularly aggravated murders for which a death sentence is potentially a
fit punishment.465 Speaking in a time before the widespread use of statutory
aggravating factors, Justice Stewart, in his concurring opinion in Furman
v. Georgia, famously described the selection of those few murderers
punished by death as being as random and infrequent as a lightning strike."
460 See supra notes 225-26.
461 See Larette v. State, 703 S.W.2d 37, 39 (Mo. Ct. App. 1985) (stating that defendant
did not want his father to testify out of concern for the father's health); Sabelli & Leyton,
supra note 6, at 193 & n.93 (citing Knight v. Dugger, 863 F.2d 705, 749-50 (1 th Cir. 1988)
and stating that defendant did not want the mother to testify about the father's sexual abuse
of siblings); Uphoff, supra note 8, at 763-65 (discussing, in a non-capital setting, a case in
which the defendant wished not to call his father to testify).
462 Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 193; White, supra note 205, at 855.
463 Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 203-07.
'64 See, e.g., Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 195 (1976).
465 See, e.g., FLA. STAT. ANN. § 921.141 (5)-(6) (West 2001); GA. CODE. ANN. § 17-10-
30(b) (2004); N.H. REV. STAT. ANN. § 630: 5, pts. VI, VII (1996); OKLA. STAT. ANN. tit. 21,
§ 701.12 (West 2002).
4 Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 309 (1972) (Stewart, J., concurring).
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Some states responded to the Supreme Court's concern about the
arbitrariness of capital punishment by enacting mandatory death penalty
statutes under which all persons convicted of murder suffer death. In
Woodson v. North Carolina, the Supreme Court invalidated those statutes,
and in so doing emphasized the second fundamental Eighth Amendment
principle.467 This principle holds that the constitutionality of capital
punishment schemes does not depend solely upon the degree to which they
banish arbitrariness; rather, a constitutional scheme requires that the
sentencer retain some authority to tailor the punishment to the individual
circumstances of the case.468 In practice, this principle of individualization
has found its most important expression in the rules of Lockett v. Ohio469
and Eddings v. Oklahoma.47 ° In those decisions, the Supreme Court held
that the sentencer may not be precluded by law from considering all the
circumstances of the offense and the offender in deciding whether to impose
a death sentence.47'
In sum, the constitutionality of the death penalty depends first on the
use of statutory guidelines which identify of the most highly aggravated
murder cases and restricts the use of the penalty to cases in that class.
Second, constitutionality depends on the sentencer's ability to select from
among those death-eligible cases, based on an evaluation of the individual
circumstances of the offense and the offender, the few in which the penalty
should be imposed. By these principles, the problems afflicting the
pre-1972 capital punishment regime were resolved by positing the
existence of a narrow class of cases in which the offender deserved death,
and by developing a scheme of aggravating and mitigating circumstances
designed reliably to identify those cases from among all other murder cases.
Such a scheme, which seeks a correspondence between courtroom result
and objective justice, confronts a devastating problem when one of the
parties fails to perform its assigned function. When the defense fails to
present important mitigating factors, so that only aggravating factors are
before the sentencer, an offender who would otherwise have been punished
by a sentence of imprisonment will instead be sentenced to death. Consider
the case of Daniel Colwell.472
Daniel Colwell was an African American raised in Americus,
46 7 Woodson v. North Carolina, 428 U.S. 280, 304-05 (1976).
468 id.
" Lockett v. Ohio, 438 U.S. 586 (1978).
47
'Eddings v. Oklahoma, 455 U.S. 104 (1982).
171 Id. at 113-15; Lockett, 438 U.S. at 608.
472 Colwell v. State, 544 S.E.2d 120, 123-24 (Ga. 2001).
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Georgia.4 He grew up in a religious family and became, through
outstanding athletic ability, a widely popular high school football star.474
Those talents earned him a football scholarship to the University of
Tennessee.475 Suddenly, during the middle of a college football game,
Colwell suffered a mental breakdown. He left the game, the team, and the
university to return to Americus.4 76 During the years that followed, Colwell
grew more mentally ill, a victim of schizophrenia and manic depression,
and isolated as jobs, friends, and his standing in the community slipped
away. In 1996, Colwell decided to end his life by committing a murder for
the purpose of being sentenced to death. 77 On July 20, 1996, he loitered in
the parking lot of an Americus mall awaiting the appearance of a victim.47
He allowed some persons of color to pass for lack of confidence that their
murder would result in his capital prosecution.479 Eventually, an elderly
white couple appeared, and Colwell shot them to death.8 Colwell then
drove to the Americus police station where he surrendered and confessed
to the shootings. 8
Colwell pled guilty and sought to prevent his lawyer from presenting
mitigating evidence to persuade the jury to impose a sentence other than
death.482 He insisted on testifying, and used the opportunity to demand a
death sentence and threaten to kill again if they returned any other
sentence." 3 The jury obliged Colwell. 4"
... E-mail from B. Michael Mears, Trial Counsel for Daniel Colwell, to Christopher
Johnson, Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law School (February 17, 2005, 3:26:46 EST)




471 Colwell, 544 S.E.2d at 124. For evidence that the existence of the death penalty
encourages some persons to commit crimes in order to receive that punishment, see White,.
supra note 205, at 874-75 (discussing cases of that kind).
4718 Colwell, 544 S.E.2d at 124.
479 E-mail from B. Michael Mears, Trial Counsel for Daniel Colwell, to Christopher
Johnson, Professor of Law, Franklin Pierce Law School (February 17, 2005, 3:26:46 EST)
(on file with author).




48AId. In 2002, Daniel Colwell took his own life in his death row cell. For further details
of the case, see Cari Courtenay-Quirk, Capital Punishment as Suicide: The Case of Daniel
Colwell, NEW ABOLITIONIST, Sept. 2003, http://www.nodeathpenalty.org/currentna/
1 _DanielColwell.html.
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The choices made by Colwell and other capital defendants who obstruct
the presentation of a defense pose a significant challenge to the integrity of
the capital sentencing process. Allowing a defendant thus motivated to
make decisions on behalf of the defense may result in a proceeding in which
the jury does not hear compelling mitigating evidence. As a result, juries
will return the "wrong" verdict if the accuracy of the verdict is evaluated,
not by reference to the evidence actually presented in the courtroom, but
rather by the reasonably available evidence that, but for the defendant's
decisions, would have been presented. The Supreme Court's concern for a
reliable correlation between the most severe penalty and the worst offenses
and offenders is, in cases such as Colwell's, undermined by the inclusion
among the ranks of the capitally sentenced those less culpable offenders
who appeared to the jury to be the worst of the worst only because they
engineered that appearance by their decisions.
A moment's reflection confirms that this problem, depicted above in
perhaps its starkest manifestation, is in no way limited to capital
punishment. Criminal defendants who deserve acquittal or conviction of a
lesser offense may, by insisting upon unwise defense or tactics, be
convicted on greater charges than the reasonably available evidence would
warrant. The concern that courtroom results reflect external reality as
accurately as possible does not vanish simply because the stakes in
non-capital prosecutions are somewhat lower.
V. CONCLUSION
Pressed between the agonies of the self-inflicted injustice brought by
the rule allocating choice to defendants and the painful silencing brought on
by the rule allocating choice to lawyers, some authorities have thought to
propose perfect solutions rendering everything to everybody. For example,
Martin Sabelli and Stacey Leyton propose bifurcating trials that involve an
unwelcome insanity defense to permit the lawyer's and the defendant's
defense to be presented separately to the jury.485 Christopher Slobogin and
Amy Mashburn suggest imposing a heightened standard of competency
where defendants would act against counsel's advice.486 Others have
suggested more complicated formulas for resolution, by which assignment
of a decision to the defendant depends on whether his control over the
485 Sabelli & Leyton, supra note 6, at 223-26.




decision may undermine a claim of actual innocence.487
I share that desire to escape the painful choice the law presents when
deciding whether to give a decision to the lawyer or to the defendant.
However, the possibility of resolving any substantial part of the difficulty
by such means is doubtful. Fear ofthe expense of bifurcation and ofdefense
opportunism seems likely always to influence courts against the possibility
of trying cases twice. And, the wound to the defendant's dignity occasioned
by the lawyer's choice would hardly seem to decrease just because there is
a separate trial in which that wound is not inflicted.
The proposal allocating decisions to defendants with the protection of
a heightened standard of competency alleviates the problem, but only by
marginally reducing the number of defendants who can take actions against
the advice of counsel. Defendants who pass the heightened standard would
still retain the power to subvert the adversary process. If the standard were
raised so high as to require the defendant's decision to be as reasonable as
the lawyer's before the defendant could act on it, judges would be in the
untenable position of having to arbitrate the merits of a decision disputed
by lawyer and defendant.
Finally, those solutions that propose not to allow innocent defendants
to make decisions subversive of the adversary process offer no workable
rule. How is the judge to know, at the moment when a decision must be
allocated, whether the defendant is probably innocent, especially in
instances when "innocent" means only not guilty of the charged offense,
though guilty of a lesser one?
In the end, I have made more of an apology for the proposed rule than
the affirmative argument originally planned. I doubt, however, that anything
more than apology is possible when fashioning the rules by which wejudge
and punish each other. Every course inflicts its distinctive damage, and
participation in the system merely poses the choice of which sin to commit
or which damage to cause. In A Portrait of the Artist as a Young Man,
James Joyce puts in the mouth of Stephen Dedalus's father a toast that
seems the fittest epitaph and ambition of the honorable criminal
practitioner: 'And thanks be to God, Johnny,' said Mr. Dedalus, 'that we
lived so long and did so little harm.' 488
In the balance of harms, the least damage is done by a rule committing
487 Slobogin & Mashburn, supra note 77, at 1637 (stating that the lawyer should decide
where the client is "clearly 'innocent' and is taking a position that will lead to a clearly less
desirable disposition"); Uphoff, supra note 8, at 799 (stating that the lawyer should resolve
disputes in favor of client, subject to four-factored analysis).
488 JAMES JOYCE, A PORTRAIT OF THE ARTIST AS A YOUNG MAN 95 (Penguin Books
1976).
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all decisions to the lawyer, with the exception of those decisions invoking
or waiving the adversary process and those decisions involving the
defendant's direct personal participation. So long as we rely on a system of
adversary trials, and so long as prosecutors manage the government's case
unhindered by the commitment of decisions to victims or other
emotionally-invested laypeople, maintenance of the system's delicate
partisan balance precludes giving to defendants any greater authority to
decide.

